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Six miles from Reno, Nevada, a flock of sheep gather behind the fence 
of a farm. Although they look like ordinary sheep, their livers, hearts, brains 
and other organs contain a large percentage of human cells. In California, 
human neurons are inserted into mice. In Minnesota, pigs are born with 
human blood in their veins. These are biologically engineered animals, 
commonly referred to as “part-humans.” The label comes from the 
assumption that they are neither fully human nor fully nonhuman. Instead, 
they are a new kind of being. But are animals partially composed of human 
parts part-human? In my dissertation, I introduce a number of methods 
available to make this distinction but, upon scrutiny, eliminate each one. 
Instead, I argue that whether an animal is part-human or merely partially 
composed of human parts depends on the transposability of parts. A suitably 
transposable part gives rise to analogous characteristics in both recipient and 
donor.  
The reason why it is important to establish the exact humanness of 
these animals is because various ethical and legal regulations are grounded 
in the human/nonhuman distinction, e.g., patenting regulations, regulations 
for conducting research on human and nonhuman subjects, etc. Hence, my 
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requirements have practical applications. However, they are only useful 
insofar as our ethical and legal regulations give preferential treatment to 
humans over nonhumans. Yet many ethicists—most famously, Peter 
Singer—have argued against the normative value of the human/nonhuman 
distinction. Those who oppose giving preferential treatment to humans over 
nonhumans generally prefer some version of the person/nonperson 
distinction, where a person has moral status in virtue of having morally 
relevant characteristics. While it may seem obvious that a proponent of the 
personhood view ought to find the humanness of part-humans irrelevant to 
how we ought to judge their moral status, I argue that this need not always 
be the case. Whether a morally relevant characteristic came about as a result 
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Six miles from Reno, Nevada, a flock of sheep gather behind the fence 
of a farm. Although they look like ordinary sheep, their livers, hearts, brains 
and other organs contain human cells—some organs as much as 40%. In 
California, human neurons are inserted into mice. In Minnesota, pigs are 
born with human blood in their veins. These are biologically engineered 
animals, commonly referred to as “part-humans” (cf. Hagen & Gittens, 2008; 
Robert, 2006). The label comes from the assumption that they are neither 
fully human nor fully nonhuman. Instead, they are a new kind of being. In 
contrast, consider human patients who have received pig heart-valve 
transplants. These are humans, partially composed of pig parts, yet no one is 
assigning them to a new category of being. No one is debating the ethical 
standing of these patients and certainly no one is referring to them as “part-
pig.” Is the asymmetry in our understanding of the two cases justified? The 
answer is not clear because we lack the appropriate method for 
distinguishing between animals that are merely partially composed of human 
parts and animals that are part-human. 
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Why is it important to establish the exact humanness of these 
animals? The point is not merely to satisfy our curiosity—“It’s human! I knew 
it!”—in the way that our curiosity might be satisfied when we establish the 
sex of someone with sexually ambiguous characteristics, for example. 
Although, we may gain satisfaction from establishing just how human these 
creatures are, the more pressing reason is that various ethical and legal 
regulations are based on the human/nonhuman distinction. In the United 
States, for example, research involving human subjects is governed by the 
Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, or the “Common Rule” 
(45 CFR Part 46), and the Institutional Review Board (IRB) is responsible for 
reviewing and overseeing any research involving human subjects in the 
academic sphere. Conversely, research involving nonhuman animals is 
governed by the Animal Welfare Act of 1966 (USC Title 7, Sections 2131 to 
2156), which sets the minimum acceptable standard for the treatment of 
animals in research, exhibition, transport and exchange. In the academic 
realm, the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC) ensures 
that nonhuman animals in research are treated humanely. As one might 
expect, there are major differences between the federal laws and institutional 
bodies that govern research on human subjects as opposed to nonhuman 
subjects. For example, even if a study is approved by the IRB, human 
subjects have to provide informed consent before they can participate. In 
contrast, the participation of nonhuman subjects is determined solely by 
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humans, e.g., by the members of the IACUC. In order to put together a 
research proposal that complies with the relevant regulations, one needs to 
know if the subject of one’s study is human or nonhuman, or perhaps 
something in between. 
Just as academic regulations are grounded on the human/nonhuman 
distinction, so too are legal regulations—despite the fact that there is no 
legislation available to help establish what is “human.”  In 1998, a 
biotechnology activist, Jeremy Rifkin, and a biology professor, Stuart 
Newman, brought this problem to the public’s attention by filing a patent 
application for combining human and nonhuman cells to develop a 
“humanoid” chimera (Rabin, 2006). Chimeras contain cell populations derived 
from at least two different zygotes. The patent was broadly written, 
encompassing different human-nonhuman combinations. Rifkin and Newman 
did not make the chimera, nor did they intend to make one. Instead, they 
filed the application with the hope of obtaining the patent so that for the 20-
year patent term they could prevent other scientists from creating human-
nonhuman chimeras.  
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, patents can be granted if the following 
conditions are met: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.” In the past, the U.S. Supreme 
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Court has interpreted these regulations broadly to include manmade living 
things, e.g., microorganisms, plants, animals, etc. that do not appear in 
nature (Hagglund, 2008). As long as the invention met the requirements, 
anything made by man was to count as patentable subject matter. Although 
the Newman-Rifkin patent application met all of the necessary 
requirements—e.g., the human-nonhuman chimeras were to be made by 
man, they do not appear in nature, they are nonobvious, etc.—the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) rejected the Newman-Rifkin 
application. Members of the Office did not consider human-nonhuman 
chimeras patentable subject matter because the broadest reasonable 
interpretation of the invention encompassed a human being and they did not 
believe that Congress intended for § 101 to include the patenting of humans 
(Rabin, 2006).  
The belief that Congress did not intend for § 101 to include the 
patenting of humans is supported by that fact that granting exclusive 
property rights over a human being is prohibited by the Thirteenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which states that “[n]either slavery nor 
involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party 
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any 
place subject to their jurisdiction” (U.S. Const. amend. XIII, §1). The 
interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment has changed significantly over 
the course of history, although, generally, the interpretations have been fairly 
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narrowly construed (Goluboff, 2009). In the first half of the 20th century, for 
example, the Thirteenth Amendment was used to secure the labor and 
economic rights of African Americans. In the Rifkin-Newman ruling, on the 
other hand, the Thirteenth Amendment seems to be used more broadly as an 
argument against the ownership of human beings. Since patents make 
inventions personal property, a patent on a human would be tantamount to 
involuntary servitude and thereby unconstitutional.  
The problem with the Rifkin-Newman ruling is its apparent 
inconsistency with past rulings. In recent years, the USPTO has granted 
patents on human cell lines as well as on microorganisms and multicellular 
organisms containing a limited number of human genes.  If the USPTO 
granted patents on “humanoid” organisms in the past, why reject the Rifkin-
Newman patent application? Members of the USPTO have admitted that 
they lack a principled way of deciding which human-nonhuman combinations 
are more human than others. As Deputy Commissioner John Doll 
commented, “I don’t think anyone knows in terms of crude percentages [of 
human genetic material] how to differentiate between humans and 
nonhumans” (Weiss, 2005, p. A03). Instead, members of the USPTO expect 
the legislative branch to provide guidelines as to what is and is not human.   
What we have seen, then, is that various ethical and legal regulations 
are based on the human/nonhuman distinction. This is why it is important to 
establish the degree to which nonhuman animals composed of human parts 
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are human. Of course, establishing what it takes to be human in the age of 
advancing biotechnology is no longer as simple as establishing that one is the 
offspring of two human parents. Today, the cellular and genetic lineages 
comprising an individual may have multiple origins. Consequently, defining 
what it means to be human is a difficult task. However, instead of 
categorically deciding what is and is not human, a less intimidating task—
yet one that will nonetheless bring us closer to sorting out the humanness of 
these creatures—is to establish criteria for eliminating animals as 
contenders. In this way, we can establish which animals we need not worry 
about and which deserve to be considered in more detail. This is the primary 
aim of my dissertation:  to establish the minimum that is required for an 
animal to count as part-human, i.e., an animal in need of a closer look, as 
opposed to an animal that is merely partially composed of human parts, i.e., 
an animal that we need not worry about.  
What I argue is that transferred human parts have to be integrated 
into the animal in a way that would make it possible for them to give rise to 
human characteristics. Otherwise, the animal is merely composed of human 
parts. Thus, for example, a shark that eats an entire human being would be a 
case that does not meet this minimum requirement. Although the shark now 
contains all the parts required to make a human being in its digestive 
system, these parts are not integrated in a way that would make it possible 
for them to give rise to human characteristics. Hence, we would not consider 
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this shark part-human. Consequently, we can put it in the category of 
animals that we need not worry about. The same verdict would apply to mice 
that have human ovaries implanted under the surface of their skin, or so I 
will argue. While there might be other reasons to worry about such 
experiments, e.g., the welfare of the animal, cost-benefit analysis, etc., the 
point is that we need not worry about the human status of these animals. 
What I offer, then, has obvious practical applications. Research ethics 
committees and members of the USPTO can use my requirements to set aside 
submissions that involve animals partially composed of human parts so that 
they can dedicate more time to the part-human candidates. Of course, my 
requirements are only useful insofar as our ethical and legal regulations give 
preferential treatment to humans over nonhumans. But there is reason to 
believe that the human/nonhuman distinction is not well supported. A 
number of philosophers—most famously, Peter Singer—have argued against 
the human/nonhuman distinction on the basis that it is merely biological and 
thus lacks normative force. (Just because someone is a member of the species 
Homo sapiens does not mean that we ought to give him or her preferential 
treatment—at least not without an additional argument). Opponents of the 
human/nonhuman distinction tend to instead favor the person/nonperson 
distinction (or some version of it) where a person is someone who has the 
characteristics that we believe to be morally relevant, e.g., the ability to feel 
pain, the ability to reason, etc. and insofar as one has these characteristics 
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one can be a person even if one is not human. Conversely, insofar as one lacks 
these characteristics, one can be a nonperson even though one is human.  
Given this distinction, it may seem obvious that a proponent of the 
personhood view ought to find the humanness of part-humans irrelevant to 
how we ought to judge their moral status. However, I argue that this need 
not always be the case. The secondary aim of my dissertation, then, is to 
consider the moral status of part-human organisms from the 
person/nonperson distinction instead of the human/nonhuman distinction. 
What I show is that the causal history of a morally relevant characteristic—
in this case, whether it came about as a result of a human transplant or a 
nonhuman transplant—can make a difference as to how we ought to judge 
the moral status of the recipient of that transplant. 
 
Summary of Chapters 
The idea of improving or prolonging life by replacing a failing body 
part with a healthy one has a long history. In Chapter 2, I offer a brief 
account of the history of xenotransplantation—the transplantation of living 
cells, tissues and organs from one species to another. The chapter begins with 
sheep blood transfusions of the 17th century, then moves through frog tissue 
grafts of the 19th century, and finally ends with ape testicle and organ 
transplantations of the 20th century.  
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In the 1970s, the techniques used to transplant parts across species 
changed dramatically. Scientists were still working on improving the 
transplantation of blood, tissues, and organs but the focus shifted to genes, 
chromosomes, nuclei and eventually stem cells. In Chapter 3, I present four 
modern day part-human candidates: 1) chimeras: made by transferring cells, 
tissues or organs; 2) hybrids: made by mixing gametes; 3) cybrids: made by 
transferring nuclei; and 4) transgenics: made by transferring genes. I explain 
how each part-human candidate is made and provide examples from current 
research. 
In Chapter 4, I look at some of the ways in which philosophers have 
thought about parts and wholes to see if any of the available part/whole 
distinctions can help delimit animals partially composed of human parts from 
animals that are part-human. I begin with mereology, a metaphysical theory 
of the relations between parts and wholes. I then look at an applied form of 
mereology, bio-ontology, which is intended to capture the unique nature of 
parts and wholes in biology. From there, I turn to an institution-based 
approach to parts and wholes that has become the default strategy for 
delineating part-humans in bioethics. Finally, I end with two part/whole 
distinctions often used to help categorize biologically engineered animals: 1) 
the quantitative approach, by which the degree of humanness is calculated 
via the ratio of human to nonhuman parts; and 2) the germ-line/soma 
distinction, an approach that emphasizes placement instead of number of 
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human parts in the genetically engineered animal. After explaining the 
virtues of each approach, I argue that none of them can adequately delineate 
part-humans. 
In Chapter 5, I provide an approach that involves establishing the 
minimum that is required for an animal to count as part-human. I argue that 
whether an animal is part-human or merely partially composed of human 
parts depends on the transposability of parts. A suitably transposable part is 
characterized by its giving rise to the same characteristic in both recipient 
and donor. Consider the following example as a demonstration of this point. 
In a recent experiment, human chromosome 21 was transferred into a mouse. 
The experimenters hoped that the transfer would create a nonhuman animal 
with Down syndrome. But whether the altered animal should be considered 
part-human or merely partially composed of human parts depends, to some 
extent, on whether or not human chromosome 21 can give rise to Down 
syndrome in mice. I argue that a part is transposable across species if the 
following three requirements are met: 1) the right partitioning frame is 
chosen; 2) part-boundaries are correctly identified; and 3) contextual 
constraints are eliminated. If the requirements are met, then the animal has 
part-human potential. Otherwise, it does not.  
Up to this point in the dissertation, my emphasis will be on the 
importance of establishing the relative humanness of part-humans for the 
sake of ethical and legal regulations based on the human/nonhuman 
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distinction. But in the last chapter, I ask whether ethicists who oppose giving 
preferential treatment to humans over nonhumans—and instead favor some 
version of the person/nonperson distinction—ought to find the humanness of 
part-humans irrelevant to how we ought to judge their moral status. 
Although it may seem obvious that a proponent of the personhood view will 
find the causal history of an acquired characteristic—for example, whether it 
came about as a result of a dolphin or a human transplant—morally 
irrelevant, I argue that this need not be the case. Causal history is morally 
irrelevant to the ontological moral status of the animal, but epistemically 
relevant to our ability to detect an animal’s moral status. I end with a 















The idea of improving or prolonging life by replacing a failing organ 
with a healthy one is at least 5,000 years old. Mythological stories about 
transplantation provide evidence that this concept has a long history. 
Probably the oldest accounts of transplantation come from Indian mythology. 
In Indian scriptures, various individuals are beheaded by the God Siva 
during his fits of anger. For example, Siva beheads Genesha but then agrees 
to bring him back to life (Kahan, 1989). When the head cannot be found, Siva 
asks his companions to bring back the head of the first living being they 
encounter that is misbehaving. The companions bring back the head of an 
elephant that was sleeping with his head facing north—an offence in the 
Hindu religion, because it causes the North Pole to disturb the peace of the 
universe. The elephant‟s head is then attached onto the beheaded trunk of 
Genesha bringing him back to life. 
Stories about transplantation are also part of Chinese mythology. For 
example, there is an old tale about „Judge Lu‟ who performed at least one 
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heart and one face transplant. First, he removed his friend‟s heart while the 
friend was asleep and replaced it with a better one. Afterwards, Judge Lu put 
his friend‟s heart on the table and told him that his heart was useless for 
composing essays because its holes were plugged. Afterwards, his friend‟s 
writing greatly improved. In fact, his friend was so pleased with the results 
that he asked Judge Lu to perform another transplant, “If you can exchange 
a heart, surely you can do the same for my wife‟s ugly face. I beg you to try 
your craft on her” (Bhandari & Tewari, 1997, p. 497). A few days later, Judge 
Lu returned with the head of a beautiful young woman and performed a 
successful face transplant.  
Aside from mythology, the first actual transplantation experiments 
probably date back to 600 BC when Susrata, an Indian surgeon, used human 
skin flaps to replace human noses—noses were often cut off as punishment 
during that time (Deschamps, Roux, Sai, & Gouin, 2005). Early transplants 
were most likely unsuccessful, although they took place between members of 
the same species and they involved the transfer of cells and tissues (e.g., 
bone, skin, blood, etc.) rather than organs. Organ transplants came later 
because they are harder to perform—they require knowledge of how to 
control the bleeding after the sick organ is removed as well as knowledge of 
how to restore circulation once the healthy organ is in place (De Vito Dabbs, 





Blood transfusions have been performed since ancient Rome, although 
before the 17th century blood was only transmitted by mouth. In ancient 
Rome, men who were seeking vigor would lap up the blood of fallen 
gladiators, and in the 15th century, Italian doctors prescribed sucking of blood 
from the arm veins of youth for rejuvenation (Maluf, 1954). The first 
intravenous transfusion was probably not performed until 1642 (see below). 
However, in 1615, Andreas Libavius, a physician and a chemist from Saxony, 
first described what an intravenous blood transfusion would entail: 
Given one has before oneself a strong, healthy, youth rich in 
spirited blood and a powerless, weak, cachectic old man scarcely 
capable of breathing. If now the physician wishes to practice the 
rejuvenating art on the latter, he should make silver tubes 
which fit into each other: open then the artery of the healthy 
person and introduce one of the tubes into it and fasten it to the 
artery; thereupon he opens also the artery of the ill person and 
fastens the other, female tube into it. These two tubes one fits 
into the other and notes herewith that the warm and spirited 
arterial blood of the healthy person flows into the ill person and 
imparts to him the fountain of life and drives away all faintness. 
(Maluf, 1954, p. 59-60) 
 
Most likely, Libavius did not perform any blood transfusions himself.  In fact, 
had he done so, he would probably find his assumption that blood would flow 
from the artery of the youth into that of the aged man (and not vice versa) to 
be problematic.  
The earliest intravenous transfusion was performed in 1642 by Georg 
von Wahrendorff, a German horseman, who injected wine into the veins of 
his hunting dogs with the hope of treating an illness. He used a small fowl 
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bone for the task. Fourteen years later, in 1656, Christopher Wren at Oxford 
made a dog drunk by injecting wine and beer into its veins (Maluf, 1954). 
Experiments that involved injecting liqueurs into the veins of animals were 
considered noble at the time, in part, because they inspired new experiments. 
In the following decade, indirect blood transfusions of small quantities 
between dogs were performed, although Dr. Richard Lower was the first to 
perform a direct blood transfusion between dogs in 1665. In his Tractatus de 
Corde (1669), Lower describes one of his experiments in which most of the 
blood of a small dog is directly replaced by blood from two larger dogs:  
Having got ready the dogs and made other preparations as 
required, I selected one dog of medium size, opened its jugular 
vein, and drew off blood, until it was quite clear from its howls 
and struggles that its strength was nearly gone, and that 
convulsions were not far off. Then, to make up for the great loss 
from this dog by the blood of the second, I introduced blood from 
the cervical artery of a fairly large mastiff, which had been 
fastened alongside the first dog, until this latter animal by its 
restiveness showed in its turn that it was overfilled and 
burdened by the amount of inflowing blood. I ligatured the 
artery from which the blood was passing, and withdrew blood 
again from the receiving dog. This was repeated several times in 
succession, until there was no more blood or life left in two fairly 
large mastiffs (the blood of both having been taken by the 
smaller dog). In the meantime, blood had been repeatedly 
withdrawn from this smaller animal and injected into it in such 
amount as would equal, I imagine, the weight of its whole body, 
yet, once its jugular vein was sewn up and its binding shackles 
cast off, it promptly jumped down from the table, and, 
apparently oblivious of its hurts, soon began to fondle its master, 
and to roll on the grass to clean itself of blood. (Lower, 1969, in 




Most of Lower‟s blood transfusions were between animals of the same species. 
However, Lower anticipated that human and nonhuman blood would mix just 
as well. Hence, in 1667, Lower and Edmund King transmitted sheep‟s blood 
into a 22-year-old Bachelor of Theology from Cambridge (Maluf, 1954). The 
purpose behind the transfusion was to change the man‟s character. 
 The function of blood was not known in the 17th century—oxygen was 
not yet discovered. Instead, people believed that blood determined a person‟s 
qualities. Not surprisingly, then, the point of Lower‟s blood transfusion 
experiments was to transfer the qualities of one individual into another, “‟tis 
intended that these tryals shall be prosecuted to the utmost variety and 
subject will bear: As by exchanging the blood of Old and Young, Sick and 
Healthy, Hot and Cold, Fierce and Fearful, Tame and Wild Animals, and, 
that not only of the same but also of differing kinds” (Lower, 1666, p. 357). In 
particular, Lower chose to transmit the blood of a sheep into the 22-year-old 
man because the man‟s brain was considered “a little too warm” and the 
blood of a docile animal, e.g., a sheep, could cool it off.  In the course of the 
experiment, a vein in the patient‟s arm was cut open and seven ounces of his 
blood were allowed to run out. Then the blood of the sheep ran into the man‟s 
vein. After about 2 minutes, the patient drew the pipe out of his vein saying 
that he has had enough. Once removed, sheep‟s blood ran through the pipe 
with full stream, indicating that the blood was in fact running from the sheep 
to the man for the duration of the experiment. The physicians who were 
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watching the experiment estimated that about 10 ounces of blood were 
received by the patient in that time. Six days later, the patient reported 
feeling much better (Maluf, 1954).  
 Around the same time, Jean-Baptiste Denis, a French philosopher, 
mathematician, and doctor of King Louis XIV, with the help of a surgeon 
named Paul Emmerez, performed a record number of four xenotransfusions 
to humans. The first one was to a young man with a fever, who was subject to 
“20 blood lettings” in an attempt to cure him.  
Bloodletting, for the purpose of curing or preventing illness, was a 
common medical practice at the time. People believed that the proper balance 
of the four humours—blood, phlegm, black bile and yellow bile—was needed 
to maintain health. Thus, Denis‟s experiment, which involved adding blood to 
a patient rather than removing it, was very controversial. However, following 
a transfusion of 9 ounces of blood from a sheep, the patient reportedly leaped 
to his feet, full of energy, and in his excitement slaughtered his blood donor 
(Cooper & Lanza, 2000). Denis‟s second xenotransfusion was to a healthy 
man who got paid to volunteer. The third one was to a patient who was dying. 
The transfusion delayed death by only a few hours (Denis, 1667). By the time 
Denis performed his fourth transfusion, French physicians who were jealous 
of his work were starting to dislike him. However, his fourth patient would 
put an end to blood transfusions for over a century. Antoine Mauroy, a 34-
year-old, newly-wed house servant, was considered to be mentally ill because 
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he would occasionally escape from his suburban home and spend time 
gallivanting in Paris. A gentleman who felt sorry for Mauroy‟s wife asked 
Denis for help. The thought was to diminish Mauroy‟s spirit through a blood 
transfusion from an animal of a gentler character, e.g., a calf. On December 
19, 1667, Denis and Emmerez transmitted 6 ounces of blood from a calf into 
Mauroy‟s arm vein. The transfusion was performed in the presence of several 
physicians who reported that the patient seemed to improve and become 
quieter. A few days later, the procedure was repeated. This time, the patient 
had a reaction to the transfusion: irregular heartbeat, pain in his chest and 
kidneys, and a sensation of heat travelling up his arm while the blood was 
being transmitted. The day before Christmas, Mauroy‟s nose was bleeding 
and he had dark bloody urine. However, his wife insisted on a third 
transfusion after the patient again became maniacal.  
There are conflicting reports as to whether or not the third transfusion 
actually took place (see, for example, Deschamps et al., 2005; Maluf, 1954; 
Tucker, 2011), but what is clear is that the patient died the following night. 
The physicians who disliked Denis bribed Mauroy‟s wife to state that the 
patient died during the transfusion. Denis was subsequently tried for 
manslaughter. In 1668, the Court exonerated Denis from any responsibility, 
concluding that the patient had been poisoned by his wife with arsenic. The 
Court also ruled that any future transfusions made to man must be 
authorized by a doctor from the Faculté de Médecine in Paris. In 1670, the 
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French Parliament declared transfusion to human beings illegal throughout 
France. The English Parliament and the Pope did the same shortly after. 
Although a few more transfusions were performed after that, the practice was 
set aside for the next 150 years. This was probably for the best, since 
ignorance of antisepsis and immunology would have resulted in serious 
complications. Today we know that sheep blood is rapidly destroyed by 
human antibodies and, consequently, sheep to human blood transfusions are 
often accompanied by “fever, chills, transient jaundice, discolored urine, and 
possibly more serious complications, such as acute kidney failure” (Cooper & 
Lanza, 2000, p. 28).  
In 1816, a century and a half later, John Henry Leacock, a Scottish 
physician, performed eight blood transfusions between different animals and 
concluded that the donor and the recipient must be of the same species in 
order for the transfusion to be successful. Thus, he recommended interhuman 




 The first reported tissue xenograft was in 1501, by Muhammad Baha‟ 
al-Dawala, an Iranian surgeon who replaced a piece of a patient‟s skull with a 
bone from a dog, in order to treat his bacterial bone infection. The surgeon 
used a slice of cucumber to protect the brain (Rodriguez, 1995). Around the 
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middle of the next century, a similar procedure was performed by Job van 
Meekerent, a Dutchman. This time, the patient was a Russian nobleman who 
had lost part of his skull in battle. A bone from the skull of a dog was used to 
repair the damage (Haeseker, 1991). Although the xenotransplantation was 
successful, the nobleman had the dog bone removed at a later time when the 
Orthodox Church threatened him with excommunication. The Church 
claimed that no man could be saved if he had a dog bone in his head (Cooper 
& Lanza, 2000).  
 In Chicago in 1880, Dr. E. W. Lee applied a skin graft from a sheep to 
a burned 10-year-old girl. The surgeon used a pedicled graft, which is a graft 
where a portion of the skin from the donor site remains attached to the donor 
area while the remainder is attached to the recipient site. After a few weeks, 
new blood vessels will grow into the recipient site and the skin flap can be 
completely detached from the donor site. This technique is still used today, 
although only to move skin from one site to another on the same individual. 
Dr. Lee, however, used three pedicled skin flaps from a living lamb and 
applied them to the back of the burned girl. To prevent the skin flaps from 
tearing, the lamb was fastened to a wooden cage and its limbs were fixed still 
with plaster. However, the girl died attached to the lamb before any new 
blood vessels formed (Cooper & Lanza, 2000).  
 Unpedicled xenografts were also very popular in the late 1800s. Frogs 
were the preferred donor since they were easily obtainable and inexpensive. 
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Moreover, frogs do not grow fur or feathers, so they blend in better with 
human skin, and doctors discovered that even their pigment disappears a few 
days after transplantation. Thus, frog skin was used on ulcers and burns. In 
the British Indian Army, a surgeon performed between 300 and 400 frog 
xenografts, all of which were successful. Although it is unlikely that the 
grafts became a permanent part of the patients, they probably accelerated 
the healing process by protecting the ulcer or burn. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
pig skin was used explicitly for this purpose on patients with extensive burns 
(Cooper & Lanza, 2000).  
  
Testicle Xenografts 
 Unlike skin and bone grafts, testicles were transplanted for the special 
purpose of revitalization and sexual rejuvenation. In 1889, Charles-Edouard 
Brown-Sequard, a French-American physician, injected himself with an 
extract of crushed dog and guinea pig testicles. He was 72 years old. The 
injections were said to have restored his strength and capacities (Schultheiss, 
Denil, & Jonas, 1997). Since then, a variety of drugs have been made from 
crushed animal organs, including thyroid extracts that are still used today for 
the palliative treatment of hypothyroidism  (Deschamps et al., 2005). 
 Thirty years later, Serge Varonoff, a Russian emigrant, turned 
endocrinotherapy into a surgical procedure. His aim was to transplant the 
testicles of chimpanzees and baboons into men in order to rejuvenate them.  
22 
 
In 1920, Varonoff performed his first transplantation. The procedure was 
fairly simple: Varonoff would cut out the testicles from an anesthetized 
chimpanzee, slice each one into six sections and insert three sections per 
testicle into two recipients. In his book, Rejuvenation by Grafting, Voronoff 
reports doing 52 testicular grafting operations between the years 1920 and 
1923. Most of the recipients were elderly men who had been sexually 
impotent for at least a decade. For example, a 74-year-old Englishman who, 
according to Voronoff, was hard to recognize 8 months after surgery, “The 
grafting had transformed a senile, impotent, pitiful old being into a vigorous 
man, in full possession of all his faculties” (Cooper & Lanza, 2000, p. 25).  
However, the medical profession was highly skeptical of Voronoff‟s 
“Viagra” and according to Jean Real, a French documentary film director, 
Parisians did not take his work very seriously: 
Many satirical newspapers and cabarets mocked the grafted 
men. The Follies Bergère even created a show around the 
subject. The whole of society laughed and the grafting of monkey 
„balls‟ became a national joke. An ashtray representing a 
monkey protecting his private parts and with the text „Non 
Voronoff, tu ne m‟auras pas!‟ (No Voronoff, you won‟t get me!) 
was found on many café tables. (Cooper & Lanza, 2000, p. 25) 
 
The negative opinion of the press did not stop Voronoff. In fact, he started 
transplanting ape ovaries into women for the treatment of menopause and at 
some point he even tried the reverse:  He transplanted a woman‟s ovary into 
a female chimpanzee and then tried to inseminate the chimpanzee with 
human sperm. The chimpanzee did not become pregnant, however.  
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 In the course of his life, Voronoff transplanted ape tissue to 2,000 
human patients (Deschamp et al., 2005). Without immunosuppressive drug 
therapy, which was not yet invented, it is unlikely that any of the 
transplanted tissue survived for more than a few days. The positive effects of 
the transplants were probably psychological. But to his credit, Voronoff had 
various medical visions that exceeded the science of his time. For example, he 
recognized the need to grow spare parts for the human body and he even set 
up a farm on the French Riviera to breed monkeys imported from Africa. 
Today, surgeons are considering setting up pig farms to grow organs for 
humans. Voronoff also had visions of human to human organ transplants. He 
predicted that: 
…in large towns in which fatal accidents are so frequent and so 
varied, patients waiting for organ transplantations would be 
sent to special hospitals to which any person dying from an 
accident would be transferred and, after thorough examination, 
his or her organs would be removed in order to be transplanted. 
(Cooper & Lanza, 2000, p. 26) 
 
Voronoff‟s predictions were remarkably accurate, although he did not perform 
any human-to-human organ transplants in the course of his life. He came 
very close in 1928, when a criminal executed by guillotine had donated his 
body to science, but the authorities of Paris denied Voronoff permission to 







 Two Frenchmen, Mathieu Jaboulay and his pupil Alexis Carrel, made 
organ transplantation possible by developing a technique for joining together 
blood vessels. In 1912, Carrel won the Nobel Prize in Physiology and 
Medicine for developing the technique (Cooper & Lanza, 2000). The kidney 
was the most popular organ transplanted at the time, because it is a paired 
organ with a single artery and its function and malfunction is readily visible 
in the production of urine (Deschamps et al., 2005). In 1906, Jaboulay 
transplanted the kidney of a pig killed 3 hours earlier to the bend of the 
elbow of a 48-year-old woman and then, later in the year, a goat kidney to the 
bend of the elbow of a 50-year-old woman. The blood vessel from the kidney 
was connected to the patient‟s arm, but the kidney remained external to the 
skin. (Transplanting a body part to a position other than its normal 
anatomical position is known as “heterotopic transplantation,” in contrast to 
“orthotopic grafting” where the body part is transplanted to its normal 
anatomical position). Heterotopic transplants are still performed today. For 
example, the oocytes of women who will undergo chemotherapy for cancer 
treatment, and will most likely become infertile as a result, can be frozen and 
then transplanted once the treatment is complete. The transplantation can be 
orthotopic or heterotopic. If it is heterotopic, the graft can be easier to 
monitor, e.g., on the forearm, or its revascularization can be enhanced by a 
larger blood supply, e.g., in the kidney capsule. However, heterotopic oocyte 
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transplants must be fertilized in vitro (Oktay et al., 2004; see also Paris, 
Snow, Cox, & Shaw, 2004). 
Jaboulay collected 1.5 L of urine from the woman with a pig kidney. He 
had similar success with the woman who underwent a heterotopic transplant 
of a goat kidney. However, the kidneys of both of the women had to be 
removed after a few days. Jaboulay blamed the failure of the transplant on 
blood clots, but rapid rejection would have produced the same result (Cooper 
& Lanza, 2000). Three more kidney xenotransplants were reported in the 
early 20th century. In 1909, Ernst Unger transplanted the kidneys of a 
macaque onto the thigh of a 21-year-old woman. The woman died 32 hours 
later. In 1913, Schonstadt transplanted a kidney from a Japanese monkey to 
the arm of a young girl. The girl died 60 hours later after producing a few 
drops of urine. And finally, in 1923, Harold Neuhof transplanted a lamb 
kidney to a man who died 9 days later. After that, most surgeons realized 
that xenotransplantation was doomed to early failure and experiments 
stopped for the next 40 years. During that time, human-to-human organ 
transplantation became popular again although there was a real shortage of 
suitable organ donors, since the concept of brain death had not yet been 
established as a way of distinguishing which individuals were acceptable 
donors.  
In large part, the failures of early transplantation experiments were 
caused by immunological rejection. Not surprisingly then, the arrival of 
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immunosuppressive drugs in the 1960s and 1970s again sparked an interest 
in xenotransplantation. In 1963, Keith Reemtsma, a professor of surgery at 
Tulane University in Louisiana, performed the first organ 
xenotransplantation with the assistance of an immunosuppressant—albeit a 
primitive one by today‟s standards. The kidney came from a rhesus monkey, 
but the 43-year-old patient died of shock 63 days later. In the next year, 
Reemtsma performed 13 kidney transplants from chimpanzees to humans. 
The chimpanzees came from either 1) the military, where they were used in 
experiments relating to space flight or 2) the circus, where they were no 
longer fit to perform. Most of the patients lived from 9 to 60 days after the 
transplant, with the exception of a 23-year-old schoolteacher who lived for 9 
months. In fact, the schoolteacher went back to work and led a normal life 
until she died suddenly from an electrolyte imbalance. Remarkably, the 
autopsy showed no signs of rejection. Nine months without rejection is still 
the longest survival record for the xenotransplantation of an organ into a 
human recipient (Reemtsma, McCracken, Schlegel, & Pearl, 1964).  
That same year, a surgeon named Thomas Starzl, along with his 
colleagues at Denver, were hoping for similar success—this time with baboon 
kidneys. They transplanted baboon kidneys to six human patients. The 
baboon kidneys were rejected slightly more aggressively than their 
chimpanzee counterparts, most likely due to a greater evolutionary distance 
between donor and recipient (Cooper & Lanza, 2000). There were a few more 
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kidney xenotransplants in the 1960s, but none in the last 40 years. An 
additional reason why kidney xenotransplants stopped being performed was 
that large amounts of urine were excreted in the first few days after 
transplant. Occasionally, the amount would reach 50 liters and would lead to 
circulatory failure and death (Cooper & Lanza, 2000).   
At the same time that kidney xenotransplants became popular again, 
heart and liver xenotransplants were also on the rise. In 1964, James Hardy 
at the University of Mississippi performed the first heart xenotransplant. 
Hardy gave the heart of a chimpanzee to a 68-year-old man who was dying 
from heart disease. The patient died within 2 hours of the operation, 
reportedly due to the small size of the heart of the donor—the chimpanzee 
weighed only 44 kg and the heart could not pump enough blood to keep alive 
a patient who weighed considerably more.  There were also a few isolated 
liver xenotransplants in the late 1960s and early 1970s with Starzl and his 
colleagues in Denver performing the first one in 1966. In the next few years, 
the same team transplanted chimpanzee livers to three children: 1) a 28-
month-old child who survived for 9 days, 2) a 7-month-old child who survived 
for 26 hours, and 3) a child who survived for 14 days (Starzl et al., 1974). 
After that, liver xenotransplants did not become popular again until the early 
1990s.  
In the late 1970s, the pharmaceutical company Sandoz brought new 
hope for xenotransplantation with a new wonder drug. Sandoz had a 
28 
 
tradition of encouraging its travelling employees to bring back plastic bags of 
soil samples from wherever they went. The soil was then analyzed for the 
presence of fungi that might be used for antibiotics. Soil samples from 
Norway and Wisconsin revealed a new fungus, Tolypocladium inflatum. 
Although the fungus did not have antibacterial potential, it turned out to be 
the most powerful immunosuppressant researchers had seen to date. After 
animal and human trials, the drug was finally approved in 1983 by the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration for use in preventing immune rejection. 
Sandoz named the drug „Cyclosporine‟ (Miller, 2005).  
A year later, the most famous xenotransplantation experiment took 
place. “Baby Fae” was born prematurely with a heart defect so severe that 
only a transplant could save her (Bailey, 1985). Upon learning of Baby Fae‟s 
condition, Leonard Bailey, a surgeon of Loma Linda University, proposed 
transplanting a baboon heart into the newborn to keep her alive until a 
human heart donor would became available. Bailey had never transplanted a 
nonhuman organ into a human, but with human organ donors of that size 
being extremely rare, he believed this was the only option. Moreover, in a 
preliminary study, Bailey transplanted the hearts of newborn lambs into 
newborn goats and was able to obtain a mean survival time of 72 days 
(Bailey, Jang, Johnson, & Jolley, 1985). The results of the preliminary study—
along with the fact that human and baboon hearts are comparable in size, 
that Fae was immunologically immature, and that cyclosporine was now on 
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the market—gave Bailey hope that the experiment would work (Deschamps 
et al., 2005). The only problem was that Baby Fae was of blood group O and 
the rules governing organ transplants are the same as those governing blood 
transfusions: The blood types of the donor and the recipient have to be the 
same. However, baboons do not have blood type O, only A, B, and AB. Thus, 
even though six available baboons were tested and the one that triggered the 
weakest immune reaction was chosen, it was nonetheless not a match for 
Fae. The baboon was blood type B (Cooper & Lanza, 2000).  
Baby Fae was a global sensation. The whole world watched as she 
survived the operation. But hope died quickly as her kidneys started to fail 
and eventually her heart followed. It is not clear whether the blood type 
mismatch was the determining factor in Fae‟s death or the fact that 
cyclosporine was not a strong enough immunosuppressive drug to prevent 
graft rejection. Either way, Baby Fae died 20 days after surgery and the hope 
of xenotransplantation seemed to have died with her. Moreover, because of 
all the publicity surrounding Baby Fae, many ethical issues were brought to 
the forefront and animal rights activists protested in front of the hospital 
where Bailey performed the surgery (Miller, 2005).  
Xenotransplantation had a brief comeback in the early 1990s when a 
new immunosuppressive agent, FK506, was marketed (Warty et al., 1988). In 
1992, Starzl transplanted the liver of a baboon to a 35-year-old patient and in 
1993 to a 62-year-old man. Although the option of a human liver transplant 
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existed at this time, Starzl thought that a baboon liver had a better chance of 
survival because the liver failure of both patients was caused by hepatitis B. 
Since there was some evidence that suggested that a baboon‟s liver is 
resistant to the virus, and since a new human liver was likely to also be 
attacked by the virus, Starzl thought the baboon liver would provide a better 
option (Cooper & Lanza, 2000). Unfortunately, neither patient lived long 
enough to prove this hypothesis correct. The first recipient survived for 70 
days but died of overwhelming sepsis and the second one survived for 27 
days, never regained consciousness, and died of failure of vital organs. 
Nonetheless, the reason why xenotransplantation was approved for both of 
these patients is because a baboon transplant had some advantage over a 
human one.  
In sum, organ xenotransplantation has not been successful. No patient 
who received an organ xenotransplant lived longer than 70 days (with the 
exception of Reemtsma‟s schoolteacher who lived for 9 months) and most 
patients who received an organ from a species other than a nonhuman 
primate died within a day (Cooper & Lanza, 2000). In spite of these 
disappointing results, xenotransplantation is again on the rise—this time 
with the help of advancing biotechnology. In the next chapter, I will discuss 















In the 1970s, the techniques used to transplant parts across species 
changed dramatically. Although scientists were still working on improving 
the transplantation of blood, tissues and organs, the main focus shifted to 
genes, chromosomes, nuclei and eventually stem cells. Before I move to an 
explanation of how modern part-humans are made, let me first explain why 
scientists are interested in making such creatures. In the first place, 
scientists use part-humans to produce human characteristics in nonhuman 
animals. Since laboratory animals cannot fully replicate human physiology, 
scientists use part-human animals to investigate human specific biological 
processes and diseases without having to experiment on human subjects. 
Second, part-human research is used to create human cells, tissues and 
organs for xenotransplantation. This process often involves transferring 
human stem cells to a developing nonhuman fetus and harvesting the 
resulting organ from the mature animal for transplantation into a human. 
Third, part-human research is used to “pharm” animals as biological factories 
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for human products. For example, sheep have been genetically engineered to 
produce human insulin in their milk. The insulin is then harvested by 
pharmaceutical companies for the treatment of diabetes.  
With that out of the way, the remainder of the chapter will be devoted 
to explaining how part-humans are made. In what follows, I focus on four 
part-human candidates: chimeras, hybrids, cybrids, and transgenics. My 
taxonomy of part-human candidates is based on how each one is made: 1) 
chimeras are made by transferring cells, tissues or organs between animals 
2) hybrids are made by mixing gametes of different species 3) cybrids are 
made by transferring nuclei into enucleated eggs and 4) transgenics are made 
by transferring genes between animals. For alternative taxonomies see 
Bonnicksen (2009), Greely (2003), Robert (2006) and Taupitz & Weschka 
(2009). 
 
Chimeras: Made by Transferring Cells, Tissues or Organs 
 Chimeras contain cell populations derived from at least two different 
zygotes of the same or different species (Taupitz & Weschka, 2009). In 
contrast, mosaics contain two distinct types of cells originating from a single 
zygote. Mosaicism typically arises during the course of development. For 
example, in early human female embryogenesis, one of the two X 
chromosomes will be functionally inactivated. As a result, in roughly half of 
the cells of a typical human female the paternal X chromosome is inactive, 
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while in the other half, the maternal X chromosome is inactive (Taupitz & 
Weschka, 2009). Since these distinct cell populations originate from a single 
zygote, human females are mosaics, not chimeras.  
In contrast, some pregnant women exchange placental blood with their 
fetus. The blood cells from the child can persist in the mother for decades 
after the child is born (Bianchi, Zickwolf, Weil, Sylvester, & DeMaria, 1996). 
Here, the woman is a chimera because she contains cell populations from two 
different zygotes. In fact, later-born children can be chimeras as well, if the 
cells of elder siblings slip across the placental membrane during the mother’s 
pregnancy.  
 There are different ways to create interspecies chimeras. Scientists can 
engraft fetal or adult tissues from one species to another, as long as there is 
some method available to prevent rejection of the graft. For example, the 
development of immunodeficient mice has made it possible to engraft human 
tissue onto mice without rejection. The first mouse of this kind—the Nude 
mouse—arose from a spontaneous genetic mutation. The mutation causes 
both hairlessness and an inability to generate mature T cells due to an 
impaired thymus—T and B cells of the immune system fight off foreign cells 
and infections (Shultz, Ishikawa, & Greiner, 2007). The severe combined 
immunodeficiency mouse (SCID) also arose from a spontaneous genetic 
mutation. The SCID mouse lacks both mature T and B cells and has since 
been manipulated to also mimic the human immune system. Human fetal 
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liver hematopoetic cells, fetal thymus and fetal lymph nodes have been 
transplanted into SCID mice to create SCID-hu mice that are 
immunologically humanized (McCune et al., 1988). These mice can support 
engrafted human T and B cells.  
 Various human tissues and organs have been engrafted and 
transplanted into immunodeficient mice, turning them into human-
nonhuman chimeras. For example, scientists have been engrafting human 
tumors under the skin of nude mice for decades. Nude mice will not reject the 
tumor and the blood supply will enable the tumor to grow. “The mouse 
essentially becomes a cancer patient whose tumor can then be manipulated 
in various ways to understand cancer mechanisms and to test therapeutic 
protocols for human cancer” (Behringer, 2007, pp. 259-260). Other human 
tissues that have been successfully transplanted into immunodeficient mice 
include skin for the study of psoriasis (Boehncke, 1999; Raychaudhuri, Dutt, 
Raychaudhuri,  Sanyal, & Farber, 2001), vaginal tissue for the study of HIV 
transmission (Kish, Budgeon, Welsh, & Howett, 2001), and hair follicles to test 
regenerative potential after transplantation (Hashimoto et al., 2001). Human 
tissues have also been transplanted into immunodeficient mice for the study 
of pathogens. The reason for this is that some pathogens will only infect 
humans (or nonhuman primates), while others that infect humans along with 
other animals may give rise to different symptoms in nonhuman animals as 
compared to humans. As a result, it is best to study pathogens in humanized 
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animals. Finally, donated human fetal organs have been engrafted into 
immunodeficient mice, albeit heterotopically, i.e., to a position other than 
their normal anatomical position (see Chapter 2). The cells of these 
heterotropically transplanted organs have been shown to grow and 
differentiate (Savidge et al., 1995; Thomas, Wang, & Hornsby, 2002). 
 Another method of creating chimeras is by organ transplantation. 
When a person’s organ starts to fail, human-to-human organ transplants are 
not always an option because of the short supply of human organ donors. 
Consider, for example, that between the years 2001 and 2004, approximately 
86,700 people per year were on the waiting for an organ transplant in the 
United States. In that time, approximately 25,400 organ transplants were 
performed annually and 6,700 patients died each year while waiting for a 
transplant (Hagen & Gitten, 2008). Due to the high demand for organ 
transplants, there has been a renewed interest in xenotransplantation. While 
having a pig heart replacement would obviously make one a chimera—since 
the population of cells that make up the organ originated from a different 
zygote—there is another sense in which the recipient would be a chimera:  
donor cells have been detected in the blood of recipients after a liver, kidney, 
heart and lung transplants (Taupitz & Weschka, 2009).  
 Scientists have been looking into pigs as a source of organs for a 
number of reasons. Pigs share some anatomical and physiological similarities 
with humans, e.g., pig and human organs are similar in size. Pigs also have a 
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short reproductive cycle and they give birth to multiple offspring at a time. 
Unfortunately, pig organs are prone to rejection. Although hyperacute 
rejection does not occur with small tissues or single cells, it occurs within 
minutes when vascularised organs are transplanted across species (Taupitz 
& Weschka, 2009). One way to minimize hyperacute rejection is to use 
immunosuppressive drugs. Another way is to outwit human immune defenses 
by genetically engineering a pig so that it will “appear” less like a foreign 
invader to the human immune system. The first transgenic pig, developed 
specifically for xenotransplantation, was born in 1992. The gene for an 
enzyme that builds sugars in porcine cell membranes was inactivated in this 
pig since human antibodies react to antigens, such as sugars, found on the 
surface of porcine organs (Renneberg & Demain, 2007). The idea was that the 
inactivation of this gene would help prevent rejection. Human trials of 
transgenic pig organ transplants are yet to be conducted.   
 Another way to prevent rejection of nonhuman organs is to “humanize” 
the organs at the cellular level. For example, Esmail Zanjani, a researcher at 
the University of Nevada at Reno, has injected human hematopoietic stem 
cells (i.e., blood stem cells) into sheep fetuses (Almeida-Porada, Porada, 
Chamberlain, Torabi, & Zanjani, 2004). According to Zanjani, the results were 
sheep with organs composed of 15% human cells, although some livers were 
as much as 40% human and contained structural units typical of human 
livers pumping human proteins (Shreeve, 2005). In the future, Zanjani wants 
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to figure out a way to purify multipotent cells from a patient’s organ and 
inject them into sheep embryos, the idea being that the cells would contribute 
to half of the organs and when the organs would be transplanted into the 
patient, the sheep cells comprising the organ would be rejected, while the 
human cells would be accepted as a perfect match (Scott, 2006).  
 The benefit of using sheep rather than pigs is that it eliminates the 
risk of zoonosis—the transmission of infectious diseases from pigs to humans. 
For example, the porcine endogenous retrovirus (PERV) could, in theory, be 
passed on to humans through a transplanted organ. This poses an especially 
high risk for patients whose immune systems are suppressed to prevent 
rejection of the organ (Taupitz & Weschka, 2009). While PERV is not 
normally infectious to people, a recent experiment has shown that the 
transmission of the virus might be possible if human and pig cells fuse. In a 
recent experiment, after hematopoietic stem cells were injected into fetal 
pigs, human cells were found in their internal organs and blood system. What 
was more interesting, and what has never been observed before, was that 
over 60% of the nonpig cells were pig-human cell fusions (Ogle et al., 2004). 
Further tests showed that fused cells, unlike pig cells, are capable of 
transmitting the virus to uninfected human cells. This finding might help 
explain how diseases such as AIDS and SARS, which originated in 
nonhuman animals, were eventually transmitted to humans.  
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 Besides being used to replace failed human organs, xenografts have 
also been used to treat neurological disorders. Fink et al. transplanted 
porcine fetal neurons into the brains of adult patients suffering from 
Parkinson’s and Huntington’s disease (Fink et al., 2000). In the past, 
neuronal replacement using human fetal neurons has been shown to be 
efficacious in patients with Parkinson’s disease, but the use of human fetal 
tissue is limited for ethical reasons. Pigs were proposed as an alternative 
resource because of similarities in brain size.  In the Fink et al. study, 
between 12 and 24 million porcine neurons were transplanted into the brains 
of 24 patients. The neurons were obtained between embryonic days 25-28 for 
Parkinson’s patients and between days 35-38 for Huntington’s patients. The 
gestation period for pigs is around 114 days. Although no deleterious side 
effects were observed in either patient group, no functional improvements 
were achieved in Huntington’s patients and only a slight clinical 
improvement was achieved in Parkinson’s patients (Taupitz & Weschka, 
2009).  
 Thus far I have only talked about the creation of chimeras where 
either the donor or the recipient is at least as old as a fetus. But chimeras can 
also be made from two eight-cell embryos pushed together in a culture dish. 
The two cell populations can sometimes grow into a single blastocyst and 
occasionally even develop to term (Behringer, 2007). For example, in 1987, a 
“geep” was created from the fusion of early stage goat and sheep embryos 
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(Fehilly, Willadsen, & Tucker, 1984). The geep looked like a chimera because 
its fur was patchy—some parts were hairy like a goat’s and some parts were 
woolly. The creator of the geep also noted that: 
The animal behaved like a goat, but did not quite smell like one, 
and preferred the company of sheep. Its sheep cells were male 
but the sex of its goat cells was not known. It proved fertile in 
many matings with ewes [female sheep] but has not, so far, with 
does [female goats]. (Silver, 2006, p. 181) 
 
The fact that the geep had characteristics of both goats and sheep is among 
the reasons people are uneasy about creating human-nonhuman chimeras by 
pushing early embryos together. However, scientists have attempted to make 
human-nonhuman chimeras by injecting human embryonic stem cells (ES 
cells) into more advanced nonhuman embryos.  
Such experiments only became possible after the first human ES cell 
lines were derived from human blastocysts in 1998 (Thompson et al., 1998). 
ES cells have the capacity to form all cell types—they are totipotent. The 
totipotency of ES cells diminishes as they start to differentiate but they can 
still contribute to all tissues of the embryo, including the germ cells, even 
several days after fertilization. Their differentiation proceeds as follows. At 
the early cleavage stage, when the embryo divides into a number of smaller 
cells without increasing in overall mass, ES cells form two groups—the 
trophectoderm and the inner cell mass (Wolpert, 2002, p. 43). The embryo is 
now a blastocyst. The cells of the blastocyst are minimally committed with 
respect to their developmental potential. The trophectoderm cells will form 
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extra embryonic structures, e.g., the placenta, and the inner cell mass cells 
will give rise to the embryo proper. Next, the cells move extensively and 
differentiate again into one of three types of cells, each forming a distinct 
layer of the embryo, the ectoderm on the outside, and the mesoderm and 
endoderm layers on the inside. In mammals, these cells will give rise to more 
than 200 different cell types, e.g., blood, muscle, cartilage, nerve, etc. Their 
differentiation is a gradual process that occurs over successive cell 
generations. For example, ES cells that have differentiated into neural stem 
cells are still multipotent because they have the capacity to generate different 
cells of the nervous system, i.e., neurons, astrocytes, and oligodendrocytes, 
but each generation becomes progressively more differentiated (Wolpert, 
2002). For the purposes of making a chimera, the cells to be injected, and the 
cells of the recipient embryo, can be at different developmental stages. For 
example, differentiated human neurons can be injected into the brain region 
of an advanced embryo. However, the less differentiated the donor cells the 
more likely they are to contribute to all cell types of the recipient organism. 
 Examples of experiments that used human stem cells to make 
interspecies chimeras include human-mouse chimeras (James, Noggle, Swigut, 
& Brivanlou, 2006), human-chicken chimeras (Goldstein, Drukker, Reubinoff, & 
Benvenisty, 2002), human-rat chimeras (Yokoo et al., 2005), human-sheep 
chimeras (Almeida-Porada et al., 2004), human-pig chimeras (Fujiki et al., 
2003), and human-goat chimeras (Zeng et al., 2006). (For additional examples 
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see Taupitz & Weschka, 2009). However, one of the most controversial 
experiments involved engrafting human neural stem cells into the brains of 
old world monkey embryos (Ourednik et al., 2001). Since old world monkeys 
are closely related to humans, there were few anatomical and physiological 
barriers in place that could prevent the human neurons from contributing to 
the brains of the chimeras—the kind of barriers that would be in place if the 
cells were injected into mouse brains, for example (see Chapter 5).  
 
Hybrids: Made by Mixing Gametes 
 A hybrid is made by mixing gametes, i.e., sperm and egg, of two 
different species (Taupitz & Weschka, 2009, p. 28). The most well known 
example of a hybrid is the mule, generated by the breeding of a male horse 
with a female donkey. Conversely, a hinny is generated by the breeding of a 
female horse with a male donkey. Mules and hinnies have been bred and 
used for carrying heavy loads for the last 5,000 years. Normally, they are 
infertile but occasionally offspring from mules mated with horses and 
donkeys have been reported (Rong et al., 1988). Other hybrids, generated by 
either natural mating or artificial insemination, include the liger (a hybrid 
from a lion and a tiger), the zeedonk (a hybrid from a zebra and a donkey), 
and the coywolf (a hybrid from a coyote and a wolf). More recently, a hybrid 
from the natural mating of a sheep and a goat was also documented (not to be 
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confused with the “geep,” which is a chimeras rather than a hybrid) 
(Letshwenyo & Kedikilwe, 2000). 
 At the beginning of the 20th century, there was an interest in doing 
experimental research on the “Descent of Man” by breeding man and apes 
(Taupitz & Weschka, 2009). Among the interested parties was Ilya Ivanov, 
one of the pioneers of artificial insemination. Ivanov, along with his Russian 
team, set out to Africa to inseminate female orangutans with human sperm. 
However, a pregnancy was never obtained (Rossiianov, 2002). Since then, no 
human-nonhuman hybrid was ever created, although, to this day, human-
nonhuman fertilized eggs continue to be produced through the “hamster test.”  
The hamster test has been used to test the fertilization capacity of 
human sperm since the 1970s (Yanagimachi, Yanagimachi, & Rogers, 1976). 
Using eggs to test the viability of sperm is supposed to reduce costly IVF-
cycles, especially if the sperm is not viable, and the use of hamster eggs is 
supposed to reduce the wasting of human eggs. To conduct a hamster test, 
fresh human semen is collected from an adult male donor. After induced 
ovulation, the hamsters (Mesocricetus auratus) are sacrificed and their eggs 
are collected from their oviducts. Insemination of the hamster eggs with 
human sperm is performed in vitro and incubation is carried out for 3 hours. 
The samples are then placed on microscopic slides to observe if the sperm 
were able to penetrate the egg. Following the assessment, the samples are 
either fixed and stained or discarded. Although the fertilized eggs are not 
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allowed to proceed further, it is very unlikely that the fertilized eggs would 
lead to viable embryos given the evolutionary distance between humans and 
hamsters (Taupitz & Weschka, 2009). 
 
Cybrids: Made by Transferring Nuclei 
A cytoplasmic hybrid, or a cybrid, is created by inserting a nucleus of a 
somatic cell into an egg cell whose nucleus has been removed. The nucleus 
comes from one species and the enucleated egg comes from another. The 
technique used to make cybrids is the same technique that was used to create 
Dolly the sheep, although Dolly was not a cybrid because both the nucleus 
and the enucleated egg used to make Dolly came from the same species. The 
technique proceeds as follows. First, the somatic cell—whose nucleus is to be 
transferred into an enucleated egg—needs to return to its totipotent stage. 
All cells start out as totipotent cells but as they differentiate many of their 
genes become inactivated and they lose their ability to become any cell in the 
body. In fact, out of the 25,000 genes in the human genome, only 2,000 are 
active in any somatic cell (Houdebine, 2008). The rest of the genes are 
inactive. For example, a nerve cell does not need to produce insulin so the 
genes involved in the production of insulin will be inactivated in a nerve cell. 
However, those same genes will be active in an islet cell. In order to create a 
cybrid, or to clone a sheep like Dolly, all the genes of the somatic cell need to 
be reactivated. This can be done by starving the somatic cell in a broth poor 
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in nutrients (Renneberg & Demain, 2007). However, the genome of the 
somatic cell might have accumulated some damage in the course of the 
individual’s life, e.g., damage from UV radiation, X-rays, reactive oxygen 
radicals and toxins. Normally, we would not be aware of such damage, as 
long as it occurred in the part of the genome that is inactive in a given cell, 
but the damage can show up once the genes are reactivated. This might 
explain why Dolly aged prematurely.  
Once the somatic cell is obtained and starved in a low-nutrient broth, 
the nucleus is removed and inserted into an enucleated egg with a 
micropipette. The egg now contains a nucleus from one species (with the 
same number of chromosomes as it would if sperm and egg had met) and the 
cytoplasm and mitochondrial DNA from another species. Next, electric 
impulses are used to stimulate cell division. Dolly proved that if the donor 
nucleus and the enucleated egg come from the same species, the embryo can 
develop to term if implanted into a surrogate mother. However, this is no 
easy task. Out of the 277 attempts, Dolly was the only success. Nonetheless, 
the result overturned an enduring dogma in biology, that development only 
runs in one direction. Once Dolly was born, it was no longer true that all the 
cells in the body, e.g., brain, muscle, bone, skin, etc., must be derived from a 
fertilized egg and not the other way around. Dolly proved that “a normal 
somatic cell can “forget” all of its specifications, behaving like a totipotent 
fertilized egg cell” (Renneberg & Demain, 2007, p. 251).  
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There are two main reasons for creating cybrids. The first is to 
generate embryonic stem cells for use in medical research. The cells could be 
transplanted into a patient without the worry of rejection, since the nuclear 
DNA would be the same as the patient’s. Ideally, the researchers would want 
to use a human egg for this purpose but there is a shortage of them. An IVF 
clinic struggles to collect 10 to 20 donated eggs in a week. In contrast, 200 
cow eggs can be obtained from a single slaughterhouse in a day. For example, 
Chen et al. used rabbit eggs, instead of cow eggs, to generate human-rabbit 
cybrids (Chen et al., 2003). Nuclei were removed from male foreskin and 
female facial skin and injected into enucleated rabbit eggs. The embryos were 
allowed to develop to the blastocyst stage, although it is not clear whether an 
attempt was made to allow the cybrid embryos to develop past that stage. 
The ES cells exhibited most of the properties of conventional human ES cells, 
they tested positive for pluripotency, and they successfully differentiated into 
mature neurons (Taupitz & Weschka, 2009). 
The second reason for creating cybrids is to preserve endangered 
species by transplanting the nuclei of an endangered species into the 
enucleated eggs of a well populated species (Loi, Galli, & Ptak, 2007). For 
example, in China scientists successfully transferred the somatic cell nuclei 
of giant pandas into rabbit eggs. The panda-rabbit cybrid embryos developed 
up to the blastocyst stage. After that, 2,300 of them were transferred into 100 
rabbit recipients, but none of the rabbits became pregnant. However, new 
46 
 
evidence shows that the panda-rabbit cybrid embryos can implant in the 
uteri of a third species—the domestic cat (Taupitz & Weschka, 2009).  
 Cybrids, as well as clones like Dolly, are expected to be identical in 
phenotype to their nuclear donor. For example, the first cloned cat was 
named Carbon copy, Cc for short, with this expectation in mind. However, 
Cc’s coat pattern was not identical to that of its nuclear donor. Why? Because 
nuclear DNA is not the only contributor to an animal’s characteristics. There 
are environmental factors, e.g., the position of the embryo in the uterus has 
an influence on which hair follicles are reached by the pigment producing 
cells (Renneberg & Demain, 2007), and mitochondrial DNA, which does not 
come from the nuclear donor, also contributes to the phenotype. Mitochondria 
contain DNA that is independent from the DNA in the nucleus, so when the 
egg cell is enucleated the mitochondria remain. The number of mitochondria 
in each cell varies as the energy needs of a cell fluctuate. If the energy need is 
high, mitochondria will grow and divide. Hence, mitochondria can make up 
as much as 25% of the cytoplasm. Its primary function is transforming 
glucose into energy, but mitochondria are also involved in cell death, steroid 
synthesis, and other cell-type specific functions (Taupitz & Weschka, 2009). 
Moreover, some experiments have shown that either the mitochondria or 
something else in the cytoplasm contributes to vertebral development in fish. 
When the nucleus from a carp cell was introduced into an enucleated goldfish 
egg, some aspects of development mimicked the goldfish rather than the 
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nuclear donor (Taupitz & Weschka, 2009).  In particular, the vertebral 
number of the cybrid was typical of a goldfish—26 to 28—rather than of a 
carp—33 to 36—showing that the enucleated egg of the goldfish can have an 
evident impact on certain developmental characteristics. 
 
Transgenics: Made by Transferring Genes 
 A transgenic animal is created by splicing sequences of foreign DNA 
(called transgenes) into its genome in order to introduce or delete specific 
characteristics. The exogenous DNA is introduced early in development so 
that it can be transmitted through the germline. Although there are various 
methods used to make transgenic animals, they all begin with gene cloning, 
i.e., making numerous copies of the DNA sequence that will become the 
transgene (Nicholl, 2002). The point of gene cloning is to isolate the DNA 
sequence and make enough copies of it for multiple experiments. Standard 
methods of gene cloning either amplify DNA in vitro or in vivo. A popular in 
vitro method of amplifying DNA is the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) while 
a popular in vivo method relies on the help of microorganisms such as 
bacteria (Gilbert, 2000). However, the problem with using bacteria is that 
their primary transcript (DNA) does not undergo post-transcriptional 
modification. In humans, when RNA molecules are copied from DNA 
molecules, as part of the process of protein synthesis, some parts of the DNA, 
i.e., introns, are processed out of the primary transcript and are thereby not 
48 
 
copied. Since bacteria lack the means to remove introns, the gene for human 
insulin needs to be inserted into the bacterium intron-free.  
 Luckily, a complementary, intron-free copy of the desired DNA 
sequence can be made from RNA using an enzyme called “reverse 
transcriptase.” The reverse transcriptase enzyme comes from retroviruses. 
The genetic material of retroviruses is composed of RNA rather than DNA 
but it is converted into DNA, via reverse transcriptase, so that the virus can 
blend in with the genetic material of the invaded cell and be copied during 
each cell division (Sanderson, 2007). Now, human cells contain RNA 
molecules that correspond to the DNA sequences of the genes being expressed 
in any particular cell. Thus, while the gene for human insulin is found in 
every cell of the body (insofar as almost all of the cells of the human body 
contain the same DNA) its complementary RNA can only be found in the 
pancreatic cells where the gene is expressed.  If we purify the RNA sequences 
out of the pancreatic cells, then using reverse transcriptase we can make the 
complementary, intron-free DNA copy, ready to be inserted into bacteria.  
 A gene can be inserted into a bacterium via a plasmid, i.e., a small 
circle of DNA. The genetic material of bacteria is contained in several 
plasmids as well as one chromosome. However, the DNA contained in the 
plasmids is not essential for cell growth and division. Given that plasmids are 
used by a bacterium, but not essential to its function, means that plasmids 
can be isolated, transformed, reinserted and the bacterium will still accept 
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them as part of itself (Hill, 2002). Every 20 minutes, when the bacterium 
divides, the plasmid, along with the transgene, will be duplicated. Of course, 
the transgene must first be inserted into the plasmid. This task is at the 
heart of recombinant DNA technology since it consists of taking a strand of 
DNA and recombining it into another string of DNA. Restriction 
endonucleases enzymes, also known as restriction enzymes, are essential for 
this task. They are found in bacteria where they are used as a defense 
mechanism against viral infections. The enzymes cut invading DNA 
(assuming the DNA is viral) at very specific sites given a specific sequence. 
For example, the first restriction enzyme discovered (out of the ~900 isolated 
to date) was EcoRI found in Escherichia coli (Hill, 2002, p. 92). EcoRI looks 
for the following double-stranded sequence: 
5’ GAATTC 3’ 
3’ CTTAAG 5’ 
 
Once the sequence is identified, the enzyme cuts each strand between the 




Next, the DNA fragments separate from each other and the protruding 3’ and 
5’ ends, known as “sticky ends,” will bond with complementary sequences. 
The origin of the sequences does not affect their ability to bond together. In 
fact, if two different DNA sequences are cut with the EcoRI enzyme and 
mixed together, the unpaired 5’ AATTC 3’ sequence will bind with the 
50 
 
unpaired 3’ TTAAG 5’ sequence. What helps them “stick” is an enzyme called 
ligase (Sanderson, 2007). Ligase helps repair broken bonds when they occur 
in a cell as a consequence of DNA replication. It is a kind of molecular glue. 
Once the transgene is glued into place, the plasmid can re-enter the 
bacterium via its pores, e.g., the pores of some bacteria open when placed in a 
medium of calcium sulfate.  
The final step of gene cloning involves screening for bacteria that 
actually took up the plasmid and thereby contain the transgene. Screening is 
typically done by applying some pressure that will allow bacteria with the 
insert to survive above the others. For example, the pressure may be in the 
form of antibiotics (Nicholl, 2002). If the plasmid with the insert contains 
genes for ampicillin resistance, then only the bacteria with the plasmid will 
survive and grow in an ampicillin medium. 
 As elaborate as the process of gene cloning may seem, it is only the 
first step of making a transgenic animal. Next, the cloned gene needs to be 
inserted at a very early stage of development, ideally the single-cell zygote 
stage, so that all of the cells of the organism (including the germ cells) can 
receive the transgene. One way to do this is with the help of a vector, e.g., a 
defective retrovirus. The first transgenic animals were successfully created 
by infecting mouse embryos with retroviruses. The retrovirus is defective 
insofar as it does not produce infectious viruses but it will nonetheless 
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incorporate the trasngene into the genome at one of the provirus integration 
sites.  
While the retrovirus method can be used successfully to make 
transgenics, it has two limitations. First, it has size limitations—only 8 
kilobases of foreign DNA can be transferred via a retrovirus—and second, the 
number of provirus integration sites in the genome can vary from one animal 
to the next—from one integration site to more than 20 (Taupitz & Weschka, 
2009). Of course, depending on the goal of the experiment, these limitations 
may not be an obstacle. For example, the retrovirus method was used to 
make fluorescent piglets in Munich. The green fluorescent protein (GFP), 
which converts UV light into low-energy green light, was first isolated from 
the jellyfish Aequorea Victoria. When coupled with a protein, GFP can make 
the journey of the protein through a cell visible. GFP can also be used to 
monitor levels of stress in animals. Researchers in Singapore are trying to 
engineer a zebrafish from the Ganges, a highly polluted river in India, in 
such a way that the fish would glow green when under stress, due to heavy 
metals in the water (Renneberg & Demain, 2007). 
 Pronuclear injection is another method that can be used to make 
transgenic animals. When sperm and egg unite to produce a zygote, foreign 
DNA can be directly injected into either the male or the female pronucleus 
via a micropipette—no vector is needed.  The problem with this method is 
that the insertion of the transgene occurs at random. Consequently, it is 
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necessary to generate more than one line of animals with each transgene to 
identify a similar change in phenotype that could be attributed to the 
transgene and not to some other factor. In contrast, the ES cell method 
allows for the integration of the transgene into specified locations in the 
genome. Here, ES cells are first isolated from the inner cell mass of the 
blastocyst and then segments of the genome can be replaced with foreign 
DNA fragments using a technique called “homologous recombination” 
(Capecchi, 2005). The cells are then injected back into the inner cell mass of a 
blastocyst but the offspring will be chimeras, since only a portion of the cells 
carry the transgene. However, subsequent crossbreeding will result in 
homozygous transgenic lines (Renneberg & Demain, 2007). Hence, this 
method has some advantages over the other two methods, i.e., large amounts 
of DNA can be transferred and one can control the site of insertion. Its major 
drawback, however, is that for reasons yet unknown, it only works on mice 
(Taupitz & Weschka, 2009). 
 Regardless of which method is used, another problem to worry about is 
possible toxic effects of the transgene product.  If the transgene is expressed 
incorrectly, the effects could be lethal. To avoid this problem, the inserted 
sequence has to include both a coding region—the sequence that ultimately 
codes for a protein, e.g., insulin, and a control region—the sequence that 
regulates the expression of the gene, e.g., a promoter to which RNA will bind 
to initiate transcription. Some promoters drive a high level of constant 
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transcription in most cell types and developmental stages. Others provide 
more control over patters of expression. A gene fused with a tissue specific 
promoter, for example, will only produce its protein product in the tissues 
specified by that promoter. In addition, it is possible to generate a transgenic 
animal with a silent transgene that can become activated at any time by the 
application of certain drugs (Taupitz & Weschka, 2009). Once the transgene, 
plus the appropriate control region, are inserted, the embryo is transferred to 
the uterus of a pseudopregnant female. In some species, females can become 
pseudopregnant following an estrus in which they engage in coitus with 
infertile males. Afterward, the females may develop mammary glands, 
lactate and build nests. If the pseudopregnant females carry the embryo to 
term, the pups will be transgenic.  
 One reason to create interspecies transgenics is to model human 
diseases in nonhuman animals to ultimately develop treatments. Another 
reason is to create “pharm” animals—interspecies transgenics that can 
secrete human proteins in their body fluids. Pharmaceutical companies then 
collect the proteins and distribute them to people in the form of drugs. 
Human proteins can be expressed in a variety of biological fluids, e.g., milk, 
urine, saliva, and seminal fluid. Milk is the preferred fluid, because of its 
large scale volume production, but urine has some advantages, too. It can be 
expressed in both sexes, harvested soon after birth and expressed throughout 
the life of an animal. However, in spite of these advantages, collecting 
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proteins from urine is also time and cost consuming, at least more so than 
collecting proteins from milk (Melo, Canavessi, Franco, & Rumpf, 2007). 
 In the late 1980s, GenePharming, a Dutch company, set out to create 
transgenic cows that could secrete the human protein “lactoferrin” in their 
milk. Lactoferrin is a protein found in breast milk that improves the 
absorption of iron and protects against intestinal infections. Out of the 2,400 
transgenic embryos that were created, only 128 developed far enough to be 
transplanted into cows, and only one was born. Unfortunately, however, the 
calf was a male and thus unable to produce milk containing the protein. A 
few years later, its transgenic sperm was used to fertilize nontransgenic cows 
and, eventually, eight transgenic female calves were born. Three of them died 
and the rest were fertilized with nontransgenic sperm once they became 
sexually active. After they gave birth they began to produce milk. The milk 
contained human lactoferrin in concentrations between 0.3 to 2.8 grams per 
liter and was identical to the lactoferrin found in human breast milk 
(Renneberg & Demain, 2007). 
 To offset some of the costs of a mammalian farm, low cost rodent farms 
have also been used. Mouse milking machines can milk a mouse and produce 
4 milliliters of milk per day. For example, since the late 1980s, transgenic 
mice have been producing t-PA, an agent that dissolves blood clots in heart 
attacks. Transgenic chickens, on the other hand, have been engineered to 
produce antibodies in their eggs. The egg white contains 3 to 4 grams of 
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protein and chickens lay an average of 250 eggs per day (Renneberg & 
Demain, 2007). Finally, goats, which reproduce faster than cattle, have been 
engineered to produce spider silk proteins in their milk. Spider silk is as 
strong as steel but at the same time light and elastic. These properties are 
ideal for making artificial ligaments and tendons or for creating bulletproof 
vests. Mass producing spider silk by keeping large numbers of spiders in the 
laboratory is not an option because spiders are territorial. They kill each 
other if they live close together. Hence, scientists created transgenic goats 
capable of secreting spider silk protein in their milk as a solution to this 
problem. However, when the fibers were obtained, they did not meet the 
tenacity and resistance properties present in spider silk, most likely because 
of a faulty purification process that is critical for obtaining the desired 
product (Melo et al., 2007). 
 
Summary 
In closing, let me briefly review the four part-human candidates I 
introduced in this chapter: chimeras, hybrids, cybrids and transgenics. 
Chimeras contain cell populations derived from at least two different zygotes 
of the same or different species. Currently, there are a few different ways to 
create human-nonhuman chimeras. First, human tissues and organs can be 
engrafted onto immunodeficient nonhuman animals—e.g., human tumors in 
Nude mice. Second, nonhuman organs can be transplanted into humans.  
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However, as we learned in the last chapter, nonhuman organs tend to be 
rejected by humans—with or without immunosuppressant drugs—hence, it is 
best to “humanize” the nonhuman donor before transplantation to prevent 
rejection—e.g., sheep chimeras whose organs are composed of cells of human 
origin. Last, nonhuman cells can be engrafted onto humans—e.g., porcine 
neuron in the brains of Parkinson’s patients—and conversely, human cells 
can be engrafted onto nonhuman animals—e.g., human neurons in the brains 
of old world monkey embryos.  
Hybrids are made by mixing gametes, i.e., sperm and egg, of two 
different species. No human-nonhuman hybrid was ever created but human-
nonhuman fertilized eggs have been, and they continue to be created to test 
the fertilization capacity of human sperm, known as the “hamster test.” Yet 
another part-human candidate is the cytoplasmic hybrid, or cybrid, made by 
inserting a nucleus of a somatic cell of one species into an enucleated egg of 
another species. An enucleated egg lacks a nucleus but contains its own 
cytoplasm and mitochondrial DNA. Scientists have attempted to make 
human-nonhuman cybrids by injecting human nuclei into enucleated rabbit 
cells, but the cybrid embryos did not develop past the blastocyst stage. 
Finally, transgenics are made by splicing sequences of foreign DNA into the 
recipient’s genome. Human-nonhuman transgenics are usually created for 
medical purposes, e.g., to secrete human proteins in their body fluids or to 














What is the relation between a whole and its parts? Is a whole 
identical to its parts? Is a whole greater than the sum of its parts? Can a 
whole survive the gain, loss or replacement of parts? Philosophers have been 
interested in such questions since Plato and the interest continues in 
contemporary metaphysics. In this chapter, I want to look at some of the 
ways in which philosophers have thought about parts and wholes. My aim is 
to see if any of the available part/whole distinctions can help us distinguish 
animals that are merely partially composed of human parts from animals 
that are part-human.  
I begin with mereology, a metaphysical theory of the relations of parts 
to wholes. I then look at an applied form of mereology, bio-ontology, which is 
intended to capture the unique nature of parts and wholes in biology. In the 
next section, I consider an intuition-based approach to parts and wholes, 
which is an approach that has become the default strategy for delineating 
part-humans in bioethics. Finally, in the last two sections, I examine two 
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part/whole distinctions often used to help categorize biologically engineered 
animals. The first is a quantitative approach, by which the degree of 
humanness is calculated via the ratio of human to nonhuman parts. The 
second is the germ-line/soma distinction, an approach which emphasizes 




Mereology is a metaphysical theory of the relations between parts and 
wholes. Although philosophers have been thinking about parts and wholes for 
a long time, the pure theory of part-whole relations was first formulated by 
Stanislaw Lesniewski in 1916.  The theory did not become accessible to 
English speakers until the publication of Henry Leonard‟s and Nelson 
Goodman‟s The Calculus of Individuals in 1940. In what follows, I focus 
mostly on the contemporary formulations of mereology as they grew out of 
the Lesniewski, Leonard and Goodman tradition. 
 Mereology is structured in a way similar to logic: it is a theory based 
on axioms and derived theorems. For example, any mereological system 
requires at least one primitive binary relation. Most often this relation is 
Parthood where “x is a part of y” is written Pxy. Using the Parthood relation, 
one can establish some basic axioms. For instance, in standard mereology 
there is the axiom of Reflexivity: 
59 
 
Reflexivity (Pxx):  Everything is a part of itself 
 
And the axiom of Transitivity: 
 
Transitivity ((Pxy & Pyz)  Pxz)):   
Any part of any part of a thing is itself part of that thing 
 
Additional axioms and principles are then added by invoking the existence of 
certain mereological items given the already established existence of other 
items. For example, standard mereology includes the Unrestricted 
Composition Principle, which states that there is always a mereological sum 
of two or more parts:   
 
Unrestricted Composition:  
For all xs there is some y such that the xs compose y 
 
In other words, for any number of objects there exists a mereological sum 
that consists of exactly those objects. For example, besides the 52 cards that 
make up a deck, there also exists something else that the cards compose, 
namely a deck.   
Focusing on the Unrestricted Composition principle helps reveal the 
similarity between mereology and set theory. A set is determined precisely by 
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what is in it. The same is true of mereological sums. Thus, in set theory, 
playing cards can compose a set but so can my left shoulder, a bottle of water 
and an accordion.  There need not be any common property that members of 
a set share in order to be part of one set. Similarly, as the Unrestricted 
Composition principle demonstrates, there need not be a common property 
that objects share in order to compose a mereological sum.  
 Rather than getting lost in the details of mereology and set theory, 
perhaps a more efficient way of assessing the applicability of mereology to 
part-humans is to think about the following question. Do we run into any 
problems if we conceive of organisms as sets composed of various members or, 
in mereological terms, as sums composed of various parts? The suggestion to 
conceive of organisms as sums might seem bizarre given Ghiselin‟s (1974) 
and Hull‟s (1978) influential thesis that organisms and species should be 
treated as individuals rather than classes. However, sets differ from classes 
in the following way: While a class is a collection of objects whose members 
share a common property the same requirement does not apply to sets. 
Consequently, although Ghiselin and Hull object to defining organisms in 
terms of shared cellular properties and to defining species in terms of shared 
intrinsic properties, that objection has no force when biological entities are 
considered sets. After all, sets are defined precisely by what is in them, which 
means that even if there is no intrinsic property that all the parts of an 
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organism share, the organism can still be considered a set—a set of whatever 
parts comprise that organism.  
 Hence, although conceiving of an organism as a sum of parts may not 
be very interesting or informative, doing so does not commit us to anything 
that is in tension with the biological nature of organisms. However, the 
noncommittal aspect of mereological sums no longer holds true when we 
consider another principle of mereology based on an analogous principle in 
set theory:   
 
Extensionality: Sameness of parts is sufficient for identity 
 
The mereological Extensionality principle says that an object is exhaustively 
defined by its constituent parts. In set theory, this principle states that a set 
is exhaustively defined by its constituent elements. What this means is that 
if one set has four telephones in it (and nothing else) and another set has four 
telephones in it (and nothing else) then they are the same set if they contain 
the same four telephones. Otherwise they are different sets. 
If we apply the principle of Extensionality to organisms, two problems 
emerge. First, organisms with different parts at different times will not be 
the same organism. This results from the fact that, on the Extensionality 
principle, an object with different parts at different times cannot be identical 
with the sum of its parts at any other time (Simons, 1987). Let me explain 
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what I mean when I say that organisms have different parts at different 
times. At the beginning of the life cycle, an organism is composed of cells that 
contain structures that will also appear in the adult form of the organism, 
e.g., chromosomes, mitochondria, membranes, etc. Yet, as the organism 
grows it acquires new parts such as organs, bones, limbs—parts that were 
not present at the embryonic stage. For example, in our own species, females 
gain breasts after puberty and if they become pregnant, they will grow a 
fetus. On the other hand, both men and women lose parts, e.g., the tissue 
lining the intestines is exchanged every few days, and after puberty, women 
lose an egg every month they are not pregnant. Perhaps the most striking 
examples of an organism‟s capacity to lose and gain parts are organisms that 
go through dramatically different life stages. For example, the butterfly goes 
through the egg, larva, pupa, and the adult stage.  
The point is that the process of gaining and losing parts is not 
something that is a rare exception for organisms. It is what organisms do! 
They grow, reproduce, age—the life cycle is about change, almost by 
definition. Hence, while it might make sense to identify a set with the sum of 
its members, given the static nature of sets, to apply the Extensionality 
principle to organisms is to violate the idea that organisms retain their 
identity through time. A criterion according to which sums composed of 
different parts are different is fundamentally incompatible with the workings 
of the biological world.  
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 The second problem that organisms pose for the Extensionality 
principle is that an organism is fundamentally different from its 
disassembled parts—something that the Extensionality principle does not 
recognize (Koslicki, 2008). According to the Extensionality principle, if x and 
y have all their parts in common then x and y are identical. Hence, if I were 
to take my cat, cut her open, remove her liver and heart, and place the two 
organs along with the rest of her body in a large zip lock bag, the 
Extensionality principle would lead me to think that the contents of the bag 
are identical to my cat before the procedure. Similarly, if I were to chop up 
my next door neighbor at the joints and stack up all his body parts in the 
corner of the backyard, the heap of body parts would be identical to my 
neighbor given that all of his parts are contained in the heap. As strange as 
this principle may seem when we apply it to organisms, it makes perfectly 
good sense when we apply it to sets. Given that a set has no properties other 
than its members, a set is exhaustively defined by its constituents. The 
relationships that the members of a set bear to each other are irrelevant to 
the identity of the set.   
 It seems obvious, however, that the same does not hold true for 
organisms. To equate a heap of my neighbor‟s parts with my neighbor—prior 
to the massacre—seems very strange, precisely because the arrangement and 
the relationship between the parts of an organism do matter. Even when the 
organism is still alive, a change in the arrangement of the parts can have 
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dramatic effects on the organism as a whole. Imagine what the 
rearrangement of organs would do to an organism or what the rearrangement 
of nucleotides within the coding sequence of its DNA would do. If on the 
Extensionality principle, sameness of parts is sufficient for identity and the 
arrangements of parts is irrelevant, the principle is violated the moment we 
consider living entities.  
 To be fair, mereologists are concerned with relations among parts, but 
their concern is very different from the concern biologists share when they 
discuss the relationship between organisms and their parts.  Talk of relations 
and integration among parts in standard mereology is motivated by the 
problem of arbitrary sums. The arbitrary sums problem arises as a 
consequence of accepting the Unrestricted Composition principle that, if you 
recall, states that for any number of objects there exists a sum that consists 
of exactly those objects. This principle generates the problem of the existence 
of certain gerrymandered, mereological sums for whose existence there is no 
evidence outside of the theory itself. Hence, the Mormon Temple and the 
Pope comprise a mereological sum and there exists a “trout-turkey” (David 
Lewis‟s example (Lewis, 1991, pp. 79-81)) whose parts are the still 
undetached upper half of a trout along with the still undetached lower half of 
a turkey. The problem of arbitrary sums cannot be easily fixed by adding a 
requirement of spatio-temporal proximity. Why? Because such an arbitrary 
requirement would not exclude pluralities of objects that are gerrymandered 
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but happen to be connected in space and time. Van Inwagen (1990) 
demonstrates this point with an example of a handshake. Based on the 
spatio-temporal proximity requirement, two people shaking hands would 
compose a further object for as long as they are engaged in the handshake 
simply because their hands are touching (Inwagen, 1990). Thus, when 
mereologists talk of relations and integration among parts they are doing so 
with the aim of solving problems of this kind. Biologists, on the other hand, 
care about the integration among parts because they are interested in 
explaining how the parts contribute to the functioning of the organism.  
 There was a time when an effort was made to make mereology more 
suitable for dealing with organic wholes. In the mid 1950s, Nicholas Rescher 
and Paul Oppenheim wrote a paper that was an attempt to tamper with the 
axioms of mereology in order to “accommodate a wide portion of the spectrum 
of scientifically interesting usages of „is a part of‟” (Rescher, 1955, p. 8). 
Rescher and Oppenheim put together a short list of requirements that a 
mereological sum should meet in order to count as an integrated whole (e.g., 
an organic whole): 
i. The whole must possess some attribute in virtue of its status as a 
whole—some attribute peculiar to it, and characteristic of it as a 
whole. 
ii. The parts of the whole must stand in some special and characteristic 
relation of dependence with one another; they must satisfy some 
special condition in virtue of their status as parts of a whole.  
iii. The whole must possess some kind of structure, in virtue of which 
certain specifically structural characteristics pertain to it. (Rescher & 
Oppenheim, 1955, p. 334) 
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However, one could not easily transfer these requirements to mereological 
theory unless the concepts of attribute, relation and structure were defined 
formally. The formal aspect of mereology is considered a virtue of the theory 
because it means that mereology (like logic) is without content and can 
therefore be applied to anything. But when formal considerations are applied 
to the plethora of phenomena found in the world, we discover that the only 
way mereological axioms can capture the messiness of reality is by leaving all 
the mess out. 
Consider the special sciences that concern themselves with particular 
(and messy) kinds of composition relevant to their respective domains. 
Biologists are interested in how cells compose multicellular organisms, 
chemists in how oxygen and hydrogen compose water, economists in how 
individual markets compose economies, etc. But mereologists are not 
interested in such details. After all, to include them would be to lose the 
formal aspect of their theory. Rather, they seek to understand something 
more fundamental:  the general composition relation itself (Ladyman, Ross, 
Spurrett, & Collier, 2007). This is the relation that obtains between parts of 
any whole. Mereologists call it “fusion.” The problem is that by making fusion 
the abstract composition relation, mereologists are ignoring actual complexity 
(of course, the more obvious problem is that we have no reason to believe that 
anything like fusion actually exists).  
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 The difficulty of extending a formal theory like mereology to 
accommodate the messy nature of organisms is what ultimately led 
mereologists to give up on the Rescher and Oppenheim project. Simons 
summarizes this historical attempt with little hope for the future, 
The lesson of history seems to be that philosophers who have 
talked about integral or organic wholes…have never managed, 
even where they tried, to get very clear about what such a whole 
was, which may suggest that the whole area is better left alone. 
(Simons, 1987, p. 290)  
 
Despite Simons‟s suggestion—to leave organic wholes out of mereology—a 
new subfield of mereology, known as bio-ontology, has recently emerged. 
Customized to the world of biology, bio-ontology is designed to capture the 
variable and complex nature of organisms. In the next section, I provide an 
overview of bio-ontology and assess its viability as a strategy for investigating 
the nature of part-humans.  
 
Bio-ontology 
 Similar to standard mereology, bio-ontology (sometimes referred to as 
“applied mereology”) is a metaphysical theory concerned with the relations 
between parts and wholes as well as the relations between parts within a 
whole. What is different about bio-ontology, however, is that its primitive 
relations are applicable to the world of biology. Unlike the primitive relations 
in standard mereology—that are based on logical relations—the primitive 
relations in bio-ontology are “law-like relations between universals of the sort 
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that are discovered through scientific research” (Smith, 2004, p. 324). 
Consequently, the relations used in bio-ontology hold between classes, not 
sets. Nonetheless, bio-ontology is similar to mereology in that it is a formal 
theory; its entities are represented by logical statements that describe what 
the terms are, how they are related to one another, and how they can or 
cannot be related to one another.  
 The two primitive relations in bio-ontology are 1) “is_A,” the relation of 
identity and 2) “part_of,” the relation of parthood.  Since any relation in bio-
ontology is a law-like relation between universals, the relations hold between 
classes. Thus, A is_a B is read “the class A belongs as a subclass to the class 
B” or “the class B subsumes class A.” What the A is_a B relation implies is 
that if (i) class A belongs to class B and (ii) a certain particular is classified as 
being an A then (iii) it has to be classified as being a B, too (Johansson & 
Lynöe, 2008). If we substitute „cat‟ for A and „mammal‟ for B we get the 
following example: if (i) cats are mammals and (ii) Felix is a cat then (iii) 
Felix is a mammal.  This is what the bio-ontological claim “cat is_a mammal” 
implies. 
 The part_of relation used in bio-ontology is also a relation between 
classes. What the claim A part_of B implies is that each member of class A is 
part of a member of class B, but not all members of B have a member of A as 
a part. For example, the bio-ontological claim “nuclei part_of cells” is true 
69 
 
because all nuclei (A) are parts of cells (B) but there are cells that do not have 
nuclei, such as prokaryotic cells.  
 Since the relations used to describe biological entities in bio-ontology 
are relations between classes it will be helpful to once again review the 
difference between classes and sets. Recall from the last section that a set 
(used in standard mereology) is defined precisely by what is in it while a class 
(used in bio-ontology) is a collection of objects that share a common property. 
Accordingly, there can only be one empty set, i.e., a set without a member, 
while there are many empty classes, e.g., the class of mermaids and the class 
of offspring of two mules. The two are different empty classes but they count 
as one and the same empty set (Johansson & Lynöe, 2008). Moreover, classes 
in bio-ontology have no predetermined limits in space and/or time. For 
example, the class of cats is “open” in a sense that if a new cat is born it 
automatically becomes a member of its corresponding class. Finally, entities 
referred to in bio-ontological claims are “prototypes,” i.e., they are more or 
less similar to each member of the class they represent (Johansson & Lynöe, 
2008, p. 431). Hence the claim “fingers part_of hand” refers to the 
prototypical five-fingered human, although nonprototypical hands also exist 
and may have more or less than five fingers. 
 When I first compared the concept of a set to that of a class, in the last 
section, I brought up Ghiselin‟s and Hull‟s influential thesis: that organisms 
and species are individuals rather than classes. Although the “individuality 
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thesis” did not pose a problem for mereology, because relations in mereology 
hold between sets, it poses a problem for bio-ontology, because relations in 
bio-ontology hold between classes. I will now reconstruct Ghiselin‟s and Hull‟s 
argument in order to show why a bio-ontological account of a “cat”—where to 
be a cat is to be a member of a certain class—is incompatible with Ghiselin‟s 
and Hull‟s account of what it means to be a cat. 
Ghiselin (1974) and Hull (1978) claim that species are individuals 
rather than classes by arguing that species are entities capable of evolving by 
selection. The implication is that such evolution requires organisms of a 
species to be connected by parent-offspring relations and these relations, in 
turn, require that the organisms of a species be spatiotemporally connected. 
As a result, members of a species must be generationally continuous if there 
is to be evolution by natural selection operating across generations—they 
must be part of a single evolving lineage (Ereshefsky, 1991; 2008). Now, since 
individuals consist of parts that are spatiotemporally restricted and because 
classes, on the other hand, consist of members that are spatiotemporally 
unrestricted (Instances of gold, for example, can occur anywhere and still 
belong to the class “gold.”), species are more likely to be individuals than 
classes.  
 This is especially true in bio-ontology. Classes are groups of entities 
that function according to scientific laws. These laws have no limits in space 
and/or time, which means that if “all cats are mammals” is a law, then that is 
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true of any cat that is born anywhere at any time. But if species are 
individuals, they do not function according to scientific laws. In fact, a shared 
similarity among organisms belonging to a particular species can be 
misleading. Two organisms may be very similar but unless they belong to the 
same spatiotemporally continuous lineage they are not part of the same 
species. As Hull (1986) argued, from an evolutionary perspective there is no 
nonhistorical similarity, governed by a scientific law, that all and only 
humans must share to be part of the species Homo sapiens. Being a part of 
the lineage Homo sapiens is both necessary and sufficient for being a human. 
Thus, the following statement in bio-ontology, “all humans are x” where x is a 
similarity that has the properties of a scientific law, is simply not a true 
statement about our own species.   
 The use of a prototype in bio-ontology further exemplifies the 
incompatibility between the theoretical commitments of bio-ontology and the 
“species are individuals” thesis. If you recall, the idea behind prototypes is 
that they are able to represent a class insofar as they are more or less similar 
to each member of that class. But if species are individuals then an organism 
belongs to a species because it is part of a lineage not because it resembles 
other members of that species. This is why species are not represented by 
prototypes but by “type specimen.” The type specimen serves as an ostensive 
definition of a species:  a definition that conveys the meaning of a term by 
pointing to an example. The type specimen for the species Homo 
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neanderthalensis, for instance, was the specimen “Neanderthal-1” discovered 
by Johann Karl Fuhlrott in 1856, consisting of a skullcap, thigh bones, part of 
a pelvis, some ribs, and some arm and shoulder bones (Richards & Schmitz 
2008). Neanderthal-1 “defined” the species Homo neanderthalensis insofar as 
it pointed to the species of which it was a member. Unlike a prototype, the 
type specimen need not be similar to other members of its species. It can be 
aberrant, deformed or have color variations because there is no requirement 
for it to be “typical” of the species. It needs only to be appropriately causally 
connected. 
 The fact that relations in bio-ontology are between classes rather than 
individuals is reason enough to worry about the applicability of bio-ontology 
to the biological domain. However, there are other aspects of bio-ontology 
that appear to be especially fitting for analyzing the nature of part-humans 
and, consequently seem worthy of a closer look. 
 For example, one promising aspect of bio-ontology is that it provides 
guidelines for deciding when something is a genuine part of an organism 
rather than something that is merely located in it. Consider the act of eating 
a banana as a useful demonstration of the transition from location to 
parthood. When I bite into a banana, a piece of it is no longer a part of the 
fruit but is now located in my oral cavity. It then degrades into sugars, amino 
acids and fatty acids. The portions that traverse the epithelium become parts 
of epithelial cells and then parts of the blood and lymph nodes. Others might 
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not acquire the status of parthood but will remain merely located in the 
stomach cavity (Smith, Majino, Schulz, Kumar, & Rosse, 2005). Bio-ontologists 
employ various criteria for establishing whether something is a genuine part 
of an organism or something that is merely located in it. Such criteria may be 
useful for judging whether an animal is merely partially composed of human 
parts or part-human, which is why I now turn to the two most widely used 
parthood criteria in bio-ontology—the genetics and the function criteria.  
 According to the genetics criterion, any biological object A is merely 
located in B (i.e., not part of) if genetic origins of A and B are different 
(Schulz, Kumar, & Bittner, 2006; see also Smith et al., 2005). In other words, 
if something is to count as part of the body it must be of the same genetic 
origin as the body itself. This means that an embryo is not part of the mother, 
and a bacterium is not part of a tissue. The two are merely located in the 
body given that their genetic origins are different than the body itself. In 
addition, artifacts such as a heart pacemaker, bullet and dental filling are 
also not part of the body since they have no genetic origin.  
The second widely used parthood criterion is that of function. 
According to the function criterion, A is part of B if A has a function essential 
to B‟s survival or the maintenance of B‟s proper functioning (Schulz et al., 
2006; see also Smith et al., 2005). According to the function criterion, the 
brain and the heart are part of an organism because they both perform 
functions essential for the survival of the organism. Conversely, urine is not 
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essential to the survival of the bladder, which means that urine is not part of 
the bladder but is merely located in it (Smith et al., 2005).  
 While the genetic and function criteria have potential to be legitimate 
ways of establishing genuine parthood, their potential remains unrealized 
because they are simply asserted, rather than argued for, in the bio-ontology 
literature. What is more frustrating, however, is that the authors allow for 
exceptions to the criteria if the entity being considered seems intuitively to be 
part of the organism. For example, sugars, lipids, amino acids, oxygen and 
nitrogen molecules do not have a genetic origin, which means that they ought 
to be merely located in an organism on the genetics criterion for parthood. 
But when we think of a banana being broken down into amino acids, the 
portion of which traverse the epithelium and ultimately enter the blood 
stream, intuitively it seems that the amino acids do become part of the 
organism. Consequently, the genetics criterion for parthood is overruled by 
an appeal to intuitions (Schulz et al., 2006). The same exception applies to 
cell organelles such as chloroplasts or mitochondria (i.e., endosymbionts) that 
have their own DNA, and thus a different genetic origin than the host cells, 
yet are considered parts of cells by some bio-ontologists (Schulz et al., 2006; 
see also Smith et al., 2005).  
Exceptions to the function criterion also apply. They include kidneys or 
other organs that come in pairs, the appendix whose functional relevance has 
disappeared during evolution and hair, which seems inessential to the proper 
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functioning of the body. None of these entities would count as parts of the 
body on the function criterion since, by themselves, they are not essential to 
its proper functioning. But, here again the intuitions of bio-ontologists 
overrule the parthood criterion because treating these entities as merely 
located in the body seems counter intuitive (Schulz et al., 2006; see also 
Smith et al., 2005).  
 Additional problems arise when an entity is considered merely located 
in the body on one criterion but a part of the body on the other. A 
transplanted heart valve or kidney, for instance, is merely located in the body 
on the genetic criterion since its genetic origins are different than that of the 
recipient. Yet transplants and implants often fulfill the same essential 
biological function as genetically identical structures. Thus, on the function 
criterion, they would count as part of the body (Schulz et al., 2006). Even if 
bio-ontologists were not committed to using both criteria at all times, they 
still fail to provide overriding reasons to help resolve conflicts of this kind.  In 
other words, they fail to provide reasons for why sometimes the genetic 
criterion should overrule the function criterion and vice versa  
 The fact that the genetic and the function criteria allow for exceptions 
based on intuitions and that no overriding reasons are provided when the two 
are in conflict is certainly troubling. But further problems arise when we take 
a closer look at the function criterion. Recall that the function criterion for 
genuine parthood states that A is part of B if A has a function essential to B‟s 
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survival or to the maintenance of B‟s proper functioning. A virus, for 
example, may take on a functional role in a body, directing the cell to 
construct certain proteins that the virus needs for reproduction, but it is not 
part of the body on the function criterion because the directions given by the 
virus interfere with the body‟s proper function (Donnelly, 2004). But what 
exactly is the body‟s proper function? The function debate in philosophy of 
biology is the place to look for answers.    
 Although in the bio-ontology literature the word „function‟ is often 
preceded by the word „proper,‟ bio-ontologists explicitly state that their 
account of function is descriptive rather than normative: “In conformity with 
the views of Cummins…we insist that much function talk is either purely 
descriptive or explains how something works when it exists” (Johansson et 
al., 2005, p. 163). Since the notion of function endorsed by bio-ontologists 
“conforms” to the views of Cummins, let us start there. According to Robert 
Cummins (1975), function statements explain the contribution of an item to 
the capacity or activity of the system that contains the item. Hence, on 
Cummins‟s view, the function of an item does not explain the existence of the 
item; rather, the function of an item is merely its causal contribution to the 
system.  
 Cummins‟s notion of function seems right insofar as it accurately 
describes the way in which biologists provide a functional analysis of an 
organism—they conceptually decompose the organism into simpler parts and 
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describe what each part contributes to the overall capacities or activities of 
the organism (Neander, 1999). In physiology, for example, the human 
organism is decomposed into systems (e.g., digestive, circulatory, respiratory, 
reproductive, immune, etc.), these systems are then decomposed into their 
parts (e.g., the digestive system into the mouth, esophagus, stomach, 
pancreas, etc.), these parts then further decomposed into their parts (e.g., the 
mouth into the tongue, saliva glands, teeth, etc.) and these into theirs (e.g., 
the tongue into muscles, sensory receptors, etc.) down to the level of 
individual cells and their subcellular components (Neander, 1999). As the 
organism is conceptually decomposed, the causal contribution of each part is 
described along the way.  
 But some have questioned whether identifying causal contributions in 
biology can be nonteleological in the way Cummins describes. For example, 
David Hull (1974) demonstrates how the concept of function in biology is 
inevitably teleological by contrasting a physicist‟s explanation of the 
expansion of gas with a biologist‟s explanation of sweating in mammals 
Just as a physicist might say that heating a gas causes it to 
expand, a biologist might say that heating a mammal causes it 
to sweat. But a biologist might also say that a mammal sweats 
when heated in order to keep its temperature constant, while no 
physicist would say that a gas expands when heated in order to 
keep its temperature constant—even though that is exactly 
what happens. (Hull, 1974, p. 102) 
 
Hull‟s point is that keeping the temperature constant is not the function of 
gas expansion but simply its effect, while keeping the temperature constant 
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is the function of sweating in mammals. Why do we attribute a function to 
the sweat of a mammal and not to the expansion of gas? According to David 
Buller (1999), the difference lies in the theoretical commitments implicit in 
the biological concept of function. What accounts for the difference is that 
sweating, like all biological functions, is a goal-directed process. Sweat seems 
to occur in order to bring about the cooling of the body while the expansion of 
gas does not seem directed toward the goal of maintaining temperature 
(Buller, 1999).  
 Cummins‟s notion of function—as mere causal contribution—does not 
capture this teleological component unique to biological function. It also does 
not provide any means of discriminating between functions and mere effects. 
On Cummins‟s account, pumping blood need not be the heart‟s function. It 
could also be making noise (something a heart does).  Hence, we could say 
that the mammalian circulatory system has the capacity to make noise, and 
on Cummins‟s functional analysis, it would follow that the heart contributes 
to the mammalian circulatory system by making noise (Buller, 1999).  But no 
biologist would claim that making noise is the function of the heart. Hence, if 
on Cummins‟s view, to say “the function of X is Y” is to mean “X produces the 
effect Y” then his account of function fails to distinguish between the effects 
of an organ, such as making noise, and the organ‟s function, such as pumping 
blood (Buller, 1999). Lastly, if functions are capacities, as they are on 
Cummins‟s view, then the human body‟s capacity to die of various diseases 
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would count as a function in the same way that a body‟s capacity to survive 
would count as a function (Griffiths, 1999). 
In addition to these problems, the notion of function that bio-
ontologists endorse is also allegedly a “purely descriptive” notion. But if bio-
ontologists were right, that function is purely descriptive, then a heart that 
does not pump blood would not have that function. But notice that we assign 
the function of pumping blood to a heart even if it fails to do so. We call such 
hearts diseased, malformed, injured, broken, etc. because they are unable to 
perform the function that they are supposed to perform (Millikan, 1989). As 
Karen Neander points out, the same applies to artifacts, “a brake is a brake 
in virtue of what it is supposed to do—was intended or designed to do—not in 
virtue of having some specific structure or disposition” (Neander, 1999, p. 
226).  Furthermore, the function of an organ sets the norm for what it is to 
function adequately. A heart does not perform its function well if it pumps 
blood around in a manner that is too slow to deliver enough oxygen to the 
inner organs of an organism (Wouters, 2005). In short, what makes it 
legitimate for us to expect from any heart that it pumps blood in a certain 
way is the fact that functions are normative, not descriptive.  
 If biological function is something that is supposed to happen in order 
to bring about some result then a theory of function needs to explain how 
normativity and teleology are possible in nature (Buller, 1999). To date, Ruth 
Millikan‟s (1984) etiological account is considered to be one of the best 
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attempts at demystifying these peculiar features of biological function. 
Millikan defines the function of an item in terms of its evolutionary history. 
On her etiological account, to ascribe a function to an item is to claim that 
earlier items of the same type had this effect and that their having this effect 
explains the presence of later items of the same type (Griffiths, 1999). Hence, 
the function of the heart is to pump blood because pumping blood is what our 
ancestors‟ hearts did, and it is what caused these ancestors to be selected 
over competitors that lacked hearts or in which the heart had a different form 
(Wouters, 2005). Hence, if we say that the function of a cat‟s sharp curved 
claws is to catch mice it need not be the case that the cat‟s claws were 
designed in this way for a purpose. Instead, we can assume the etiological 
account of function and say that catching mice is the function whose survival 
value has bred cats with this particular form of claw (Lorenz, 1963, p. 9). 
After all, on Millikan‟s account, a trait or organ has a function in virtue of its 
role in the process of natural selection—to say that the function of X is to do 
Y implies that X is there because its ancestors did Y (Griffiths, 1999;  see also 
Millikan, 1984; Neander, 1983; Wimsatt, 1972; Wright, 1973, 1976).  
 There is some consensus among philosophers of biology that the theory 
of evolution by natural selection can demystify the normative and teleological 
features of biological function (although, as is always the case in philosophy, 
some would disagree (cf. Cummins, 1975; Davies, 2001; Hardcastle, 1999)). 
Moreover, unlike Cummins‟s theory, Millikan‟s theory can distinguish 
81 
 
functional effects from accidental ones. On the etiological account, the reason 
that it is the function of my heart to pump blood rather than to make noise is 
because the hearts of my ancestors contributed to their reproductive success, 
and thereby to the reproduction of hearts, by pumping blood, not by making 
noise (Buller, 1999). But bio-ontologists also reject the etiological account of 
biological functions, “Etiological approaches presuppose that all functional 
talk is explanatory talk; so that the function of A is referred to only in order 
to explain why A exists. Our attempt to defend a natural-scientific concept of 
function…rejects this presupposition” (Johansson et al., 2005, p. 163). It 
seems, then, that the bio-ontological account of function amounts to the 
following view. According to the function criterion, A is part of B if A has a 
function essential to B‟s survival or the maintenance of B‟s proper 
functioning. Hence, although a virus may take on a functional role in the 
body, directing the cell to construct certain proteins that the virus needs for 
reproduction, it is not part of the body on the function criterion because the 
direction given by the virus interferes with the body‟s proper function. What 
do bio-ontologists take “functions” to be? They insist that, in conformity with 
Cummins‟s view, functions can be purely descriptive. According to Cummins, 
the function of an item is merely its causal contribution to a complex system. 
The problem with Cummins‟s notion, however, is that it does not capture the 
teleological component of biological function, it fails to provide a means of 
discriminating between functions and mere effects, and it falsely 
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characterizes biological functions as something descriptive rather than 
normative. Millikan‟s etiological account, on the other hand, avoids these 
shortcomings and is considered to be the best attempt at demystifying these 
peculiar features of biological function. However, bio-ontologists reject the 




 Although the axioms of mereology and bio-ontology are based on the 
rules that govern sets and classes, it is with the help of intuitions that the 
metaphysicians working in these areas decide which theories to accept and 
which to reject. By “intuitions” I mean judgments that are not made on the 
basis of an explicit reasoning process that a person can consciously observe 
(Gopnik & Schwitzgebel, 1998). In metaphysics, it is considered a cost to a 
theory, rather than a benefit, if one is forced to abandon some intuition in 
order to accept the theory. The metaphysics literature is full of arguments 
against theories that lead to unintuitive consequence and of arguments that 
compare theories on the basis of the quantity and quality of the intuitions 
with which they conflict (Ladyman et al., 2007). For example, consider the 
following passage from L.A. Paul (2004) on the role of our intuitions in 





This is a serious problem for the essentialist if she thinks that 
an object‟s nature is not adequately captured by the few 
essential properties we have reasonably clear intuitions about. 
As such an essentialist, I take the variability of our intuitions 
about which properties of objects are essential to constitute the 
most serious threat to essentialism. After all, essentialism has a 
solid intuitive grounding as part of a philosophical (and perhaps 
even somewhat pretheoretical) understanding of the world, and 
the success of quantified modal logic has provided a rigorous 
formal framework that can undergird the view. But if, on gentle 
investigation, the intuitive grounding turns out to be confused or 
even absent, then the robust ontological picture of the de re 
natures of objects that essentialism entails may be more costly 
than it is worth. (Paul, 2004, p. 178) 
 
As Paul points out, the fact that our intuitions about what properties of an 
object are essential to it may vary is a serious problem for “essentialist” 
metaphysicians. After all, metaphysicians believe that our intuitions ground 
our philosophical understanding of the world. Given the prominent role of 
intuitions in metaphysics, it makes sense for those working in mereology and 
bio-ontology to formulate the kinds of theories that reassure them of what 
they already believed to be true.  
 Of course, contemporary metaphysicians are not the only ones who 
appeal to intuitions in constructing and arguing for their theories—
philosophers have been doing it since Plato. Recent philosophical literature 
driven in large part by appeals to intuitions includes: analyses of knowledge, 
the nature of meaning and reference, the human mind, and the moral right 
and wrong. What ought to be the proper role of intuitions (if any) in the 
validation of philosophical theories is a highly contentious topic (see, for 
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example, DePaul & Ramsey, 1998). I do not wish to fully engage in this 
debate. Instead, I want to offer a couple of reasons against the sole reliance 
on intuitions. My critique has two targets. The first one, as I already 
mentioned, is standard and applied mereology. The second one is bioethics, 
where intuitions have become the default strategy for assessing the 
humanness of biologically engineered animals.  
 As I explained in the last two chapters, successfully transplanting 
human parts into different species is a relatively recent phenomenon. The 
infancy of the research program might explain (although not justify) why for 
some bioethicists, intuitions have become the default method for assessing 
the relative humanness of genetically engineered animals. Consider, for 
example, an article by Josephine Johnston and Christopher Eliot in which 
the authors claim that “a human being with functional eagle wings” would 
likely count as human (Johnston & Eliot, 2003). The authors provide no 
justification for this claim. They assume that readers will find it intuitively 
true. Or, again, consider a report about the ethics of transplanting human 
neurons into a mouse (see Chapter 6). At Stanford University, an ethics 
committee wrote: 
We can note that, as far as we can see, the concern must be 
about specific kinds of human characteristics. A mouse with the 
human brain‟s sense of vision does not seem particularly 
troubling. Even a mouse with a memory of human quality might 




or that seemed to have a human level of self-consciousness 
would be, at the least, troubling. (Greely, Cho, Hogle, & Satz, 
2007, p. 38) 
 
The claim that some mice with human characteristics might be more human 
than others—and thereby more troubling—is, again, justified only by an 
appeal to intuitions. In fact, the committee recommends using thought 
experiments about mice with various human characteristics as a “useful way 
to explore these problems” (Greely et al., 2007, p. 18). 
Although there is nothing prima facie wrong with using intuitions in 
the course of investigation, I want to offer a couple of reasons against the sole 
use of intuitions in the context of part-humans and, more broadly, in the 
context of metaphysics. First, evidence from psychology (Nash, 1974) 
suggests that when it comes to judging the humanness and the “animality” of 
part-human, part-animal mythological hybrid figures our intuitions run 
contrary to our reasoning. A random sample of college students asked to 
judge a figure‟s humanness or animality claimed that they were especially 
influenced by the humanness or animality of the head or face. However, when 
the same subjects were asked to judge 29 portraits of mythological hybrids 
along a human-animal continuum they consistently judged the animal-
headed figures having a human torso and limbs as clearly more human than 
human headed figures having an animal torso and limbs (Nash, 1970). What 
this study suggests is that the subjects‟ intuitive designation of mythological 
hybrids along a human-animal continuum was contrary to their reasoned 
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view of what body parts should have the most influence on their decisions. 
The apparent inconsistency between intuition and reason is likely to recur in 
judgments of the humanness of biologically engineered animals, since both 
mythological hybrid figures and part-human candidates are comprised of 
human and nonhuman parts.  
The second problem with relying on intuitions when delineating part-
humans is that human intuitions about a wide range of empirical facts have 
frequently turned out to be wrong. History has shown that intuitions about 
the nature of the solar system or the shape of the earth have been mistaken. 
In fact, intuitions about empirical facts continue to mislead us even today. 
Recall the 1997 photograph of a hairless mouse with what appeared to be a 
human ear growing on its back (see, for example, Renneberg & Demain, 
2007). The photograph prompted protests around the world against genetic 
engineering because the people protesting had falsely assumed that the 
mouse was genetically engineered to grow a human ear on its back. In 
reality, however, no genetic engineering was involved in creating the mouse 
and the “ear” had no human cells in it (Choi & Vascanti, 1997). What 
appeared to be a human ear was only ear-shaped scaffolding made out of the 
same sterile, biodegradable material used in dissolving surgical stitches 
(Renneberg & Demain, 2007). Cartilage cells from the knee of a cow were 
then implanted into the scaffold, and the cartilaginous ear was implanted 
under the skin layer of the mouse. The mouse was immunodeficient, i.e., it 
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carried a random mutation that prevented its immune system from rejecting 
the cow graft (see Chapter 3). Eventually, the mouse grew extra blood vessels 
that infiltrated the biodegradable scaffolding and nourished the cow cells. 
Once the scaffolding had dissolved, the cartilage had enough structural 
integrity to support itself. The aim of the experiment was to grow a human 
body part that could be used in human reconstructive surgery, although this 
particular ear was never transplanted into a human since it was made out of 
cow rather than human cells.  
 One could argue that the above example is not a demonstration of the 
faults of our intuitions but rather a demonstration of how the media misleads 
us into believing something that is false. However, the point here is a broader 
one. Namely, that extrapolating our intuitions across unfamiliar territory 
(whether it is due to the media‟s influence or something else) can mislead us 
profoundly. Modern science has consistently confirmed this for scales, 
magnitudes, and spatial and temporal distances (Ladyman et al., 2007). For 
example, we are astounded to hear that there are more molecules in a glass 
of water than there are glasses of water in the ocean, or more cells in one 
human finger than there are people in the world. And no one‟s intuitions, in 
advance of the scientific findings, told them that combustion primarily 
involves something being taken up rather than given off, that white light 
would turn out to have compound structure, that birds are the only living 
descendants of dinosaurs, that the earth is round and moves around the sun, 
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or that Australia is presently on its way to a collision with Alaska (Wolpert, 
1992; Ladyman et al., 2007). The point is that scientific findings often run 
counter to human intuitions.  
 To summarize, in this section I have presented two reasons against the 
sole use of intuitions as an investigative strategy. First, evidence from 
psychology suggests that when it comes to judging the relative humanness of 
part-human hybrids, our intuitions run contrary to our reasoning. Second, 
human intuitions often mislead us when we rely on them to make judgments 
about empirical facts. I aimed my critique at mereology and bio-ontology, two 
areas where theories are accepted based on how well they align with our 
intuitions, and bioethics, where intuitions have become the default method 
for assessing the relative humanness of genetically engineered animals.  
 
Quantitative 
 In the next two sections I turn to a couple of different approaches to 
thinking about parts and wholes that on their face seem more appropriate to 
delineating part-humans than the previous approaches I looked at (that were 
simply made available by philosophical theory). The quantitative approach, 
unlike the intuition-based approach, involves explicit reasoning about 
transferred human parts. Here, the degree of humanness found in an 
organism is calculated via the ratio of human to nonhuman parts. Sina 
Muscati characterizes this approach in the following way:  
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A quantitative model would focus on the proportion of human 
genetic material in the transgenics. This approach would involve 
setting an arbitrary threshold of prohibited “humanness”—at 
transgenics having 50% or more human genes, for example, or 
perhaps 25%. (Muscati, 2004, p. 216)  
 
According to Muscati, the quantitative model involves measuring the number 
of human cells or genes transferred and then calculating the final proportion 
of human to nonhuman cells or genes in the recipient. It also requires setting 
a threshold to determine which organisms are part-human and which ones 
are merely partially composed of human parts. If the threshold is set to 50%, 
an organism with less than 50% human genes or cells is merely an organism 
partially composed of human parts. More than 50%, the organism is part-
human.  
 The quantitative method is straightforward but it has several obvious 
drawbacks. First, if proportion of human to nonhuman cells is the primary 
concern, then a typical healthy adult would be more nonhuman than human. 
This follows from the fact that the body of a healthy human adult has an 
estimated 10 times the number of microbial cells as human cells—the small 
size of the microbial cells, compared to human cells, accommodates their 
large number (Singer, 2007; Dupré, 2010). Consider, for example, that the 
aim of the Human Microbial Project (HMP), an extension of the Human 
Genome Project (HGP), is to count and characterize all the microbes living in 
the human body, paying special attention to the microorganisms living in the 
nasal passages, oral cavities, skin, gastrointestinal tract and urogenital tract 
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(Turnbaugh et al., 2007). Since the percentage of microbial cells will 
definitely be higher than the percentage of human cells in a typical human 
being, establishing the humanness of a chimera by counting how many of its 
cells are human will not be very informative. On the other hand, when it 
comes to counting human genes instead of cells, the problem seems to go in 
the opposite direction. In light of evolutionary conservation, most human 
genes are shared with a variety of organisms, which means that on the 
quantitative model, many of these organisms would count as part-human 
long before they were ever tampered with in the laboratory.  
 An additional problem facing the quantitative model is that differences 
counted at the molecular level do not add up to differences at the level of the 
phenotype. The part-whole relationship of organic wholes is far more 
complicated. Consider that at the beginning of the life cycle—the embryonic 
stage, which, if you recall, is also the stage at which most biological 
engineering is conducted—an organism is composed of cells that contain 
structures that will appear in the adult form of the organism, e.g., 
chromosomes, mitochondria, membranes, etc. (Godfrey-Smith, 2001) Yet as 
the organism grows it acquires new parts such as organs, bones, limbs—parts 
that were not present at the embryonic stage. Naturally, the parts that were 
present at the embryonic stage had much to do with the parts acquired later 
in life but just how much is not known. What is known is that the 
relationship between the early parts and the later parts is not one-to-one:  
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one gene can contribute to multiple phenotypes and many genes can 
collectively contribute to one phenotype. To complicate matters further, the 
developmental response of genes to a changing environment is nonlinear and 
does not allow for the simple ordering of genes along a one-dimensional scale 
phenotype (Lewontin, 2002). Thus, adding up the number of human genes or 
cells in an organism is not going to reflect the amount of human traits found 
in the organism as a whole.   
Given the ratio of human to nonhuman cells in the human body, the 
high number of conserved genes among various organisms, and the 
complicated relation between organic wholes and their parts, the quantitative 
model is unlikely to be a good measure of the level of humanness found in 
any given organism. But perhaps the most troubling aspect of this approach 
is the fact that setting a percentage threshold at the outset presupposes what 
is at issue, namely, what it means to be part-human.  
 
Germ-line/Soma 
Another approach to parts and wholes, often used to categorize 
biologically engineered animals is the germ-line vs. soma genetic modification 
distinction. The idea behind this approach is to pay attention to the location 
in the body where the human parts are being transferred, rather than simply 
counting how many are transferred. The germ-line vs. soma genetic 
modification distinction became popular in the 1970s, after the development 
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of recombinant DNA technology—the process used to transfer DNA from one 
organism into the DNA of another (see Chapter 3). Soon after, scientists 
became interested in using recombinant DNA technology to introduce non-
mutated versions of disease-causing genes to achieve a therapeutic goal—
known as “gene therapy” (Rasko, O‟Sullivan, & Ankeny, 2006). Gene transfer 
procedures could result in either somatic modifications or germ-line 
modifications.  
Somatic cells are all the cells in the body other than egg or sperm cells. 
(The term “somatic” comes from the Greek word soma for “body”). Hence, 
somatic genetic modification typically involves adding genes to the cells 
affected by a disease, e.g., liver cells affected by liver disease, with the hope of 
alleviating the disease. The new genes are not passed on to future 
generations. Unlike somatic cells, the germ-line “constitutes the reproductive 
cells of an organism (i.e., the germ cells, including their products, and 
gametes) that transmit genetic information from one generation to the next” 
(Rasko et al., 2006, p. 6). Hence, germ-line genetic modification typically 
involves adding genes to the egg, sperm or very early embryos, with the hope 
of curing a disease. As a result, the modified genes would likely appear in all 
the cells of the offspring and in all subsequent generations of that offspring.  
Experimental somatic modification has been performed on humans, 
although it has not proven very successful in clinical trials. In 1999, somatic 
modification suffered a major setback with the death of 18-year-old Jesse 
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Gelsinger (Rasko et al., 2006). Jesse suffered from a rare enzyme disorder 
that affected his liver. As in all cases of somatic gene therapy, a virus was 
used as a vector to deliver the therapeutic gene to the affected cells. However, 
Jesse died from multiple organ failures soon after starting the treatment and 
it is believed that his death was triggered by an immune response to the 
virus carrying the therapeutic gene. However, in spite of this setback, 
research in human somatic gene therapy continues and is considered less 
controversial than germ-line gene therapy.  
Germ-line gene therapy has the benefit of eliminating the disease 
before birth, but there are a number of reasons why it has not been 
performed on humans. First, there are safety reasons—germ-line genetic 
modification can introduce unwarranted mutations into the genome of the 
recipient. Second, there is a worry that “fixing” a genetic mutation before an 
individual is born will put pressure on parents to have “perfect” children, 
making germ-line genetic modification a form of enhancement rather than 
therapy. Finally, there is a concern that since germ-line modifications are 
inherited they could change the human gene pool and ultimately the whole 
human species. If we want to preserve the human gene pool, than we should 
outlaw human germ-line genetic modification, or so the argument goes. 
Whether this worry has any force is controversial. For example, Eric T. 
Juengst points out that “the human gene pool, unlike the sea, has no top, 
bottom, or shores; it cannot be „preserved‟” (Juengst, 2008, p. 156). 
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Putting gene therapy worries aside, the question of interest is the 
following: Can the germ-line/soma distinction help distinguish which 
genetically engineered animals are part-human and which ones are merely 
partially composed of human parts? At first, the distinction seems promising: 
if human genes are added to the germ-line of a nonhuman animal, or if 
human cells comprise the germ-line, then the animal might be considered 
part-human. Conversely, if human genes are merely added to a targeted area 
of cells, e.g., kidney cells, or if human cells only comprise the kidney, then the 
animal might be merely partially composed of human parts. But upon closer 
examination, it becomes apparent that the germ-line/soma distinction tells us 
very little about the humanness of the modified animal—if it tells us 
anything at all, it tells us something about the humanness of the future 
offspring of that animal. The reason why the germ-line/soma distinction is 
not helpful for delineating the humanness of genetically engineered animals 
is that scientists can control for tissue specific expression (Rasko et al., 2006). 
For example, they can control an experiment so that the germ-line 
modification is only expressed in the germ-line cells of the recipient and not 
any other cells. In this scenario, the only thing that would change would be 
the sperm or egg cells of the animal that have very little affect, if any, on the 
animal as a whole. Conversely, one can control the experiment so that 
somatic modification would be expressed in all of the cells of the recipient 
except its sperm or egg cells. Here, again, the germ-line/soma distinction 
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seems to fail: Why would we categorize an animal that is almost entirely 
composed of human cells—minus its sperm or egg cells—as merely partially 
composed of human parts? While the germ-line/soma distinction may be 
better-suited for examining the humanness of the offspring of modified 
animals—if the animals reproduce at all—it is not well-suited for examining 
the humanness of modified animals themselves.  
 
Summary 
In this chapter, I looked at some of the ways in which philosophers and 
scientists have thought about parts and wholes to see if any of the available 
part/whole distinctions would be helpful for distinguishing animals that are 
merely partially composed of human parts and animals that are part-human. 
I started with mereology—a metaphysical theory of the relations of part to 
whole and the relations of part to part within a whole. I argued that 
mereology is not equipped to capture the variable and complex nature of 
organisms because of its ties to set theory. Similar to set theory, mereology 
has an Extensionality principle, which states that an object is exhaustively 
defined by its constituent parts. However, contrary to this principle, an 
animal is identical with itself, even though it gains and loses parts in the 
course of its life and an animal is not identical to its disassembled parts, 
because the arrangement of parts is relevant to identity.  
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Next, I looked at bio-ontology, an applied form of standard mereology, 
especially designed to capture the variable and complex nature of biological 
entities. However, I was disappointed to discover that 1) bio-ontologists treat 
species as classes that have law-like relations, 2) their criteria of parthood 
are undeveloped, and 3) their account of function is questionable. In the next 
section, I considered an intuition-based approach to parts and wholes, an 
approach used not only in mereology/bio-ontology but also in bioethics. I 
found two problems with the intuition-based approach. First, evidence from 
psychology suggests that when it comes to judging the relative humanness of 
part-human hybrids, our intuitions run contrary to our reasoning; and 
second, human intuitions often mislead us when we rely on them to make 
judgments about empirical facts.  
Finally, in the last two sections, I examined two part/whole 
distinctions often used to help categorize biologically engineered animals. The 
first was the quantitative approach, by which the degree of humanness is 
calculated via the ratio of human to nonhuman parts. I concluded that this 
approach is unlikely to be a good measure of the level of humanness found in 
any animal because of the surprising ratio of human to nonhuman cells in a 
typical human body, the high number of conserved genes among animals, and 
the complicated relation between organic wholes and their parts. The second 
was the germ-line/soma distinction, an approach that emphasizes placement 
instead of number of human parts in the genetically engineered animal. The 
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problem with this approach, however, is that while the germ-line/soma 
distinction may be well-suited for examining the humanness of the offspring 
of modified animals—if the animals reproduce at all—it is not well-suited for 
examining the humanness of modified animals themselves. In the next 
chapter, I propose my own approach to delineating part-humans, that avoids 











PART-HUMAN OR MERELY PARTIALLY COMPOSED  
OF HUMAN PARTS? MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS  




Establishing what it means to be human, or part-human, in the age of 
advancing biotechnology is a difficult task. In the last chapter, I criticized a 
number of approaches that I thought were ill suited for the task of 
establishing the relative humanness of biologically engineered animals. In 
this chapter, I take on the less intimidating task of establishing the 
minimum that is required for an animal to count as part-human. I focus on 
“humanized mice,” that carry a “partial or complete human physiological 
system” (Macchiarini, Manz, Palucka, & Shultz, 2005, p. 1307). As part-human 
candidates, humanized mice are supposed to make extrapolation1 from mice 
to humans more reliable by simulating a variety of human diseases, e.g., 
diabetes (Leroith & Gavrilova, 2006), osteoporosis (Klein, 2008), Alzheimer’s 
(Gotz, Schonrock, Vissel, & Ittner, 2009), etc. The purpose of the simulation is 
                                                          
1 For more on the problem of extrapolation in biology see Ankeny, 2001; Bolker, 1995; 
Burian, 1993; Cartwright, 1989; LaFollette & Shanks, 1996; Love, 2009; Mitchell, 2000; 
Schaffner, 1986; Steel, 2008; Weber, 2005; Wimsatt, 1998. 
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to mimic human disease in the mouse in order to develop treatments for 
humans (cf. Chaible, Corat, Abdelhay, & Dagli, 2010; Rosenthal & Brown 2007; 
Shultz, Ishikawa, & Greiner, 2007). 
 As simulators of human disease, humanized mice need not exactly 
mimic the target human phenotype—only its relevant features. The same 
holds true of simulations in climate science, for example.2 If a climate model 
is supposed to test the hypothesis that increasing concentrations of CO2 in 
the atmosphere will result in an increased frequency of tropical cyclones, we 
do not expect the cause and effect in the simulation to be identical to the real 
thing, e.g., we do not expect the climate model to literally generate 
hurricanes. Instead, we require an appropriate analogy between the inputs 
and outputs of the real climate and those in the simulation. But how does one 
go about creating a mouse model whose inputs and outputs are human 
enough to serve as a simulator of human disease?  
In what follows, I examine this practical problem from a conceptual 
perspective. My solution comes in the form of three requirements. In order to 
make a humanized mouse with part-human potential, one must 1) choose the 
right partitioning frame; 2) correctly identify part-boundaries; and 3) 
eliminate contextual constraints. The first two requirements ensure that the 
parts chosen for transfer in the human, e.g., human genes, chromosomes, 
cells, etc. are the ones that give rise to the target phenotype, e.g., Down 
                                                          
2 Thanks to Dan Steel for this example. 
100 
 
syndrome. The last requirement ensures that differences between donor and 
recipient that could prevent transferred parts from giving rise to analogous 
traits in the recipient are eliminated.   
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In the next three sections, I 
demonstrate the force of each requirement with examples from current 
research, and argue that if they are met, the mouse has the potential to count 
as part-human and serve as a simulator of human disease. In the fourth 
section, I consider possible objections to my argument. Finally, I conclude by 
showing that the scope of my requirements is not limited to humanized mice.  
 
Partitioning Frames 
The process of making humanized mice typically proceeds from donor 
to recipient—that is, from human donor to mouse recipient. To begin, one 
must identify the parts to be transferred from the donor.3 How should the 
parts be chosen? It depends on how one divides an organism into parts. 
William Wimsatt, for example, makes use of the idea of a partitioning frame. 
The frame dictates which parts are relevant and which ones ought to be 
ignored, given some explanatory project (Wimsatt, 1972; see also Winther, 
2006). Thus, on a morphological partitioning frame, the relevant parts are  
                                                          
3 It might seem that the process of making humanized mice begins with modifying the 
recipient to prevent it from rejecting transferred parts, e.g., weakening the immune system 
of the mouse (see Chapter 3). While this may be the actual first step, it is not the first step in 
the design of the experiment. In order to know how to modify the recipient, one must first 
know what parts will be transferred. 
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static structures, e.g., skeletal or muscular, whereas on a physiological 
partitioning frame, an organism is divided into processes, e.g., immunological 
or digestive, and so on (Winther, 2011).  
However, the partitioning frame used for making humanized mice has 
to be different from those above, since the relevant parts—i.e., the parts to be 
transferred across species—are determined by a distinctive explanatory 
project. If the project is to express some trait in a base population, then we 
must first identify all the parts that contribute to this trait in the target 
population. For example, if the goal is to make a mouse that can secrete 
lactoferrin—a human milk protein—in its milk, then the parts to be 
transferred should include the gene that codes for lactoferrin plus any 
additional regulatory regions that would ensure the protein is only expressed 
wherever and whenever milk protein is expressed.  
Unfortunately, identifying all the relevant parts for transfer across 
species is not always as straightforward as this example suggests. What 
counts as a relevant part often depends on how the target phenotype 
evolved—e.g., whether or not it coevolved with some other feature of the 
organism. For example, the beaks of Darwin’s finches on Galapagos Island 
probably evolved independently or at least without any obvious changes to 
the rest of the organism (Wagner, Pavlicev, & Cheverud, 2007). But not every 
feature of an organism has an evolutionary history to call its own. For 
instance, Gould and Lewontin (1978) argue that the human chin did not 
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evolve on its own but rather as a side effect of the way the jaw grows. 
Therefore, it should not be studied as a separate part. Sterelny and Griffiths 
(1999) point to a similar example in Old World monkeys: the muzzles of male 
Mandrills are electric blue but so are their behinds and genitals. Is each of 
these salient parts of the male monkey separate or are they parts of a single 
evolving trait?  
I propose that questions of this sort—i.e., questions concerning the 
evolutionary history of a trait—need to be taken into consideration when 
making humanized mice. Why? Because knowing how the target phenotype 
evolved helps in identifying all the parts involved in its expression. To see the 
benefits of this evolutionary perspective, consider a recent experiment in 
which mice were genetically engineered to carry a humanized version of the 
Foxp2 gene (Enard et al., 2009). Commonly referred to as “the human 
language gene,” Foxp2 gained popularity when it was identified as the cause 
of a severe speech and language disorder in half of the members of a large 
London family of four generations (Vargha-Khadem, Watkins et al. 1995). 
The affected family members had trouble processing and expressing 
grammar and their articulation of speech and nonlinguistic oral and facial 
movements were grossly defective. DNA analysis showed that the affected 
individuals carried one nonfunctional Foxp2 allele due to a heterozygous 
point mutation.  
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 The human Foxp2 gene differs at only three amino acid positions from 
its orthologue in the mouse and at two positions from its orthologue in the 
chimpanzee (orthologues are genes that differ from each other as a result of 
speciation but are related to each other by descent from a common ancestral 
gene). Thus, by looking at the human Foxp2 gene and its orthologues in the 
mouse and the chimpanzee, we can infer that only a single amino acid 
substitution occurred on the mouse lineage since the evolutionary lineages 
leading to chimpanzees and mice diverged 70 million years ago. The 
hypothesis, then, is that the two substitutions that accumulated on the 
human lineage since the split from the chimpanzee were subject to positive 
selection due to their effect on language (Enard et al., 2002). Thus, in the 
Enard et al. (2009) experiment, the two substitutions were transferred into 
mice to test their effects in nonhuman organisms. The study showed that 
although they remained within normal range, transgenic mice with the 
“humanized” version squeaked at a lower frequency than wild-type mice.  
Due to the frequency change in their squeak, these humanized mice 
made headlines around the world (cf. Wade, 2009). Did they acquire a 
phenotype analogous to human language? It is hard to say, since mice lack 
anything that we would identify as a language. Nevertheless, squeaking at a 
lower frequency seems far from the target. I propose that the right 
partitioning frame can bring us closer. Again, the right partitioning frame is 
simply the one that will allow us to pick out the parts that give rise to the 
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target phenotype, and we are more likely to choose the right partitioning 
frame if we consider how the target phenotype evolved. For instance, if 
humans share nonvoluntary vocalizations e.g., grunts, cries, screams, etc. 
with other animals, such as mice and chimpanzees, but they also have an 
unmatched ability to learn vocalization, we should inquire as to how the 
voluntary control of vocalization evolved.  
The involvement of the Foxp2 gene in grammar and articulation in 
humans was discovered through a mutation. Such discoveries are obviously 
valuable. My point, however, is that the evolutionary history of a trait, 
especially a complex trait such as language, can provide insights as to where 
else to look and what other parts might be relevant. For example, we should 
ask about: 1) memory—it imposes limits on the recursive property of human 
language as well as the ability to form complex sentences; 2) the generation 
of sound—in humans it is by oscillation of vocal folds as opposed to mice who 
generate sound by an aerodynamic whistle; 3) motor control, e.g., the ability 
to learn and coordinate muscle movements in the lungs, larynx, tongue and 
lips—it is necessary for articulation; and 4) lung capacity—it imposes a limit 
on the length of spoken sentences (Hauser, Chomsky, & Tecumseh, 2002). In 
sum, understanding the evolutionary history of the target phenotype will 
help us locate all the parts that contribute to its expression. 
 Of course, locating all the parts required to express a given 
characteristic can be an overwhelming task. Luckily, however, we need not 
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worry about a one-to-one correspondence between parts in a base and target 
population; the base population is a model, and a model does not have to 
replicate every aspect of the target system in order to be successful. In fact, 
many successful models ignore variation or exclude variables present in the 
target system for descriptive and explanatory purposes (cf. Downes, 1992; 
Weisberg, 2007).  For instance, a classical mechanics model of the planetary 
system describes the planets as only having shape and mass, disregarding all 
the other properties (Frigg & Hartmann, 2009) and the interior space of a cell 
in a biology textbook is often depicted as relatively empty even though 
intercellular space is known to be crowded (Love, 2010). 
One strategy for choosing which elements of the target system to 
ignore and which to highlight in the model is to downplay the external 
elements with which the target system interacts, in order to narrow in on the 
causal interaction between the internal elements of the system (Love, 2010; 
see also Bechtel & Richardson, 1993). Another strategy, and the one that is 
well suited for simulating human disease in mice, is to focus on the parts that 
Kenneth Waters (2007) calls “difference-makers.” Waters does not discuss 
difference-makers in the context of models—his focus is on genetics—but I 
find his concept especially useful for thinking about mouse simulators of 
human disease. In order to ultimately explain what it means to be a 
difference-maker in genetics, Waters begins with a simpler example. The 
example is of Mary lighting a match. Waters asks: How can we explain that it 
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is Mary’s striking a match, rather than the presence of oxygen, that caused a 
match to light? According to Waters, counterfactual theories cannot provide 
the explanation:   
Mary’s striking the match counts as a cause on counterfactual 
accounts because if Mary had not struck the match, then the 
match would not have lit. But the same reasoning leads to the 
conclusion that the presence of oxygen was also a cause; if 
oxygen had not been present, then the match would not have lit. 
(Waters, 2007, pp. 1-2) 
 
Waters does not deny that oxygen is a real cause in this example. He simply 
believes, as most of us would, that oxygen is not what made the difference. 
The problem is that our belief that oxygen is not the difference-maker is 
usually based on mere intuitions. Unless, according to Waters, Mary is not 
holding a single match but a box of matches. If a box of matches were 
present, our belief would be justified because although oxygen was present, 
none of the other matches lit. In other words, the key to identifying causes 
that make a difference is having access to a multiplicity of outcomes rather 
than a single event. The same principle applies in the context of genetics. As 
Waters points out, even scientists would have no basis for thinking that the 
polypeptide’s linear sequence is determined by DNA rather than RNA if they 
had only a single translation event to work with (Waters, 2007). Given a 
multitude of translation events, however, they could conclude that although 
both DNA and RNA polymerase are real causes of a polypeptide sequence, 
only DNA is a cause that makes a difference.  
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 Here is why Waters’s concept of a difference-maker is helpful for 
meeting the first requirement, i.e., choosing the right partitioning frame. It 
might turn out that a uniquely human environment is a necessary “part” of 
language acquisition and thus ought to be duplicated (if possible) in 
humanized mice experiments. But it might also turn out that although the 
right environment is necessary for language acquisition, it is nonetheless not 
a difference-maker. If the right environment is not a difference-maker then 
we should ignore it in the initial process of humanizing mice, because, on my 
account, the right partitioning frame will help us locate the parts that make a 
difference to the target phenotype and exclude parts that make no difference.  
 Let me wrap up this section with a brief summary. The process of 
making humanized mice begins with identifying the relevant parts to be 
transferred from the donor. In this section, I have argued that the right 
partitioning frame will help us locate which parts are relevant and which 
ones ought to be ignored, given some explanatory project. If the project is to 
create a mouse that can express a target phenotype, then we should take into 
consideration how the target phenotype evolved, and what parts make a 
difference to it, when choosing partitioning frames.  
 
Part Boundaries 
Once the parts to be transferred are identified via the right 
partitioning frame, the next step is to isolate them from a complex system. 
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According to William Bechtel and Robert Richardson (1993), there are three 
types of complex systems: aggregative, component, and integrative. Each type 
corresponds to a unique way in which the parts of the system contribute to its 
performance. The contribution of the parts to the system’s performance 
determines the suitability of decomposition as an investigative strategy. For 
example, an aggregative system is completely decomposable into parts 
because its components simply add together, i.e., they make independent 
contributions to the performance of the system (Wimsatt, 1972). In contrast, 
a component system is nearly decomposable because its components retain 
their own integrity but make contributions to the performance of the system 
by interacting sequentially or linearly with other components. In contrast to 
both of these, an integrative system is minimally decomposable because its 
components interact with each other in nonadditive ways and are integrated 
to such a degree that their organization, rather than their distinctive 
properties, is more important to explaining the performance of the system 
(Bechtel & Richardson, 1993; see also Haugeland, 1998; Kauffman, 1971; 
Simon, 1969; Wimsatt, 1972). Organisms tend to fall into this last category. 
Their parts are not functionally independent, nor do they contribute to the 
behavior of the organism in a linear way. Rather, they are mutually 




For example, some parts of the brain transgress compartmental 
boundaries. In his recent book, Carl Craver (2007) identifies the action 
potential in the brain as that kind of part:  
The mechanism of the action potential relies crucially on the fact 
that some components of the mechanism are inside the 
membrane and some are outside. The membrane allows the 
intracellular and extracellular concentrations of ions to be 
different, allows a diffusion gradient to be set up, and allows for 
a separation of charge. (Craver, 2007, p. 141) 
 
Some parts of a minimally decomposable system interact not only with things 
outside of their compartmental boundaries, like the action potential in the 
brain, but also with things outside of the organism. For example, an 
organism’s part may be homeostatic and self-regulating in response to 
environmental changes (Bechtel & Richardson, 1993). Plants are minimally 
decomposable in this way since the height of a plant can depend on the 
interaction of various parts within its cells as well as the interaction between 
the plant and its environment (Lewontin, 2002).  
To see the logistics involved with identifying the relevant parts for 
transfer out of a minimally decomposable system, consider the O’Doherty et 
al. (2005) mouse model of Down syndrome (DS). DS is a human genetic 
disorder caused by an extra copy of chromosome number 21. Thus, O’Doherty 
et al. inserted human chromosome 21 into mice with the hope of modeling the 
disorder in rodents. The mice were tested for various symptoms of DS, which 
typically include mental retardation along with craniofacial abnormalities, 
brain volume reduction and congenital heart defects. To check for mental 
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retardation, experimenters conducted behavioral, learning and memory tests. 
The mice showed a trend toward hyperactivity compared with wild-type 
littermates, although the trend did not reach significance. Moreover, the mice 
seemed capable of retaining short-term memory for up to a minute but were 
deficient in long-term memory. The density of neurons was significantly 
lower in the cerebellum of DS mice than wild-type littermates, ~60% of DS 
mice had congenital heart defects compared to ~40% in humans with DS, and 
DS mice had a small mandible but no overall diminution in cranium size.  
Given the mixed results, it is worth checking whether my second 
requirement was met in this experiment—i.e., whether the boundaries of 
transferred parts were correctly identified. The aim of the study was to model 
human DS in mice. In humans, cells typically contain 23 pairs of 
chromosomes but the cells of a person with DS contain three rather than two 
copies of the 21st chromosome. Thus, it appears that it is not the chromosome 
itself that is responsible for the illness but rather its relation to the other two 
chromosomes. But since mice have only 20 pairs of chromosomes, creating a 
mouse model of human DS by adding a third copy of mouse chromosome 21 
was not an option. Therefore, O’Doherty et al. reasoned in the following way: 
the genes on mouse chromosome 16 have orthologues on human chromosome 
21 but also on 3, 16 and 22. Consequently, adding a third mouse chromosome 
16 is equivalent to adding a third copy of parts of four human chromosomes. 
In addition, approximately 2/3 of known genes on human chromosome 21 
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have orthologues on mouse chromosome 16 and the remaining 1/3 of the 
genes have orthologues on mouse chromosomes 10 and 17. A mouse with an 
inserted human chromosome 21 would thereby carry three copies of genes on 
that chromosome, via the existing orthologues in the mouse, while no other 
mouse genes would be tripled (O’Doherty et al., 2005). Since human DS 
seems to be caused by too many copies of a particular chromosome, the 
“boundaries” of the transferred parts in this experiment had to extend far 
enough to cover the phenomenon of excess chromosomes. Hence, the only way 
that the genes on human chromosome 21 could be tripled in these humanized 
mice was if the existing mouse orthologues were sufficiently similar to their 
human counterparts to count as their third copy. 
However, we should wonder if this assumption was justified. 
Orthologues can be similar as a consequence of being related to each other by 
descent from a common ancestral gene. But they can also be very different, as 
a result of speciation.  Thus, to label two genes orthologues is to make a claim 
about their relation to one another—not about their resemblance. Since 
O’Doherty et al. do not discuss the similarities between the mouse and 
human orthologues in their article it is possible that the genes on human 
chromosome 21 were not tripled in these humanized mice. On the other hand, 
what O’Doherty et al. did well was insert an entire chromosome—rather than 
individual genes—thereby compensating for the fact that genes may extend 
beyond their protein-coding sequences. In fact, the changing definition of a 
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gene and its borders provides a perfect example of what it takes to meet my 
second requirement.  
On the classical view, genes on chromosomes were like beads on a 
string, each one a unit of hereditary information coding for a single protein. 
This definition has changed dramatically in the last twenty years, especially 
post-ENCODE. The aim of the ENCODE project was to characterize 1% of 
the human genome using various experimental and computational 
techniques. The picture that emerged is extremely complex (Gerstein et al., 
2007). As Falk (1986) predicted, the gene is neither discrete, nor continuous, 
nor has a constant location, function, sequence or definite borders. Given the 
complex nature of the gene, by inserting an entire chromosome, O’Doherty et 
al. increased the likelihood that all the genes on that chromosome—whatever 
their borders and location—would also be transferred. 
What we see then is that locating the boundaries of human parts to be 
transferred into a mouse—with the aim of simulating a human disorder—is a 
difficult task. Animals are integrative systems. The fact that they are not 
easily decomposable into parts can pose problems. Indeed, the less 
decomposable the donor and the recipient, the harder it is to correctly 
identify the boundaries of parts to be transferred, and the less likely that the 






The act of choosing the right partitioning frame and isolating parts for 
transfer happens prior to transplantation. Once the parts are isolated, they 
are inserted into the recipient where they are expected to give rise to the 
target phenotype. This expectation arises from a tendency to think of parts as 
entities whose properties can be examined and defined in isolation from the 
whole, and a tendency to think that parts will preserve their properties even 
after they have been transplanted into a new location. Human to human 
kidney transplants support this line of thought:  the properties of the kidney 
are the same before and after transplant. But as Richard Lewontin and 
Richard Levins point out (2007), the concepts of “part” and “whole” are 
reciprocally related: Something cannot be a whole unless there are parts that 
make it up and conversely, nothing can be a part unless there is a whole of 
which it is a part, “parts do not come together to make wholes but come into 
being in them only as the whole comes into being” (Lewontin & Levins, 2007, 
p. 132).  
Consider the mitochondrion as an example of this reciprocal 
relationship. The mitochondrion is an organelle found in most eukaryotic 
cells. Its primary function is to supply cellular energy but it is also involved 
with other processes—e.g., signaling, cellular differentiation, control of cell 
growth, etc. What is interesting about the mitochondrion from the 
evolutionary perspective, however, is that it contains its own DNA, which is 
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circular like that of bacteria. In addition, it is similar to bacteria in that it 
has its own machinery to transcribe and translate that DNA, has an outer 
membrane, and divides by fission—rather than by mitosis like the other 
organelles. These and other observations led to the endosymbiotic hypothesis 
for the origin of mitochondria (Margulis, 1970). The hypothesis states that 
single-celled organisms captured smaller organisms, e.g., bacteria, and used 
them as an efficient source of energy via endosymbiosis. Eventually, bacteria 
simply became mitochondria.   
Today the mitochondrion is a part in a cell, but even if it could survive 
outside of it (given its evolutionary past) isolating it from the cell would not 
be a fruitful way of getting at its current properties. The properties of the 
mitochondrion, as a part, manifest themselves in its incorporation and 
integration in the cell (Bechtel & Richardson, 1993). The same holds true for 
many biological parts, e.g., genes and cells. Their properties become manifest 
when they are part of a living system and these properties can change when 
the properties of the living system change.4 Given this fact, when making 
humanized mice we must ask whether the transferred parts—even if 
identified correctly—can give rise to the same phenotype in the context of a 
different species.  In the remainder of this section, I argue that biological 
differences between human and nonhuman organisms can act as phenotypic 
constraints and regulate what can and cannot become of transferred parts in 
                                                          
4 The exception are parts of organisms which are integrated into the organism but are at the 
same time relatively autonomous with respect to other parts of the organism, i.e., modules 
(cf. Wagner, Pavlicev, & Cheverud, 2007) 
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a new context. In other words, species differences must be considered when 
trying to extrapolate across species boundaries. 
 It might be helpful to illustrate the importance of such considerations 
with an example. James et al. (2006) attempted to make human-nonhuman 
chimeras by dissecting 6-day-old human embryos into clumps of cells and 
injecting those cells into 3.5-day-old mouse embryos. Thus, both the 
transferred cells and the cells of the host were ES cells. The chimeric 
blastocysts were transferred into the uteri of pseudopregnant mice. At 
embryonic day 8.5, James et al. terminated the pregnancies of these mice. 
The embryos were then examined for human ES cell contribution. The results 
showed that only 4 out of the 28 chimeric embryos that were implanted 
contained human ES cell derivatives and 3 out of the 4 were developmentally 
abnormal. Only one embryo was morphologically similar to normal 
littermates and contained ten human ES cell derivatives (James et al., 2006). 
What happened to all of the other human ES cells? And why did most of the 
embryos that still had some, develop abnormally? 
The answers to these questions are probably tied to the differences in 
rate of development between the two species. In contrast to humans, who are 
pregnant for 9 1/2 months, mice are pregnant for a mere 20 days. Due to the 
longer gestation period, human ES cells grow at a slower pace than mouse ES 
cells and are thereby likely to be outcompeted by mouse cells in a blastocyst-
stage chimera. Stages of development, relative to the gestation period of each 
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species, also differ. In humans, for example, eyelids open on the 7th month of 
fetal life but in the mouse, eyelids remain closed until 12-14 days after birth 
(Kaufman, 2007). Moreover, mice and humans have significant differences in 
the signaling factors that mediate cell self-renewal and senescence. In 
humans, the clock that keeps track of cell divisions and signals cell cycle 
arrest is the telomere. It shortens as the cells divide. In mice, however, the 
telomeres are significantly longer at all stages of cell development making it 
unlikely that they undergo telomerase-based senescence (Kipling & Cooke, 
1990). 
In addition, there are differences in size, lifespan, and evolutionary 
history between mice and humans—factors especially relevant for modeling 
human disease. Humans are 3,000 times larger than mice. The increase in 
cell number corresponds to 105 more mitoses. Moreover, processes such as 
mutation repair and stress response differ in humans whose life expectancy 
is ~70 years, compared to 2 years in mice, and our longer lifespan means an 
increased risk in generating cancerous mutations (Beckers, Wurst, & Hrabé 
de Angelis, 2009). In addition, the two species evolved in different ecological 
niches with different pathogens (Hughes & Mestas, 2007). Not surprisingly, 
then, mice and humans have different immune systems. For example, their 
respective cells of the immune system—e.g., T and B cells—tend to reject 
tissue transfers from the other species, e.g., a skin graft from a human will be 
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rejected by the mouse and vice versa.5 Mice also lack a peripheral immune 
system present in humans, composed of lymph nodes, thymic tissue and 
Payer’s patches. Cytokine molecules, secreted by immune cells to signal other 
immune cells, are species specific as well.  
These differences help explain why therapies that work on mice often 
fail to provide similar results in our own species (Hughes & Mestas, 2007; see 
also Monaco, 2003; Oehler & Bicknell, 2000; Panitch, Hirsch, Haley, & Johnson, 
1987; Shepherd & Sridhar, 2003; Sykes, 2001; van Oosten et al., 1996; Wood, 
2003). Although contextual differences tend to narrow when species are 
closely related, the relation between the species has to be intimate for this to 
happen. Chimeras generated from mixing embryos of M. musculus and M. 
caroli (mice) developed successfully to adulthood, but chimeras between 
mouse and vole and mouse and rat did not come to term (James et al., 2006), 
presumably due to the irreconcilable differences I outlined above. However, 
the important point is that although some differences between humans and 
mice can be overlooked in humanized mice experiments, the ones that act as 
contextual constraints on the target phenotype cannot.  
Given the vast number of these constraints, it is hard to believe that 
transferred human cells can proliferate in the context of a mouse. While this 
does happen, the extent to which these cells are still “human”—except by 
origin—is debatable. Another example helps us see this point:  The 
                                                          




experiment by Muotri et al. (2005) in which 105 human ES cells were injected 
into the brains of 14-day-old mouse embryos. The stages of development were 
mismatched in this experiment:  the embryos were advanced enough to have 
a developing brain—day-14 relative to the 20-day-long gestation period in 
mice—while the injected undifferentiated cells were derived from human 
blastocysts. The embryos were removed with intact placentas from pregnant 
females and placed back after injection. Pups were born by normal vaginal 
delivery. The results showed that only < 0.1% of the brain cells in the mice 
were of human origin. However, there was widespread incorporation of 
human ES cells in a variety of regions: cortex, hippocampus, thalamus, 
striatum and corpus collosum. What is interesting is that the cells that 
integrated into the host tissue had dimensions similar to those of adjacent 
cells—their size, shape and orientation adjusted to the preexisting cellular 
architecture. For example, the diameter, orientation and branching patterns 
of human ES cell derived neurons, astrocytes and oligodendrocytes were 
indistinguishable from those of their host counterparts. In addition, 
transplanted cells seemed to regulate their maturation speed and size and 
establish contact with host neurons within the recipient’s granular layer of 
the hippocampus. This indicates remarkable adjustment to the new 
environment since in humans, granule cells in the hippocampus are not 




The fact that transferred human cells proliferated in this experiment 
might be perceived as evidence against my third requirement—that 
contextual constraints must be eliminated. After all, the differences between 
mice and humans that I emphasized above were not an obstacle to these 
transferred cells—the cells multiplied, migrated, and integrated into the host 
organism without complications. But in what sense, except by origin, were 
these cells still human?  Not only were they indistinguishable from their host 
counterparts, in terms of size, shape, orientation, etc., but their rate of 
development adjusted to that found in the mouse. As a result, it is more 
reasonable to interpret the human cells mimicking the mouse cells as a 
vindication of my third requirement. What it shows is that the context of the 
host organism can be powerful enough to force human ES cells to behave like 
mouse cells. If transferred human cells start behaving like mouse cells, then 
they are unlikely to give rise to whatever human phenotype they were 
expected to give rise to.  
 
Objections Considered 
Before wrapping things up, I want to consider an important potential 
objection to my argument. Someone might think that my requirements are 
too formulaic and that they consequently fail to account for the array of 
complexities found in nature. When we study complex adaptations, for 
example, it often turns out that the “one structure—one function” 
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relationship does not hold; the same structure may lead to different functions 
and different structures may lead to the same function.  
 For example, in genetics the ability of structurally different elements 
to “perform the same function or yield the same output” (Edelman & Gally, 
2001, p. 13763) is known as degeneracy. When scientists knock out selected 
genes through homologous recombination, the expected result is a phenotypic 
effect that can be attributed to gene loss—sometimes an effect that 
ultimately leads to the death of the organism. But in up to 30% of the cases, 
there is no effect on the phenotype despite the absence of the gene product. 
“Some examples include mice that are unable to make such seemingly 
important proteins as myoglobin, tenascin C, vimentin, gelsolin, and a 
neurofilament subunit” (Edelman & Gally, 2001, p. 13763). In these mice, the 
absence of the above gene products has little or no effect on their phenotypes. 
The proposed explanation for these findings is “that the gene networks of the 
affected animals are degenerate, allowing widespread, compensatory 
adjustments” (Edelman & Gally, 2001, p. 13763).  
The fact that target phenotypes can be multiply realized is, indeed, a 
potential problem for my requirements. One might expect my first 
requirement—choosing the right partitioning frame—to account for 
degeneracy. For instance, recall the mouse that can secrete a human protein 
in its milk. One might expect the relevant parts chosen for transfer to not 
only include the lactoferrin gene (plus some regulatory regions), but also 
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other elements that may compensate for the possible loss of this gene in 
humans. Let me put this objection in broader terms: we expect of a 
simulation to not only mimic the target when the target functions properly 
but also when it malfunctions. However, there are a couple of problems with 
this expectation, at least as it applies to degeneracy. First, we simply may not 
know all the parts that are involved in degeneracy, and second, including all 
such elements might make the task of identifying the relevant parts for 
transfer too complicated. Both problems are legitimate but neither one 
undermines my project. My requirements are meant to provide idealized 
sufficient conditions for making a mouse simulator of human disease. Hence, 
the content I provided under each requirement is not meant to be exhaustive. 
What it means to choose the right partitioning frame may be adjusted as 
scientists come across new findings, such as all the parts involved in 
degeneracy.   
 
Conclusion 
Establishing what it means to be human, or part-human, in the age of 
advancing biotechnology, is a difficult task. In this chapter, I have argued 
that if certain requirements are met in the process of making humanized 
mice—1) if the right partitioning frame is chosen, 2) if the part boundaries 
are correctly identified, and 3) if contextual constraints are eliminated—then 
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humanized mice have the potential to count as part-human. Otherwise, they 
are merely partially composed of human parts.  
In closing, I want to point out that the scope of my requirements is not 
limited to humanized mice. Whenever biological parts are transferred from 
one living entity to another with the hope of producing some target 
phenotype, my requirements apply. In fact, they help predict which 
experiments will succeed and explain why they do. For example, consider 
human to human kidney transplants. My requirements explain why such 
experiments are successful:  first, since both the donor and the recipient are 
of the same species, it is easy to choose the right partitioning frame; second, 
the boundaries of a kidney, as an organ, are easy to pick out; finally, most 
contextual constraints are avoided. The only significant contextual constraint 
is the immune system, but immunosuppressant drugs can be prescribed to 
prevent rejection of the organ. In sum, human to human kidney transplants 
are successful because they meet the three requirements I have proposed in 
this chapter. Of course, if human-to-human kidney transplants are our best 
success story, then transplanting human parts into mice with the hope of 















A number of years ago, Irving Weissman, a professor at Stanford 
University, had an idea for an experiment: Make a mouse whose brain is 
made up of human neurons. This mouse would be an interspecies chimera 
since it would contain cell populations derived from at least two different 
zygotes of different species (see Chapter 3). To make the human neuron 
mouse, Weismann decided to use a line of mice from Harvard University 
because their neurons die a week before birth, which normally leads to the 
death of the mouse as well (Scott, 2006). But rather than let these neuron 
mice die, Weissman wanted to see if by transplanting human neural stem 
cells in utero, mice with brains repopulated by human neurons could survive. 
Before conducting the experiment, Weissman asked a panel of Stanford 
bioethicists and scientists to evaluate his proposal. A number of ethical issues 
were discussed in the panel‟s published findings, but the possibility of 
conferring humanity onto a mouse, and thereby the moral status that goes 
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along with being human, has received significantly more attention than the 
other issues. 
In response to these findings, Mark Sagoff (2007) has argued that 
conferring humanity onto a mouse cannot be a real moral concern, since no 
one seems to be troubled by the fact that many animals already have human 
characteristics. According to Sagoff, what is really troubling the ethicists is 
that the cells present in the mouse are derived from Homo sapiens: 
What makes the activity of the neuron mouse human is not its 
content or character—there may be animals, such as dolphins, 
that apparently act the same way—but its association with the 
introduction of cells taken from Homo sapiens. What if the 
introduction of dolphin brain stem cells into fetal mice produced 
similar or even more “human-like” results? Would the moral 
problem disappear or be different? (Sagoff, 2007, pp. 51-2) 
 
Sagoff leaves these questions unanswered, but the rest of the article implies 
that he thinks mice should be judged based on their characteristics rather 
than on the types of cells, e.g., human or dolphin, that gave rise to particular 
characteristics.  
In the previous chapters I emphasized the importance of establishing 
the relative humanness of part-humans for the sake of ethical and legal 
regulations based on the human/nonhuman distinction. Yet, there are many 
ethicists like Sagoff who are against giving preferential treatment to humans 
over nonhumans. Opponents of the human/nonhuman distinction instead 
tend to favor the person/nonperson distinction (or some version of it). 
According to this way of seeing things, a person is someone with 
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characteristics that we believe to be morally relevant, e.g., the ability to feel 
pain, the ability to reason, etc. and insofar as one has these characteristics, 
one can be a person even if one is not human. Given this distinction, it may 
seem that a proponent of the personhood view will find the humanness of 
part-humans irrelevant to how we ought to judge their moral status. After 
all, if being human does not matter for being a person, why care about how 
human something is? But this is precisely the problem Sagoff is raising. Is 
the causal history of an acquired characteristic, e.g., whether that 
characteristic came about as a result of a dolphin or a human transplant, 
morally irrelevant to the status of that creature?  This is the question on 
which I want to focus in this chapter. In the first half, I argue that causal 
history is morally irrelevant to the ontological moral status of the animal. 
Conversely, the second half argues that causal history is epistemically relevant to 
our ability to detect that moral status. The goal then is to establish what the 
appropriate role of causal history is in judgments of moral status, especially 
as they apply to part-humans.  
 
The Ethical Debate 
The distinctive concern about part-human research, according to 
Greely et al., is that the transfer of human parts might confer human moral 
status onto nonhuman organisms: 
What we called “conferring humanity on mice” seems to be the 
main concern in the literature on chimeras…the authors have  
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not used our language of “conferring humanity” on the 
transplanted animal, but the concerns each expresses seem 
equivalent to the concerns we encompassed in our term. (Greely 
et al., 2007, p. 36) 
 
Greely et al. discuss the idea of transferring humanness onto mice and ask 
whether part-human experiments could transform a mouse into a man, “or to 
be more precise, into a creature with some aspects of human consciousness or 
some distinctively human cognitive abilities” (Greely et al., 2007, p. 35), 
perhaps in the way that Gregor Samsa, a character in Kafka‟s 
Metamorphosis, was transformed into a cockroach.  
The other authors who worry about conferring humanity onto 
nonhuman organisms include Karpowicz et al. They warn against part-
human research, especially “if human-like capacities associated with human 
dignity were to emerge in such animals to some degree” (Karpowicz, Cohen, & 
Van Der Kooy, 2005, p. 124). Their argument proceeds as follows. If human 
dignity is an unconditioned worth unique to humans, then the transfer of 
human components might confer human dignity upon an organism that 
previously lacked such dignity. But placing components necessary for human 
dignity into a nonhuman body where they cannot function fully, if at all, 
would diminish or eliminate human dignity.1 Robert Streiffer (2009) thinks 
                                                          
1 Although Karpowicz et al. attempt to ground human dignity in “a cluster of capacities that 
matter ethically and that members of that species generally exhibit” (Karpowicz, Cohen, &  
Van Der Kooy, 2005, p. 121, emphasis mine) they also ascribe human dignity to all humans 
no matter how seriously impaired they may be, “those who are human and yet display a 
limited subset of these capacities, say, the newborn infant or the person with severe 
disabilities, still have human dignity” (Karpowicz, Cohen, & Van Der Kooy, 2005, p. 121). As 
Streiffer rightly points out (2009), these answers are inconsistent. It cannot be the case that  
127 
 
this argument is a nonstarter because it generates the following dilemma. On 
the one hand, if the introduction of human components confers human 
dignity onto an organism that previously lacked such dignity, then the 
research does not diminish or eliminate human dignity but rather enhances 
it. On the other hand, if the introduction of human components does not 
confer human dignity onto an organism that otherwise lacked such dignity, 
then, again, the research does not diminish or eliminate human dignity, since 
that dignity was never there to begin with (Streiffer, 2009). 
Instead, Streiffer argues that enhancing the moral status of an 
organism is prima facie good. The problem, rather, is “that the subsequent 
treatment of the subject likely will fall far below what its new moral status 
demands” (Streiffer, 2005, p. 348). If the transfer of human parts into an 
organism can enhance its comparatively low moral status to that of a normal 
human adult, then we ought to treat that individual as we treat others with 
full moral status. However, if we continue to treat that individual as we treat 
other nonhuman organisms in a laboratory setting, then “what would have 
been animal confinement, pain, suffering, and death, becomes the moral 
equivalent of…human confinement, pain, suffering, and death” (Streiffer,  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
some capacities determine whether an individual has human dignity and at the same time 
that all humans have human dignity and no nonhumans have it. Seeing that “capacities” are 
not actually doing any of the work for Karpowicz et al., I omitted them in my reconstruction 
of their argument.   
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2009, p. 34). This makes status-enhancing research much worse than 
research on nonhuman organisms, according to Streiffer.  
Finally, Baylis and Robert also focus on the possibility of conferring 
humanity onto nonhuman organisms. Their worry, in contrast to the worry of 
Streiffer and Karpowicz et al., is that part-human research might create 
confusion about the moral status of the animals, “The engineering of 
creatures that are part human and part nonhuman animal is objectionable 
because the existence of such beings would introduce inexorable moral 
confusion in our existing relationships with nonhuman animals” (Robert & 
Baylis, 2003, p. 9). Here is a short recapitulation of their argument, which 
they do not endorse but note as the strongest argument against part-human 
research. If an individual is a human being, it has full moral status. If it is 
not human, its moral status is contingent upon the attitudes of its human 
creators or overseers. This is evident in our thinking about rights to life, for 
example. A nonhuman animal‟s right to life depends on the will of human 
beings while human beings have a right to life simply in virtue of being 
human. This conclusion implies a strong dichotomy between the moral status 
of humans as opposed to nonhuman animals, and the fact that part-humans 
are neither fully human nor fully nonhuman generates confusion regarding 
the ethical treatment of part-human organisms (Robert & Baylis, 2003). In 
sum, the ethicists who write on the topic of part-human organisms tend to 
worry (or recognize the worry) that biological humanization of nonhuman 
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organisms might lead to their moral humanization. To avoid this morally 
problematic result, they suggest various restrictions on part-human research.  
 
The Personhood View of Moral Status 
What is at stake in the above mentioned debate is the moral status, or 
moral standing, of part-humans. Analogous to legal standing—which gives 
one the right to bring one‟s claims before a court—moral standing gives one 
the right to have one‟s interests taken into account as morally good reasons to 
be treated in this way or that (Rachels, 2004). The belief that moral standing 
runs along species lines, i.e., that human beings have the moral status they 
do because they belong to the species Homo sapiens, is known as moral 
anthropocentrism. The views of the ethicists I outlined above are morally 
anthropocentric, although the authors may have different motivations for 
subscribing to such a view. Streiffer (2010), for example, is explicit about the 
pragmatic advantage of subscribing to it, since most people within the 
scientific and medical communities also subscribe to it. Regardless of the 
motivation, it is clear that Sagoff is right—the ethicists in this debate are of 
the opinion that inserting cells or genes derived from Homo sapiens into 
nonhuman organisms is likely to affect their moral status.  
The most famous criticism of moral anthropocentrism comes from 
Peter Singer (1975). According to Singer, discriminating among individuals 
on the basis of species membership alone makes one a “speciesist,” analogous 
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to a sexist who discriminates among individuals on the basis of sex 
membership. While there are biological differences between species and 
sexes, these differences are not morally significant ones, according to Singer. 
That‟s why speciesism and sexism are forms of arbitrary discrimination. 
Which differences are the morally significant ones? Many ethicists think that 
it is the mental characteristics of an individual that make the moral 
difference. Since not all human beings have the relevant mental 
characteristics, and since some nonhumans might have them, moral 
boundaries are not co-extensive with species boundaries. Cora Diamond 
summarizes this view as follows: 
If (for example) we treat as the properties which make us 
human the capacities for reasoning and self-consciousness, then 
indeed these capacities may be morally relevant, but if they are 
morally relevant at all, they are significant whether they are the 
properties of a being who is a member of our species or not. And 
so it would be better to use a word like „person‟ to mean a being 
that has these properties, to bring out the fact that not all 
human beings have them and that non-human beings 
conceivably have them. (Diamond, 1991, p. 35) 
 
As Diamond points out, the term „person‟ may be used for individuals who 
possess morally relevant characteristics and this term may refer to humans 
and nonhumans alike. For example, John Locke uses the term „person‟ 
interchangeably with „moral Man‟ and defines it as a “forensic term, 
appropriating actions and their merit” (Locke, Essays II xxxvii, p. 26). For 




For were there a Monkey, or any other creature to be found, that 
had the use of Reason, to such a degree, as to be able to 
understand general Signs, and to deduce Consequences about 
general Ideas, he would no doubt be subject to Law, and in that 
Sense, be a Man, how much soever he differ‟d in Shape from 
others of that Name. (Locke, Essays III, xi, p. 16) 
 
On the other hand, Immanuel Kant thought that personhood did not turn 
exclusively on the capacity to reason, but also required that an individual be 
autonomous. In virtue of having these capacities, persons are free to 
determine themselves “as ends in themselves,” while nonpersons are beings 
whose ends are determined by others (Kant, 1964). It is because persons are 
rational and free that they are capable of being blamed, praised and held 
responsible for their actions. Harry Frankfurt adds an additional 
requirement: A person is someone who is capable of forming “second-order 
desires” (Frankfurt, 1971). A second order-desire is a desire about a desire. 
For example, an addict‟s desire for a drug is a first-order desire. The addict is 
engaged in the conscious activity of desiring the drug but he is not conscious 
of his desire. His desire is not the object of his attention—he does not think 
about it (Korsgaard, 1996). In contrast, a recovering drug addict not only 
desires a drug but also desires not to desire the drug. This is a desire of the 
second order.  
For utilitarians, like Singer, who value the promotion of happiness and 
the avoidance of pain over anything else, the mental characteristic relevant 
for moral status is sentience (or the ability to feel pleasure or pain). Jeremy 
132 
 
Bentham was the first utilitarian to write about the importance of sentience 
for moral status: 
It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of legs, 
the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are 
reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to 
the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable 
line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps, the faculty of 
discourse?...the question is not, Can they reason? Nor, Can they 
talk? But, Can they suffer? (Bentham, 1879, p. 311) 
 
According to Bentham, there is no justifiable way of excluding individuals 
from the moral community if they have the capacity to suffer. Similarly, 
Singer maintains that the comparable interests of all sentient beings be given 
equal weight independent of whose interests they are and what other 
qualities they may possess. Hence, my own interests should not count more 
than the interests of anyone else and neither should the interests of my own 
species. Singer‟s reasoning here is based on the concept of equality—not as a 
statement of fact but as a moral idea about how we ought to treat one 
another. “The principle of the equality of human beings is not a description of 
an alleged actual equality among humans: it is a prescription of how we 
should treat human beings” (Singer, 1989, p. 165). For Singer, the concept of 
equality applies to all species. The fact that some animals are less intelligent 
than others does not mean that their interests should be disregarded.2 If they 
                                                          
2 Although Singer argues that psychological capacities, such as intelligence, do not 
undermine the interests of an individual, VanDeVeer points out that weighing the interests 
of beings with more complex psychological capacities more heavily than those without such 
capacities  is not incompatible with Singer‟s position. Humans can suffer from the dread of 
impending disaster, e.g., death from cancer, in a way that other animals cannot, “a turkey  
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are sentient, then they have interests, and those interests warrant equal 
consideration (Singer, 1979).  
 Singer‟s commitment to the equality of sentient beings is an answer to 
the question “How should we treat one another?” Following James Rachels 
(2004), I take it that the reason there is disagreement among philosophers 
about which mental characteristics are required for personhood is because 
the answer depends on the moral question. For example, if the question is 
about moral responsibility, a relevant mental capacity might be the ability to 
reason. After all, we do not hold someone morally accountable unless that 
individual has the ability to recognize the difference between right and 
wrong. If the question is about who we should or should not torture, on the 
other hand, a relevant mental capacity is likely to be sentience. If the 
question is about who we should or should not coerce, it probably matters 
whether or not the individual is autonomous, and so on (Rachels, 2004). The 
point is that since not all human beings have this or that mental capacity, 
and perhaps some nonhumans also have it, the moral boundaries are not 
synonymous with species boundaries. Moreover, even if it turned out that all 
                                                                                                                                                                             
will not be wary of impending Thanksgiving events” (VanDeVeer, 1979, pp. 70-71). In 
examples of this kind, it is the difference in psychological capacities that accounts for the 
discrepancy in suffering. Moreover, suffering can be affected by life span and the capacity to 
remember, “a steer does not suffer from the memory [of being castrated] in the way that 
women continue to suffer from the trauma of rape, e.g., „reliving‟ of the experience in dreams, 
and so on” (VanDeVeer, 1979, pp. 70-71). In sum, whether or not there will be long term 
harm is a function of the psychological capacities of the individual involved, and for that 
reason on Singer‟s account, psychological capacities (along with sentience) may play a role in 
how we treat one another. 
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and only humans were autonomous, this would be a biological and thereby a 
contingent fact about us—not a necessary part of being human (Kadlac, 
2009). 
Before I move on to the next section, I want to point out that a 
proponent of the personhood view of moral status need not believe that only 
modifications to the brain, as opposed to other parts of the body, can change 
someone‟s moral status. In their recent book, Rolf Pfeifer and Josh Bongard 
(2006; see also Johnson, 1990) argue that thoughts—including spatial and 
social cognition, problem solving, reasoning, and natural language—are 
highly constrained and shaped by our bodies. “The kinds of thoughts that we 
can produce or carry out ultimately have their foundation in our 
embodiment” (Pfeifer & Bongard, 2006, p. 2). Here is a brief overview of their 
argument. One of the most elementary capacities of any creature is 
categorization, or the ability to make distinctions in the world. If we cannot 
distinguish food from nonfood, dangerous from safe objects, our parents from 
other people, or our home from the rest of the world, we are not going to 
survive for very long. The formation of such categories is very directly 
determined by our embodiment, i.e., by the shape of the body, the kinds of 
limbs and where they are attached, the kinds of sensors (eyes, ears, nose, 
skin and mouth) and where on the body they are found. When we interact 
with the world, the body is stimulated in very particular ways and this 
stimulation provides the raw material with which the brain works. Even 
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abstract categories, e.g., mathematical notions, are influenced by our 
morphology. Here, the authors draw on the work of others to argue that the 
concepts of a real number, a set, etc., are based on metaphors (e.g., a point 
“moving” toward infinity) and these metaphors are, in turn, grounded in our 
bodies.   
Pfeifer‟s and Bongard‟s argument undermines the idea that for a 
proponent of the personhood view, only modifications of the brain could have 
moral consequence. If reason is a morally significant capacity, and the way 
we reason is shaped by our bodies, then modification of the rest of the body 
could also have consequences for the moral status of an individual.  
 
Argument Against Causal Histories Making a Moral Difference 
Sagoff‟s view—that part-human candidates should be judged solely on 
their characteristics rather than on the origin of the genes or cells that gave 
rise to those characteristics—is consistent with the personhood view of moral 
standing I outlined in the last section. Put slightly differently, what Sagoff is 
suggesting does not constitute a controversial position among ethicists. 
Nevertheless, it is worth wondering why anyone would think that causal 
histories make a moral difference. So when do we care about causal histories? 
And what would embracing such a view look like? 
Imagine a scenario in which one mouse fetus receives a stem-cell 
transplant from a dolphin and another mouse fetus receives a stem-cell 
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transplant from a human. Now, imagine that both of the mice acquire some 
new characteristic as a result of the transplant and that the new 
characteristics of the two mice are identical to each other. For example, they 
can both reason. Given the idea that causal histories make a moral 
difference, the fact that one characteristic came about as a result of a dolphin 
transplant but that the other capacity came about as a result of a human 
transplant can make a difference as to how we ought to judge the moral 
status of each mouse, even though the acquired characteristics are exactly 
the same.  
This seems counterintuitive. So why would anyone hold such a view? 
Well, as it turns out, judging identical characteristics differently in virtue of 
their distinctive causal histories is fairly common in disciplines outside of the 
moral domain. Consider a few examples. First, artistic replicas of famous 
paintings are done with such precision—some even during the same time 
period as the original—that there is no method available to tell them apart. 
Yet only one of the paintings is worth a fortune—not because of any 
difference in their characteristics, since the two are exactly alike, but because 
of who painted it. Second, in medicine, illnesses are often categorized 
according to their causes, i.e., the etiology of the illness. Migraine headaches, 
for example, may be caused by vasospasm of cerebral arteries or by 
vasoconstriction of the innervated vascular system. Each mechanism can lead 
to the aura experienced during a migraine, but knowing the etiology of 
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migraines is critical for their cure and prevention. Third, geological history is 
important for distinguishing lithological properties. Basalt and Troctolite are 
two kinds of igneous rocks that can look exactly identical. Usually, geologists 
can tell the two rocks apart by their crystal size: Basalt has smaller crystals 
than Troctolite, because it tends to cool faster. But on occasion, the two rocks 
can cool at exactly the same rate and thus have exactly the same crystal size. 
Moreover, both rocks are abundant in olivine and plagioclase, which means 
that looking at their mineral composition will not help make the distinction. 
In such a scenario, the causal history of the rocks is the only way by which 
geologists can tell them apart.3 Fourth, in cognitive ethology, the causal 
mechanism behind the same trait observed in two different species can affect 
how the trait will be categorized:  
The naturalist who studies animals in their natural 
surroundings must resort to other methods. His main source of 
inspiration is comparison. Through comparison he notices both 
similarities between species and differences between them. 
Either of these can be due to one of two sources. Similarity can 
be due to affinity, to common descent; or it can be due to 
convergent evolution. (Tinbergen, 1963, p. 421)  
 
Distantly related species subject to similar selection pressures may end up 
with traits that are more alike than the traits of closely related species that 
had dissimilar selection pressures. For example, cognitive and behavioral 
abilities that were once considered exclusively human have been noted across 
some of our more distant relatives, e.g., imitation skills in domestic dogs 
                                                          
3 Thanks to Matt Mosdell for this example. 
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(Kaminski, Call, & Fischer, 2004; Range, Viranyi, & Huber, 2007), category 
formation in African gray parrots (Pepperberg & Wilcox, 2000), as well as tool 
manufacture and use by New Caledonian crows (Chappell & Kacelnik, 2002). 
Whether these traits are produced by mechanisms similar to the ones found 
in humans, mechanisms that may have come about as a result of similar 
selection pressures, for example, will influence how these traits are to be 
categorized.4 Fifth, and finally, in the courtroom, the causal history behind 
identical outcomes is critical for determining the severity of each crime, e.g., 
a premeditated crime is considered more severe than, say, manslaughter. 
 What these examples illustrate is that judging identical characteristics 
by their causal histories is practiced across disciplines. Of course, this might 
be a peculiarity of disciplines operating outside of the moral domain. Thus, in 
order to really see if the view has any merit, we need an example where two 
characteristics are identical but where differences in causal history make a 
difference to our moral judgment of each. Michael Thompson‟s account of “life 
forms” and John Searle‟s account of “intentionality” are the right kinds of 
examples. What I am going to do next is show why Thompson and Searle 
think that causal history should influence our moral judgment. Once I have 
done that, I will argue that their arguments are unconvincing.   
 
                                                          
4 Tinbergen (1963) thought that a comprehensive categorization of a given behavior required 
knowledge of three additional causes: 1) ontogeny (or development); 2) adaptive significance 
(or adaptive function); and 3) phylogeny (or evolutionary history). 
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Michael Thompson‟s Argument for Causal  
Histories Making a Moral Difference 
Thompson sets out to compare the characteristics of species, or “life 
forms,” in order to draw some normative conclusions about them. To avoid 
the objection that “life form” is not a category from which one can derive an 
“ought”—since it is a biological rather than a normative category—Thompson 
argues that life form is not a biological category, “The concept life form is a 
pure or a priori, perhaps a logical, concept” (Thompson, 2004, p. 11). Contrary 
to popular empiricist opinion, Thompson argues that the concept of a life 
form, e.g., human, is not observation-dependent. His argument for this claim 
comes in the form of examples. The examples are designed to illustrate the 
limits of empiricism—that is, to show that the way we reason about life forms 
goes beyond mere observation.  
 The first example is about umbrella jellies. Thompson asks us to 
imagine a scientist studying this particular life form, making various 
observations about it as she comes across more and more samples. She then 
begins to form judgments about the umbrella jelly, the kind of judgments we 
might hear on a nature documentary show. “The umbrella jellies have 144 
tentacles” she tells us. But while our scientist has studied the life form 
through observation, her judgments about it are not a synopsis of what she 
saw. They are not about “what is always or mostly or even often the case with 
jellies of this kind” (Thompson, 2004, p. 4). One hundred and forty-four has 
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probably never been the average number of tentacles the mature umbrella 
jelly has had. As Thompson acknowledges, Anscombe (1958) has made the 
same point about human teeth. We are often told that human beings have 32 
teeth, but it certainly is not true that every human being has 32 teeth—some 
of us have more and some have less. Thirty-two is also not a statistical 
average for humans since the number of humans with fewer than 32 teeth is 
greater than the number with more. Nonetheless, it is true that humans have 
32 teeth. It is also true that umbrella jellies have 144 tentacles. Each 
statement captures something that is true about each life form yet is not 
based on observational data. 
 Thompson‟s second example of how our reasoning about life forms 
extends beyond empiricism is about reproduction. If we compare the division 
of an amoeba and the division of a human cell we find that they have much in 
common. The chromosomes are copied, the nucleus splits in two, the cell‟s 
organelles arrange themselves symmetrically, etc. In each case, the outcome 
seems metaphysically mysterious. Olson, for example, has proposed that 
when an amoeba divides it ceases to exist: 
Clearly there are exactly two amoebas after the division, and the 
original amoeba cannot be identical with both. And nothing 
could make the original amoeba identical with one of its 
daughters but not the other, for its relation to each is the same. 
Neither does the amoeba become something other than an 





Human cell division, as amoeba division, is equally metaphysically 
mysterious. When we study the pages of an introductory biology text, the 
essentials of both cell divisions are the same. But what is being reproduced in 
each case? Thompson thinks the a priori judgment reveals itself in the 
answer to that question, “while amoeba division is reproduction of amoeba-
kind, human cell division is not the reproduction of humankind” (Thompson, 
2004, p. 17). In other words, we do not think of the human kind as 
reproducing with each cell division but we do of amoeba kind. Once again, our 
judgment goes beyond empirical facts since there is nothing in the process of 
cell division that would lead us to this conclusion. Our application of the 
concept of reproduction is “everywhere implicitly mediated by an appeal to 
the underlying life form which the individual exemplifies” (Ibid.) According to 
Thompson, the fact that we appeal to the concept of a life form in order to 
draw conclusions about reproduction of a given kind, shows that our 
reasoning is not merely empirical but a priori.   
 The point of Thompson‟s two examples is to argue that the concept of a 
life form, including that of Homo sapiens, is not merely biological. That is not 
to say that Thompson is dismissive of the work of taxonomists. He 
acknowledges that they provide us with “a record either of history or of the 
similarities that the history explains” (Thompson, 2008, p. 67) but he 
nonetheless thinks that simply thinking of individuals in terms of life forms 
precedes any judgment of similarity or of a shared history. It is important to 
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keep in mind that Thompson is not interested in the metaphysics of life forms 
but in how we reason and come to various conclusions about them, “I think 
the question should not be: What is a life-form, a species, a psuche?, but: How 
is such a thing described?” (Thompson, 2008, p. 62) Thompson thinks that the 
way we talk about life forms reveals something about the way we reason 
about them. For example, the sentences used by the narrator of a nature 
documentary always take a particular form, “The S is (or has, or does) F” 
(Thompson, 2008, pp. 64-65). Thompson calls these judgments natural 
historical judgments, e.g., the umbrella jelly (S) has 144 tentacles (F). He 
thinks there is an important difference between the structure of these 
judgments and other types of judgment, e.g., “some S is F, all S‟s are F” and 
“most S‟s are F” or indeed “any S is F in normal circumstances, or ceteris 
paribus” (Thompson, 2008, p. 73). In the case of the latter type of judgment, F 
is attached to an individual variable as a property of individuals who belong 
to S. Conversely, what is expressed in natural historical judgment is a 
person‟s “interpretation or understanding of the life-form shared by the 
members of that class” (Thompson, 2008, p. 73). 
 Our language allows us to express natural historical judgments in 
slightly different forms, e.g., “S‟s are F” or “It belongs to an S to be F,” but a 
common noun (S) and some predicative expression (F) are always present. 
Thompson thinks that the rest of the sentence, “the other linking 
expressions—the definite article, the bare plural—are part of the context” 
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(Thompson, 2008, pp. 64-65). His reference to context is, again, a reference to 
the a priori nature of natural historical judgments. When we make 
judgments about life forms we “look to a wider context” (Thompson, 2008, p. 
55). If predators had destroyed the wings of a dragonfly or a sparrow so they 
were never actually used in flight, the left over stumps would still be wings. 
Why? Because judgments about wings are not judgments about the actual 
material constitution. Rather, the concept of a wing is “implicitly mediated by 
an appeal to the underlying life form which the individual exemplifies” 5 
(Thompson, 2004, p. 17). Thompson makes a similar point about acorns. 
When we identify something as an acorn we do not make that judgment 
simply by looking at the material lump in front of us. By thinking of the 
acorn as a seed we have already “looked to a wider context.” Hence, the look 
to a wider context is “not a look to the left and right.” Instead, Thompson 
compares it to a “practice” in Rawls, where the description of an individual as 
“stealing a base” or “striking out” is available only given the practice of 
baseball (Thompson, 2008). While for Rawls, the wider context is a practice, 
for Thompson it is a life form.  
Thompson thinks that within natural historical judgments there is a 
subgroup of judgments called judgments of natural goodness and badness.  
                                                          
5 Thompson is under the impression that identifying something as a wing is done by 
reference to its particular life form. However, this is not always the case. When a fossil is 
found and its life form is unknown, a particular body part may be identified as a wing, as 
opposed to a fin for example, by reference to other life forms with similar body parts. 
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Recall, that most judgments made by the narrator of a nature documentary 
take the form “The S is F” but some judgments—judgments of natural 
goodness or badness—might be about defects or deformities found in 
individual members of a particular life form. Given the proposition “The S is 
F” the narrator may infer “This S is defective in that it is not F” (Thompson, 
2008, pp. 80-81). Here, she may show images of an individual jelly missing a 
tentacle or with a mouth that is malfunctioning.  She may use words like 
“bad” or “defective” to describe this jelly. Such natural historical judgments 
are normative and it is the particular life form that sets the normative 
standard. The content of these judgments, unlike their form, may vary 
depending on life form. What counts as sound or defective in an umbrella 
jelly may differ from what counts as good or bad in other jellies, and still 
more in oak trees, bacteria, or tigers (Thompson, 2004). Moreover, judgments 
of natural goodness and badness about people, e.g., this person is imprudent, 
are simply judgments of soundness and defect as they apply to our particular 
life form, “The judgments in which I criticize the actions of individual persons 
as unjust or imprudent, or criticize the people themselves as unjust or 
imprudent people, will thus be special forms of what I called judgments of 
natural goodness or badness” (Thompson, 2004, p. 13). Judgments of natural 
goodness or badness are, thus, grounded in norms of behavior particular to 
each life form. I can judge my friend‟s actions to be good based on what it 
means for human beings to flourish but I cannot make the same judgment of 
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another species.  For example, I cannot judge a praying mantis as bad for 
biting off her partner‟s head after mating, because human norms of behavior 
do not apply to nonhuman animals.   
 The fact that our judgments of natural goodness and badness do not 
apply to praying mantes is a point about scope. Thompson thinks that we 
rarely question the form of generality contained in our moral principles, e.g., 
“it is impermissible to do A” or “one has reason to do B” (Thompson, 2004, p. 
15), but, in fact, the highest form of generality that can be attached to such 
claims is a life form. In humans, for example, when we criticize someone as 
unjust or imprudent we make a judgment about “the supposed goodness and 
badness of the operations of will and practical reason that would be exhibited 
in the action judged” (Thompson, 2004, p. 13). Thompson does not think such 
judgments apply across life forms, i.e., what is imprudent for one life form 
may be prudent for another, because what makes for a good will and a good 
practical reasoning is determined by the life form to which an individual 
belongs: 
Knowledge of what counts as a good sight, or as a sound capacity 
to move, is thus substantive knowledge of the specific life form 
in question…our fundamental practical evaluative knowledge is, 
as we have seen, substantive knowledge of what makes for a 
good will and good practical reason in a specifically human 
being. What would be a virtue in the bearers of another 
intelligent life form we don‟t know. We have no more insight into 
what would count as a „reason for action‟ among Martians, for 
example, than we have into what would make for good eyesight 
among them, supposing they have eyes. The mind goes blank at 
the approach of the question. (Thompson, 2004, pp. 13-14) 
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It is not merely the case that standards of practical reason that apply to 
humans do not apply to nonhumans. Rather, it is that we cannot even make 
sense of what would count as a good reason for action for creatures of a life 
form other than our own (Kadlac, 2009).  
This is where Thompson breaks away from the Kantian conception of 
practical rationality. Kant thought that moral principles are grounded in 
reason and thus, apply unconditionally to all rational creatures, regardless of 
life form: 
It may be added that unless we wish to deny to the concept of 
morality all truth and all relation to possible object, we cannot 
dispute that its law is of such widespread significance as to hold, 
not merely for men, but for all rational beings as such—not 
merely subject to contingent conditions and exceptions, but with 
absolute necessity. (Kant, 1964, p. 76) 
 
Reason, for Kant, is the only thing that can transcend desire. Thus, the moral 
law, as it applies to rational beings, is not “subject to contingent conditions 
and exceptions.” Rather, a morally good action is an action that we have 
reason to do regardless of what we happen to want, humans and nonhumans 
alike. “We ought never…to make principles depend on the special nature of 
human reason” (Kant, 1964, p. 79).  
 As Thompson points out, Kant thought that principles of sound 
practical reasoning applied indifferently to “humans, twin earthers, and 
Martians alike” (Thompson, 2004, p. 14). In contrast, Thompson, thinks that 
even if both humans and Martians could reason, and their reasons were  
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qualitatively the same, a human reason for acting would be different from a 
Martian‟s. He makes the same point about „twin humans,‟ creatures “exactly 
similar to us, living on a planet, Twin Earth, that developed independently of 
ours, but that nevertheless came to be like Earth in any respect you care to 
mention” (Thompson, 2004, p. 12). Thompson thinks that these twin humans 
would be bearers of a different life form, even if we could not tell us and them 
apart. Given the differences in our life forms, our judgments of natural 
goodness and badness, as they apply to bearers of the human life form, would 
not apply to twin humans.   
Thompson is opposed to equating the two life forms based on their 
material constitution—seeing as their material constitution is the same—
because doing so would make the concept of a life form merely analytic: 
They are on all account properly „twin humans‟, their form is not 
human form but twin human form. The anatomical, 
pathological, and cardiological textbooks published up there may 
say exactly the same things as ours do, and the diagrams may 
look exactly the same, but their treatises are speaking of and 
diagramming something else. Any other view would make the 
content of the treatises analytic. (Thompson, 2004a, p. 361) 
 
How does one make sense of all of this? If twin humans and humans have all 
the same properties—insofar as we could not tell them apart—yet, at the 
same time, the concept of a life form is not analytic, what content are we to 
use for discriminating between life forms? For Thompson, the answer is the 
natural history of each life form. “The concept human…is a concept that 
attaches to a definite product of nature, one which has arisen on this planet, 
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quite contingently, in the course of evolutionary history” (Thompson, 2004, p. 
12). An individual falling under the concept of red oak, Martian, human, twin 
human, etc., is always a matter of “falling into a single, naturalistically 
intelligible, trait-transmitting historical succession” (Thompson, 2004a, p.  
366). This is the way in which we understand the category of a life form as it 
is found in nature, “a thing‟s coming under this form or universal arises 
through the operation of prior bearers of the form—that is, through 
reproduction or habituation” (Thompson, 2004a, p. 366). Thus, Thompson 
grants that the way humans turned out is a contingent fact of evolution, but 
he also argues that the way humans turned out is “no accident” at all, insofar 
as the human life form is a product of a specific shared evolutionary history, 
one that, by definition, could not have been shared with any other life form. 
Thus, for Thompson, normative judgments of the natural goodness or 
badness of a given characteristic will vary depending on the causal history of 
the life form to which the characteristic belongs.  
 
John Searle‟s Argument for Causal Histories  
Making a Moral Difference 
I have now shown why Thompson thinks that causal histories should 
influence our moral judgment. Now, let me show why Searle agrees. Unlike 
Thompson, who is interested in comparing various characteristics across life 
forms, Searle is interested in comparing only one characteristic: 
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intentionality. Intentionality is a morally relevant characteristic because of 
its ties to autonomy. An individual cannot act of her own free will unless she 
can act intentionally. In a classic paper, Searle (1980) argues that computers, 
unlike brains, do not have “the right causal powers” for generating 
intentionality. What accounts for the difference between brains having 
intentionality and computers not having it, according to Searle, is not the 
formal structure of the brain—since the brain‟s organization could be 
paralleled in a computer—but the actual stuff that the brain is made of, e.g., 
neurons, axons, etc. “Whatever else intentionality is, it is a biological 
phenomenon, and it is as likely to be as causally dependent on the specific 
biochemistry of its origins as lactation, photosynthesis, or any other biological 
phenomena” (Searle, 1980, pp. 382-383). Searle grants that he might be the 
instantiation of a number of computer programs but, nonetheless, what 
allows him to have intentions is the fact that the programs are instantiated 
in an organism with a particular chemical and physical structure, “and this 
structure, under certain conditions, is causally capable of 
producing…intentional phenomena” (Searle). Only the right causal history, 
i.e., a biological one, can bring about intentionality:  
“Could a machine think?” 
The answer is obviously, yes. We are precisely such machines. 
“Yes, but could an artifact, a man-made machine, think?” 
Assuming it is possible to produce artificially a machine with a 
nervous system, neurons with axons and dendrites, and all the 




seems to be obviously, yes. If you can exactly duplicate the 
causes, you could duplicate the effects. (Searle, 1980, p. 380) 
 
Searle thinks that if two effects are identical, e.g., if both a human and a 
computer can pass the Turing test, we ought to judge the effects differently 
because of what gave rise to each one. If the cause were biological then the 
effect was intentional, otherwise it was not. What follows from this is that 
given the right causal history, a characteristic can be within the scope of 
moral judgment, otherwise it cannot.  
 
Problems with Thompson‟s and Searle‟s Arguments 
I have now shown why both Thompson and Searle think that the 
distinct causal histories of identical characteristics can rightly influence our 
moral judgment of each. However, I will now show why both of their 
arguments fail, and why changes to the causal history are morally irrelevant 
when these changes do not affect the moral characteristic in question. 
Thompson has argued that what makes for a good will and good practical 
reasoning extends only to individuals who share the same natural history, 
e.g., Homo sapiens. Now, to some extent I agree with Thompson. Insofar as 
our shared evolutionary history has had a profound effect on how we reason, 
it makes sense for him to say that the standards by which we judge an 
individual good or bad are species dependent. In other words, he is right to 




mantis, that do not share the evolutionary history that made us who we are 
today. The problem, however, is that proximate causes, such as gene 
mutations, can override the effects of a shared evolutionary history. For 
example, some humans are born with a severe mental handicap and thereby 
lack the ability to reason. Now, on Thompson‟s account, our judgments of 
natural goodness and badness should also extend to these individuals, since 
they are of the same life form as the rest of us. But how can we hold such 
individuals morally accountable for their actions, if they lack the capacity to 
reason? It seems to me that an individual who cannot reason, whether she is 
human or not, is beyond the scope of moral responsibility. If that is right, 
then contrary to what Thompson claims, the standards by which we judge an 
individual good or bad are not life form dependent. Rather, they depend on 
the mental capacities of the individual in question—regardless of what the 
causal history of that individual happens to be. 
 In contrast to Thompson, Searle‟s argument is prone to a different kind 
of objection. Although he successfully proves that a biological causal history 
is sufficient for intentionality, he fails to prove that it is also necessary. As 
Margaret Boden (1990) argues, Searle‟s analogy between intentionality and 
photosynthesis does not work, because while we can identify the products of 
photosynthesis and show how these differ from other biochemical products, 
our definition of intentionality is still philosophically controversial—we 
cannot even confidently identify it when we see it. Thus, Searle is right to say 
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that photosynthesis is causally dependent on the specific biochemistry of its 
origin, because “we not only know that chlorophyll supports photosynthesis, 
we also understand how it does (and why various other chemicals cannot)” 
(Boden, 1990, p. 92). Yet when it comes to intentionality, this thinking is not 
quite right. Why? Because intentionality is poorly understood; we hardly 
have a theory of it, let alone knowledge of how it is generated. Since we lack 
this kind of knowledge, we cannot successfully prove that biological causes 
are necessary for intentionality and consequently, Searle cannot be right. In 
sum, Searle‟s argument falls short of proving that a difference in causal 
histories amounts to a difference in our moral judgment of the effects.  
 
Argument for Causal Histories Making a Moral Difference 
Since neither Thompson nor Searle argue successfully for the 
conclusion that causal histories make a moral difference, thus far it looks like 
our moral judgment of Sagoff‟s mice should be the same regardless of any 
differences in their causal histories. In fact, to favor mice with the human 
cells simply because the cells are human would make us prone to Singer‟s 
“speciesist” objection. However, this does not mean that we should ignore 
causal histories all together. While Sagoff is right to point out that causal 
history is morally irrelevant to the ontological moral status of the animal, he does 
not point out that causal history is epistemically relevant to our ability to detect an 
animal‟s moral status. What I aim to show now, is that causal histories can be 
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morally informative when making a certain kind of inference—namely, an 
inference by analogy. 
Arguments by analogy are often used to help solve the epistemological 
problem of inferring the mental states of others without having access to 
them. Since mental states are private experiences, and nonhuman organisms 
cannot directly communicate their mental states to us, arguments by analogy 
are used as a substitute. The arguments typically start with a premise about 
what we already know. For example, in humans we know that mental 
capacity X is correlated with the property (or set of properties) Z. Therefore, 
by analogy, if other organisms exhibit the property (or set of properties) Z, we 
can infer that they also have the mental capacity X. Typically, there are two 
types of properties invoked in arguments by analogy: behavioral properties or 
neurological properties. The following is an example of an argument by 
analogy that invokes behavioral properties. In humans, we know that the 
mental capacity to feel pain is correlated with a protective motor reaction. 
For instance, if we experience pain in our hand after an electric shock, we 
have a protective motor reaction to pull back our hand.  By analogy, then, if 
we see a nonhuman organism pull back its appendage after an electric shock, 
we can infer that the organism also has the mental capacity to feel pain.  
However, behavioral similarity can sometimes lead to false inferences. 
At the beginning of the 20th century, Charles Sherrington (1906) 
demonstrated that a protective motor reaction does not always provide 
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evidence that the animal is in pain. Sherrington transected the brainstem of 
animals, at the level of the midbrain, so that subcortical structures and the 
cortex no longer received input from the spinal cord. Although the forebrains 
of these animals were no longer receiving input from the periphery, 
behavioral responses to noxious stimuli were nonetheless observed.  More 
recent experiments have shown that rats whose spinal cords are severed 
continue to respond to an electric shock applied to their hind legs (Grau, 
Barstow, & Joynes, 1998) and pinching the tail of a spinally transected cat 
will promote stepping movements of the hind limbs, demonstrating that 
simple escape movements can occur without pain (Lovely, Gregor, Roy, & 
Edgerton, 1986). Moreover, turning the head and neck toward the noxious 
stimuli, licking of affected paws and even vocalization can occur in 
decerebrate animals (Baliki, Calvo, Chialvo, & Apkarian, 2005; King, Devine, 
Vierck, Rodgers, & Yezierski, 2003; Sherrington, 1906).  
In response to his findings, Sherrington coined the term nociception 
(from Latin nocere meaning “to harm”).  Currently, nociception is defined as 
“the ability to detect a noxious, potentially tissue-damaging, stimulus and 
respond to it” (Elwood & Appel, 2009, p. 1243), while pain is “the associated 
unpleasant, emotional interpretation or feeling associated with the 
perception” (Elwood & Appel, 2009, p. 1243). To determine whether animals 
can experience pain, and not merely nociception, it is necessary to design 
experiments that bring out more than just behavioral responses to noxious 
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stimuli. Sharrington‟s discovery serves as a reminder that behavioral 
evidence is often inconclusive with respect to which mental capacity, if any, is 
associated with a given behavioral response.  
Another type of inference by analogy that can help solve the question 
of whether other organisms have mental states relies on neurological rather 
than behavioral similarity between species. The structure of the inference is 
still the same: we start with a premise about what we already know and infer 
what is likely to be the case. For example, in humans we know that the 
mental capacity to feel pain is correlated with activation of the anterior 
cingulated cortex (ACC), i.e., part of the brain‟s pain network (Farah, 2008). 
Therefore, by analogy, if other organisms exhibit activation of the ACC, we 
can infer that they also have the mental capacity to feel pain. For example, 
experiments have shown that there are many similarities between human 
brains and rat brains, as well as similarities in the way their forebrains 
respond to noxious stimuli (cf. Apkarian et al., 2006; Borsook et al., 2006; 
Borsook et al., 2007). Other vertebrates, e.g., birds, reptiles, fish, etc. have 
spinal nociceptive circuitries similar to that of humans but they do not share 
the specific forebrain regions involved in human pain (National Research 
Council, 2009). Invertebrates share even fewer similarities. The idea, then, is 
that given some neurological similarities, or lack thereof, we can make 
inferences about the mental capacities of nonhuman organisms. 
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Nevertheless, using neurological similarity to make inferences about 
the mental states of others can be problematic for a few reasons. First of all, 
we do not yet have a complete understanding of the human brain. For 
example, recent experiments show that, in humans, the ACC can be activated 
by not only pain but also stimuli of which humans are unaware (Kilgore & 
Yurgelun-Todd, 2004; Sidhu, Kern, & Shaker, 2004). Second, structural 
similarity does not guarantee functional similarity, e.g., bat wings and 
human hands are structurally similar but they function in very different 
ways (Allen & Bekoff, 1997). Finally, if a brain structure associated with 
some mental state in humans, e.g., pain, is missing in another species, we 
may not be fully entitled to infer that the species is therefore incapable of 
that mental state. In other words, different structures may be associated with 
the experience of pain in different animals. For example, behavioral tests 
revealed that decapods have vision despite lacking a human visual cortex 
(Elwood & Appel, 2009). 
In spite of these problems, Martha Farah (2008) argues that 
arguments by analogy that rely on neuroscientific evidence are more 
informative than ones that rely on behavioral evidence. The reason why is 
that the relations between mental states and brain states are “different in 
kind” from the relations between mental states and behaviors. For example, 
when my hand undergoes an electric shock, this causes me to feel pain, which 
in turn causes me to retract my hand. Hence, when I see a rat undergo an 
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electric shock and subsequently retract its legs I infer by analogy that the rat 
also feels pain. Here, the relation between the feeling of pain and retracting 
of the appendage is causal and contingent. Although it is likely that the pain 
from an electric shock will cause me to retract my hand, it is not certain that 
it will. After all, it is possible for me to act otherwise.   
Conversely, Farah argues that the relation between the feeling of pain 
and my ACC activating is neither causal nor contingent. “The predominant 
view of the relation between mental states and brain states in cognitive 
neuroscience and contemporary philosophy of mind is one of identity: mental 
states are brain states” (Farah, 2008, p. 14). According to Farah, cognitive 
neuroscientists and philosophers of mind are in agreement that ACC 
activation is identical to pain and so it cannot exist without there being pain. 
Farah argues that even the people who hold the weaker version of this view 
would agree that if we know the ACC is activated in someone‟s brain, we also 
know that the individual is in pain. This connection, unlike the connection 
between mental states and behavior, is a necessary one. Because the relation 
between mental states and brain states is that of identity, and is therefore 
noncontingent, neuroscientific evidence is qualitatively different and more 
definite from behavioral evidence. Consequently, according to Farah, 
arguments by analogy that rely on neuroscientific evidence are more 
informative than ones that rely on behavioral evidence. 
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Thus far I considered two types of arguments by analogy used to infer 
the mental states of nonhuman animals: arguments that rely on behavioral 
properties and arguments that rely on neurological similarity. Now, I want to 
propose a third kind of argument by analogy that relies on genetic/cellular 
properties. To assess the mental capacities of a part-human organism, one 
might use the following argument by analogy. In humans, we know that 
mental capacity X is correlated with gene(s) or cell(s) Z. Therefore, if gene(s) 
or cell(s) Z are implanted into a nonhuman organism, we can infer that the 
organism will also express mental capacity X. Thus, for example, in humans 
we know that mental capacities are correlated with human neurons. 
Therefore, if human neurons are implanted into a nonhuman organism, we 
can infer that the organism will also express human mental capacities. Of 
course, Z and X can be more specific but the general idea is the same. What, 
then, is the relationship between genes/cells and mental capacities? First, 
genes and cells are not identical to mental states; rather, they can “give rise” 
to mental states via brain states. Hence, the relationship is a causal one. 
Moreover, the causal relationship between genes/cells and mental capacities, 
just as the causal relationship between behavior and mental capacities, is 
contingent. As I argued in the last chapter, depending on the circumstances, 
the transferred genes and cells may or may not give rise to a given mental 
capacity. In other words, there is no necessary connection between genes/cells 
and mental capacities.  
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 Nevertheless, I take it that a weaker form of inference by analogy can 
still be used to draw conclusions about the mental capacities of part-human 
organisms. The argument might look something like this. In humans, we 
know that mental capacity X is correlated with gene(s) or cell(s) Z. Gene(s) or 
cell(s) Z are implanted into a nonhuman organism. The nonhuman organism 
is more likely to also have mental capacity X—at least more likely than if the 
gene(s) or cell(s) Z came from an organism that lacks mental capacity X. 
Hence, if we know that the genes or cells transplanted into a mouse came 
from a human who has evolved the capacity to reason, then we can infer that 
the mouse is more likely to also acquire the capacity, at least more likely 
than a mouse who receives genes or cells from an animal that lacks the 
capacity. Now, this argument is somewhat weaker than arguments by 
analogy that rely on neurological or behavioral evidence. Nonetheless, I 
believe it should still inform our judgment regarding the moral status of part-
human organisms. Here is how. 
 Previously, I established that moral status is attached to mental 
characteristics. From this I concluded that if the morally relevant 
characteristics of Sagoff‟s mice are identical, then the moral status of the 
mice should be the same, regardless of how the characteristics were acquired. 
Unfortunately, however, it is not always easy to figure out who has and does 
not have morally relevant characteristics. Consider a spectrum: at one end 
are morally relevant capacities that are easy to test for, at the other end are 
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morally relevant capacities that are very difficult to detect. Pain, for example, 
might be at the “easy” end of the spectrum. Of course, even pain is not so easy 
to detect since behavioral cues may be a sign of nociception rather than pain. 
However, as I mentioned previously, invasive experiments may be conducted 
to rule out one or the other. Conversely, the “hard” end of the spectrum might 
contain morally relevant capacities that are almost impossible to detect, e.g., 
intentionality. If an individual claims that she intended to do something but 
then fails to do it, it is very hard to determine whether she failed to have the 
intention or whether she failed to have the will to carry out what she 
intended to do.  
The point, then, is that knowing whether the implanted genes or cells 
came from an individual who has evolved some “hard” to test for capacity 
may help us make more accurate judgments regarding that organism‟s moral 
status. After all, the relationship between genes/cells and mental capacities 
may be contingent but it is nonetheless causal. Hence, if a cell that was 
implanted into a mouse came from an elephant that we know has the 
capacity to feel empathy (see for example Bates et al., 2008), and if it turns 
out that empathy is a morally relevant capacity that is difficult to test, then 
we should take this into consideration when making judgments about the 
moral status of the mouse. On the other hand, if the cells implanted into a 
mouse came from an organism that we know lacks the capacity to feel 
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empathy then, again, that consideration should influence our judgment of the 
moral status of that mouse.  
In sum, the causal history behind an acquired characteristic of a 
mouse may be epistemically morally relevant because it can provide evidence 
about what inferences are justified regarding the acquired characteristic. 
This is in contrast to Sagoff‟s earlier point. Nevertheless, Sagoff is right to 
say that causal history is morally irrelevant to the ontological moral status of the 
animal. Given this distinction in the role of causal history in informing our 
moral judgments, we can conclude that the origin of cells implanted into an 




I started this chapter with a literature review of arguments made by 
ethicists troubled by the possible creation of mice with human characteristics. 
The worry of these ethicists is that conferring humanity onto mice might 
entitle them to an upgrade in moral status. But holding such a belief makes 
one a speciesist, according to Singer. Singer is opposed to giving preferential 
treatment to humans over nonhumans and instead favors a version of the 
person/nonperson view of moral status. On this view, a person is someone 
with characteristics that we believe to be morally relevant, e.g., the ability to 
feel pain, and insofar as one has these characteristics, one can be a person 
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even if one is not human. Given this distinction, it may seem that a 
proponent of the personhood view would find the humanness of part-humans 
irrelevant to how we ought to judge their moral status. After all, if being 
human does not matter for being a person, why care about how human 
something is? This is the problem Sagoff has raised. Is the causal history of 
an acquired characteristic, e.g., whether it came about as a result of a dolphin 
or a human transplant, morally irrelevant?  Although Thompson and Searle 
have argued in favor of causal histories making a moral difference, I found 
neither of their arguments convincing. Consequently, I argued that causal 
history is morally irrelevant to the ontological moral status of the animal, but 
















 I want to end with a summary of the dissertation. I began with a brief 
history of xenotransplantation and showing that the idea of improving or 
prolonging life by replacing body part has a long and interesting history. For 
example, people used to believe that the qualities of one individual can be 
transferred to that of another through the exchange of blood. In Chapter 2, I 
offered an account of various transplantation experiments, starting with 
sheep blood transfusions of the 17th century, continuing to frog tissue grafts 
of the 19th century, and finally ending with ape testicle and organ transplants 
of the 20th century. Towards the end of the 20th century, the techniques used 
to transplant parts across species changed dramatically. Although scientists 
still work on improving the transplantation of blood, tissues and organs, the 
main focus of xenotransplantation shifted to genes, chromosomes, nuclei and 
eventually stem cells.  
In Chapter 3, I explained how modern part-humans are made. I 
focused on four candidates: chimeras, hybrids, cybrids and transgenics. To 
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recap, chimeras contain cell populations derived from at least two different 
zygotes of the same or different species. Currently, there are a few different 
ways to create human-nonhuman chimeras. First, human tissues and organs 
can be engrafted onto immunodeficient nonhuman animals—e.g., human 
tumors in Nude mice. Second, nonhuman organs can be transplanted into 
humans. However, since nonhuman organs tend to be rejected by humans 
(with or without immunosuppressant drugs) it is best to “humanize” the 
nonhuman donor before transplantation in order to prevent rejection. Last, 
nonhuman cells can be engrafted onto humans—e.g., porcine neurons in the 
brains of Parkinson’s patients—and conversely, human cells can be engrafted 
onto nonhuman animals—e.g., human neurons in the brains of old world 
monkeys.  
Unlike chimeras, hybrids are made by mixing gametes, i.e., sperm and 
egg, of two different species. No human-nonhuman hybrid was ever created, 
but human-nonhuman fertilized eggs have been created to test the 
fertilization capacity of human sperm, known as the “hamster test.” Yet 
another part-human candidate is the cytoplasmic hybrid, or cybrid, made by 
inserting a nucleus of a somatic cell of one species into an enucleated egg of 
another species. An enucleated egg lacks a nucleus but contains its own 
cytoplasm and mitochondrial DNA. Although scientists have attempted to 
make human-nonhuman cybrids by injecting human nuclei into enucleated 
rabbit cells, the cybrid embryos did not develop past the blastocyst stage. 
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Finally, transgenics are made by splicing sequences of foreign DNA into the 
recipient’s genome. Human-nonhuman transgenics are usually created for 
medical purposes, e.g., to secrete human proteins in their body fluids or to 
mimic human diseases.  
The next two chapters were dedicated to the central question of my 
dissertation. Are the above listed candidates part-human or merely partially 
composed of human parts? The reason why it is important to establish the 
exact humanness of these animals is that various ethical and legal 
regulations are based on the human/nonhuman distinction, e.g., patenting 
regulations and regulations for conducting research on human and 
nonhuman subjects.  
In Chapter 4, I looked at some of the ways in which philosophers have 
thought about parts and wholes to see if any of the available part/whole 
distinctions can help to distinguish animals partially composed of human 
parts from animals that are part-human. I started with mereology—a 
metaphysical theory of the relations between parts and wholes, and argued 
that it is not equipped to capture the variable and complex nature of 
organisms because of its ties to set theory. Similar to set theory, mereology 
has an Extensionality principle, which states that an object is exhaustively 
defined by its constituent parts. However, contrary to this principle, an 
animal is identical with itself even though it gains and loses parts in the 
course of its life, and an animal is not identical to its disassembled parts, 
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because, contrary to the Extensionality principle, the arrangement of parts is 
relevant to identity.  
Next, I looked at bio-ontology, which is an applied form of standard 
mereology designed to capture the variable and complex nature of biological 
entities. However, I was disappointed to discover that bio-ontologists treat 
species as classes that have law-like relations, their criteria of parthood are 
undeveloped, and their account of function is questionable. In the next 
section, I considered an intuition-based approach to parts and wholes, an 
approach that is used not only in mereology/bio-ontology but also in bioethics. 
I found two problems with the intuition-based approach. First, evidence from 
psychology suggests that when it comes to judging the relative humanness of 
part-human hybrids, our intuitions run contrary to our reasoning; and 
second, human intuitions often mislead us when we rely on them to make 
judgments about empirical facts.  
Towards the end of Chapter 4, I examined two part/whole distinctions 
often used to help categorize biologically engineered animals. The first was 
the quantitative approach, by which the degree of humanness is calculated 
via the ratio of human to nonhuman parts. I concluded that this approach is 
unlikely to be a good measure of the level of humanness found in any animal 
because of the surprising ratio of human to nonhuman cells in a typical 
human body, the high number of conserved genes among animals, and the 
complicated relation between organic wholes and their parts. The second was 
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the germ-line/soma distinction, an approach that emphasizes placement 
instead of number of human parts in the genetically engineered animal. The 
problem with this approach, however, was that while the germ-line/soma 
distinction may be well suited for examining the humanness of the offspring 
of modified animals—if the animals reproduce at all—it is not well suited for 
examining the humanness of modified animals themselves.  
Finally, in Chapter 5, I provided an approach that involves 
establishing the minimum that is required for an animal to count as part-
human. I argued that whether an animal is part-human or merely partially 
composed of human parts depends on the transposability of parts. A suitably 
transposable part is characterized by its giving rise to the same characteristic 
in both recipient and donor. I argued that a part is transposable across 
species if the following three requirements are met: 1) the right partitioning 
frame is chosen 2) part-boundaries are correctly identified and 3) contextual 
constraints are eliminated. The first two requirements ensure that the parts 
chosen for transfer in the human, e.g., human genes, chromosomes, cells, etc. 
are the ones that give rise to the target phenotype, e.g., Down syndrome. The 
last requirement ensures that differences between donor and recipient that 
could prevent transferred parts from giving rise to analogous traits in the 
recipient are eliminated.  In the first three sections, I demonstrated the force 
of each requirement with examples from current research and argued that if 
they are met, the animal has part-human potential. In the last two sections, I 
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considered possible objections to my argument and demonstrated the broad 
scope of my requirements.  
The requirements I offered in Chapter 5 have obvious practical 
applications. Research ethics committees and members of the Patenting 
Office can use my requirements to set aside submissions that involve animals 
partially composed of human parts, so that they can dedicate more time to 
the part-human candidates. However, my requirements are only useful 
insofar as our ethical and legal regulations give preferential treatment to 
humans over nonhumans. Yet, many ethicists—most famously, Peter 
Singer—have argued against the human/nonhuman distinction. Ethicists 
who oppose giving preferential treatment to humans over nonhumans tend to 
favor some version of the person/nonperson distinction, where a person has 
moral status in virtue of having characteristics that we believe to be morally 
relevant, e.g., the ability to feel pain, the ability to reason, etc. My aim in 
Chapter 6 was to consider the moral status of part-human animals from the 
standpoint of someone who holds the person/nonperson distinction instead of 
the human/nonhuman distinction. While it may seem obvious that a 
proponent of the personhood view ought to find the humanness of part-
humans irrelevant to how we ought to judge their moral status, I argued that 
this need not always be the case. Whether a morally relevant characteristic 
came about as a result of a human rather than a dolphin transplant can 
make a moral difference. In particular, although causal history is morally 
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irrelevant to the ontological moral status of the animal, I argued that it is 
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